Nichols v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
This text of 648 N.E.2d 1307 (Nichols v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendant, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Aetna), appeals from a judgment in the amount of $25,000 entered pursuant to the allowance of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action seeking underinsured motorists (“UIM”) benefits under an excess personal liability policy (excess policy). The defendant also appeals from the denial of its cross motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Brett Nichols, the minor son of Bruce and Ann Nichols, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on September 14, 1989, by a tortfeasor who had $10,000 of bodily injury liabil[457]*457ity insurance. The tortfeasor’s insurer paid the plaintiffs $10,000. Alleging that Brett’s damages were in excess of $35,000, the plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the entire $25,000 UIM coverage of an excess policy which they purchased from the defendant is available to cover the damages.2
The plaintiffs were not entitled to collect under their primary automobile insurance policy with Aetna (primary policy) which provided UIM coverage of $10,000 on each of the three vehicles in the plaintiffs’ household. The language of the primary policy, set forth in the margin,3 contains the
[458]*458formula for assessing the defendant’s liability for UIM coverage. The policy also specifically details to and for whom the insurer will pay damages and the circumstances under which payment will be made.4 The definition of UIM provided by the primary policy comports with the statutory definition of an underinsured motor vehicle as set forth in G. L. c. 175, § 113L(2).5
1. UIM coverage under the primary policy. In this case, the tortfeasor had $10,000 bodily injury liability insurance, and the plaintiffs had $10,000 UIM coverage under their primary policy. The UIM provisions of the plaintiffs’ policy were, therefore, inapplicable since the tortfeasor’s $10,000 bodily injury coverage was not less than the plaintiff’s $10,000 UIM coverage. Alguila v. Safety Ins. Co., 416 [459]*459Mass. 494, 496-497 (1993).6 The tortfeasor was not underinsured within the meaning of the primary policy.7 Id. at 497.
2. UIM coverage under the excess policy. The plaintiffs’ excess policy conditions the defendant’s obligation to pay on the plaintiffs’ right to recover from the “owner or operator of an uninsured auto or an underinsured auto.” Applying the statutory definition, the tortfeasor’s vehicle is deemed to be underinsured if the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability coverage is less than the plaintiffs’ underinsurance coverage. See G. L. c. 175, § 113L, supra note 5. As the excess policy is a personal liability policy,8 and not an automobile insurance policy, the tortfeasor’s status as an underinsured driver must be determined by comparing the plaintiffs’ total underinsurance coverage with the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability [460]*460coverage.9See Connolly v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 932, 935 (Me. 1983) (stacking injured party’s UIM coverage provided by two policies and comparing combined UIM coverage with tortfeasor’s coverage to determine tortfeasor’s status as underinsured). Accordingly, the tortfeasor in this case is underinsured since the tortfeasor’s $10,000 bodily injury liability insurance is less than the plaintiffs’ $35,000 underinsurance coverage ($25,000 under the excess policy and $10,000 under the primary policy). The plaintiffs, therefore, have a right to recover under the underinsurance provisions of the excess policy.
The defendant claims that the offset provision of the primary policy, which limits the defendant’s liability for any “unpaid damages up to the difference between the total amount collected from the automobile bodily injury liability insurance covering the owner and operator of the auto and the [UIM] limits” under the primary policy, is incorporated by reference into the excess policy.10 As the defendant would have us read the excess policy, the defendant’s potential liability would be limited to $15,000 ($25,000 UIM limit of the excess policy less the $10,000 bodily injury liability insurance received from the tortfeasor). The plain language of the excess policy, however, provides that the defendant will pay the amount of the plaintiffs’ loss (allegedly in excess of $35,000) less the total amount of insurance recovered under any other UIM or automobile liability insurance ($10,000 from the tortfeasor) to the extent of the $25,000 policy limit. See Ja[461]*461cobs v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 417 Mass. 75, 77 (1994), quoting from Hanover Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 405 Mass. 1101, 1101 (1989) (“[Wjhere the words of an insurance contract are ‘plain and free from ambiguity they must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense’ ”). In any event, the primary policy contains a similar provision which requires reducing the plaintiffs’ damages by “the amount recovered from any legally responsible person.” Both provisions result in the defendant’s potential liability of $25,000 under the excess policy. We conclude that the defendant’s liability under the excess policy is determined by the express terms of the excess policy’s coverage provision and that the offset provision of the primary policy is inapplicable.
3. Conclusion. The judgment of the Superior Court for the plaintiffs against the defendant in the amount of $25,000 is vacated.11 A new judgment should be entered declaring that the defendant is potentially liable for the entire $25,000 UIM coverage limit under the excess policy, but that a determination of the defendant’s liability will depend upon the plaintiffs’ proof of actual damages.
So ordered.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
648 N.E.2d 1307, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 456, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nichols-v-aetna-casualty-surety-co-massappct-1995.