MEMORANDUM OF DECISION FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BLUMENFELD, District Judge:
In this case the plaintiffs challenge the validity of the six month residence requirement imposed by Connecticut on persons seeking to register to vote in the town where they reside as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. This claim states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction is properly laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
I.
The named plaintiffs, former residents and registered voters in West Hartford, Connecticut, moved to Hartford, Connecticut, on January 17, 1972. More than thirty days later, their applications for admission as electors in Hartford were denied on the ground that they did not satisfy the six month durational residence requirement imposed by the Connecticut Constitution, Art. VI, §§ 1 and 9,
and Conn.Gen. Stats. § 9-12.
They have instituted this suit, on behalf of themselves and all other “adult residents of Hartford, Connecticut who have resided in said town less than six months and who are otherwise qualified for admission as electors in the Town of Hartford, Connecticut.” The court finds that the class as so defined satisfies the requirements of Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) (2).
Although the named plaintiffs
changed their residence only intrastate, there is a similar state requirement of six months town residence for admission as an elector in local elections which applies to persons who have moved to Connecticut from outside the state.
II.
The defendants, state and local election officials,
request the court to dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust state administrative remedies. Exhaustion of state remedies is not required in a suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, “where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court.” King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). It would be wholly unrealistic to expect a Board for Admission of Electors, see Conn.Gen.Stats. § 9-44, to rule squarely contrary to the state’s constitutional and statutory commands. See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). The defendants also urge dismissal on the ground of mootness on the premise that the named plaintiffs will have become eligible for admission as electors prior to any impending elections. However, prior to July 17, 1972, when their residence in Hartford will be of six months duration and they will become eligible to register as voters in Hartford, the plaintiffs will be deprived of other political rights.
So long as the present system remains in effect the problem is one which is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” as noted in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1494, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 n. 2 (1972). The case is not moot.
III.
Whether a state has the power to impose a six month durational residence requirement on the right of a citizen to vote is no longer an open constitutional question. In Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra,
405 U.S. at 337, 92 S.Ct. at 1000, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.” In testing whether the State of Tennessee had denied newly arrived citizens equal protection by its durational residence requirement, the Court applied the rule that a state must show a compelling interest
to justify a restriction on access to the right to vote, 405 U.S. at 330, 331, 92 S.
Ct. 995, and held that Tennessee’s constitutional and statutory requirement of one year’s residence in the state and three months in the county before being qualified to vote was an invidious discrimination against new residents in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
“In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are
‘necessary
to promote a
compelling
governmental interest.’ Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. [618] at 634 [89 S.Ct. 1322, at 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600] [emphasis in original] ; Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, 395 U.S. [621] at 627 [89 S.Ct. 1886 at 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583].”
In view of Dunn v. Blumstein, it is frivolous for the defendants to contend that the constitutional and statutory requirements of six months residence in a town as a condition on the right to be admitted as an elector are not unconstitutional. Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962).
The defendants have advanced one argument not discussed in Dunn v. Blumstein. They contend that with respect to new residents who have moved from within the state, there is a compelling state interest in imposing the six month residence requirement in that under Connecticut law towns have the option of conducting local municipal elections in May or November. Conn.Gen. Stats. § 9-164. The defendants assert that the
“six month residency requirements effectively prevent people from changing their residency from one town to another when the election dates are different and taking part in all of the election processes in the two towns.”
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
BLUMENFELD, District Judge:
In this case the plaintiffs challenge the validity of the six month residence requirement imposed by Connecticut on persons seeking to register to vote in the town where they reside as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. This claim states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and jurisdiction is properly laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
I.
The named plaintiffs, former residents and registered voters in West Hartford, Connecticut, moved to Hartford, Connecticut, on January 17, 1972. More than thirty days later, their applications for admission as electors in Hartford were denied on the ground that they did not satisfy the six month durational residence requirement imposed by the Connecticut Constitution, Art. VI, §§ 1 and 9,
and Conn.Gen. Stats. § 9-12.
They have instituted this suit, on behalf of themselves and all other “adult residents of Hartford, Connecticut who have resided in said town less than six months and who are otherwise qualified for admission as electors in the Town of Hartford, Connecticut.” The court finds that the class as so defined satisfies the requirements of Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) (2).
Although the named plaintiffs
changed their residence only intrastate, there is a similar state requirement of six months town residence for admission as an elector in local elections which applies to persons who have moved to Connecticut from outside the state.
II.
The defendants, state and local election officials,
request the court to dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust state administrative remedies. Exhaustion of state remedies is not required in a suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, “where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court.” King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2131, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). It would be wholly unrealistic to expect a Board for Admission of Electors, see Conn.Gen.Stats. § 9-44, to rule squarely contrary to the state’s constitutional and statutory commands. See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). The defendants also urge dismissal on the ground of mootness on the premise that the named plaintiffs will have become eligible for admission as electors prior to any impending elections. However, prior to July 17, 1972, when their residence in Hartford will be of six months duration and they will become eligible to register as voters in Hartford, the plaintiffs will be deprived of other political rights.
So long as the present system remains in effect the problem is one which is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” as noted in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1494, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 n. 2 (1972). The case is not moot.
III.
Whether a state has the power to impose a six month durational residence requirement on the right of a citizen to vote is no longer an open constitutional question. In Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra,
405 U.S. at 337, 92 S.Ct. at 1000, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.” In testing whether the State of Tennessee had denied newly arrived citizens equal protection by its durational residence requirement, the Court applied the rule that a state must show a compelling interest
to justify a restriction on access to the right to vote, 405 U.S. at 330, 331, 92 S.
Ct. 995, and held that Tennessee’s constitutional and statutory requirement of one year’s residence in the state and three months in the county before being qualified to vote was an invidious discrimination against new residents in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
“In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are
‘necessary
to promote a
compelling
governmental interest.’ Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. [618] at 634 [89 S.Ct. 1322, at 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600] [emphasis in original] ; Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, 395 U.S. [621] at 627 [89 S.Ct. 1886 at 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583].”
In view of Dunn v. Blumstein, it is frivolous for the defendants to contend that the constitutional and statutory requirements of six months residence in a town as a condition on the right to be admitted as an elector are not unconstitutional. Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962).
The defendants have advanced one argument not discussed in Dunn v. Blumstein. They contend that with respect to new residents who have moved from within the state, there is a compelling state interest in imposing the six month residence requirement in that under Connecticut law towns have the option of conducting local municipal elections in May or November. Conn.Gen. Stats. § 9-164. The defendants assert that the
“six month residency requirements effectively prevent people from changing their residency from one town to another when the election dates are different and taking part in all of the election processes in the two towns.”
This is, of course, quite true; but it does not constitute a valid reason why a bona fide new resident should not be permitted to vote in the municipal elections in the town to which he has recently moved. Furthermore, the argument is constitutionally impermissible. As Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra
at 342, 92 S.Ct. at 1003: “such laws force a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose between travel and the basic right to vote. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. [570] 582-583, [88 S.Ct. 1209, 1216-1217, 20 L.Ed.2d 138] (1968). Absent a compelling state interest, a State may not burden the right to travel in this way.”
The defendants also assert that “(t)his provision prevents the wholesale importation of voters into a town for one election, caucus or primary who would not maintain their residency once the election has been completed.”
This is nothing more than a variation of an argument struck down by the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein. There is a difference between access to the ballot in the first instance and protection against voter fraud and other irregularities in an election. There are less drastic means for preventing such evils than total deprivation of the right of all new residents to vote. The state may vigorously protect the purity of its ballot by administrative safeguards,
and its criminal law.
Tennessee’s constitutional and statutory residence requirements which are not materially different from those of Connecticut were subjected to such a thorough scrutiny and value analysis by the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein that a repetition in this case would be redundant. In a reasoned dictum in the course of its opinion the Court said:
“ . . . (thirty) days appears to be ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud —and a year, or three months, too much.” 405 U.S. at 348, 92 S.Ct. at 1006.
Since the plaintiffs resided in Hartford for more than thirty days before instituting this action against its officials, the action has not been prematurely brought.
We hold that the six month
durational
residence requirements imposed by the Connecticut Constitution, Art. VI, §§ 1 and 9 and Conn.Gen.Stats. § 9-12 do not comply with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and they are, therefore, invalid.
Enter judgment accordingly.