Nicholas Woodall v. Phoenix Police Department, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00962
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Nicholas Woodall, No. CV-21-00962-PHX-GMS

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Phoenix Police Department, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17 221); (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Case (Doc. 263), and (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for 18 Leave to File for Termination Sanctions (Doc. 290). For the reasons stated below 19 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 221) is granted in part and denied in 20 part. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 263) is denied and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave 21 to File Termination Sanctions (Doc. 290) is also denied. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On Friday October 30, 2020, at approximately 5:18 PM, the City of Phoenix (the 24 “City”) Police Department received a 9-1-1 call. The caller expressed concern because a 25 man with his face covered by a ski mask was going through the contents of a plastic trash 26 bag outside the FBI Building.1

27 1 Plaintiff asserts that the 9-1-1 caller did not identify the building as the FBI building but nevertheless acknowledges that he was engaged in protest on the sidewalk outside the 28 visitor drive entrance by the west side of the FBI building and apparently that he did have a plastic trash bag with him. (Doc. 265 at 5, 13). 1 Officers Richard Sias and Kody King (the “Officer Defendants”) responded to the 2 call, arriving approximately twenty minutes later. Both wore body cameras, which 3 produced recordings2 that were provided to the Court for consideration on summary 4 judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (holding that a court may 5 properly consider video evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and should 6 view the facts “in the light depicted by the videotape”); Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 7 485 F.3d 463, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). 8 When the Officer Defendants first saw Plaintiff from inside their vehicle, they said: 9 King: Oh. This guy. Sias: Apparently. What’s he doing. 10 King: Oh my God! Standing there with a sign. Sias: I know. 11 King: Standing on the public sidewalk. Probably I don’t know protest maybe. 12 Sias: Watch. Just watch. 13 (Ex. F at 01:01–:16; Ex. G at 01:00–:13). 14 Plaintiff was alone outside the FBI building, holding up a protest sign and wearing 15 “a mask and shades” to protect his identity. He was on the sidewalk, which runs north-to- 16 south along the street to the west side of the FBI property. The sidewalk abuts desert 17 landscaping that separates it from the circular drive and gate in front of the FBI building. 18 The building itself is further set back from the road to the northeast. Plaintiff stood near 19 the street, north of the driveway entrance to the circular drive but was not close to the 20 building or the gate. 21 While Plaintiff was standing on the public sidewalk, most of his plastic bag sat on 22 the unpaved area between the west edge of the paved sidewalk—furthest from FBI 23 property—and the curb. (Ex. F at 01:27–:31). Officer Sias was the first to engage with 24 Plaintiff, getting out of the officers’ vehicle and asking Plaintiff what he was doing. (Id. at 25 01:22–:33). The exchange between the two was civil in its entirety. Plaintiff responded 26 2 The recordings were filed non-electronically (Doc. 240) in support of Defendants’ Motion 27 for Summary Judgment, and labelled as Exhibit F—the footage from Officer Sias’s body worn camera—and Exhibit G—the footage from Officer King’s body worn camera. The 28 recordings will be cited as “(Ex. F)” and “(Ex. G)” with timestamps marking the play time of each video. 1 that he was protesting peacefully (id. at 01:33–:35) to which Officer Sias replied 2 “excellent” and asked what Plaintiff’s sign said. (Id. at 01:35–:38). Plaintiff, who had set 3 the sign down so that his message could not be seen, indicated that he did not “think it 4 matter[ed]” what the sign said and further responded that it was “no problem” because it 5 was a message to only the FBI. (Id. at 01:29–:47). 6 At this point, Officer Sias told Plaintiff that the officers were “going to have to 7 document who” they were talking to. (Id. at 01:49–:52). In response, Plaintiff asked if he 8 was doing anything illegal because he had talked to “a guy in there”—gesturing to the FBI 9 building—and had been told the sidewalk was public. (Id. at 01:58–02:06). Officer Sias 10 indicated that the sidewalk was public but that the area between the paved sidewalk and 11 the curb where his plastic bag was sitting was the FBI’s private property. (Id. at 02:06– 12 :13). Plaintiff then apologized “immensely” and moved his bag completely onto the 13 sidewalk. (Id. at 02:14–:18). 14 Officer Sias then asked if Plaintiff had ID. (Id. at 02:20). Plaintiff replied that he 15 would rather leave than provide his ID. (Id. at 02:20–:22). Officer Sias replied: “We’re 16 going to need to get your ID. It’s no problem. We just have to document who we’re talking 17 to.” (Id. at 02:23–:27). When Plaintiff responded that he did not think he had an ID on 18 him, Officer Sias asked him for his name and date of birth. (Id. at 02:28–:32). Plaintiff 19 said he did not want to provide that information unless Officer Sias could specifically prove 20 to him that there was a problem that would justify taking this information. (Id. at 02:33– 21 :42). Officer Sias responded: “You were on their property so they want you trespassed. So 22 we’re going to have to trespass you from their property.” (Id. at 02:42–:48). 23 Officer Sias again assured Plaintiff that the small parkway area between the 24 sidewalk and the curb was not public property. (Id. at 02:48–03:14). When Plaintiff asked 25 if the placement of the plastic bag on the small area between the sidewalk and the curb 26 would be considered insignificant, Office Sias replied “[n]o, not really” because “nothing’s 27 insignificant; people call us for a reason.” (Id. at 03:13–:30). When Plaintiff began to 28 1 suggest that the officers did not need to trespass him and create an issue (id. at 3:30–:50), 2 Officer Sias interrupted and said 3 It doesn’t need to be an issue. I still just gotta tell you and document it so you can’t come back on their property. Nothing 4 says that you can’t come on the sidewalk because you’re more than welcome to come on the sidewalk. But I do have to 5 document that you were on their property and they don’t want you on the property anymore. 6 7 (Id. at 03:48–04:04). As other officers began to arrive at the scene, Officer King told them 8 that Plaintiff was “protesting the FBI” and that Officer Sias was trying to get identification 9 from Plaintiff. (Ex. G at 04:22–:33). 10 After a minute or so of additional discussion between Officer Sias and Plaintiff on 11 documenting Plaintiff’s identity, Plaintiff asked if there was an issue of probable cause 12 when he was not informed that the area was FBI property and expressed concern that 13 Officer Sias was now taking his information for “something like protesting.” (Ex. F at 14 04:48–05:03). Officer Sias responded, “I am not taking your information for protesting 15 though” to which Plaintiff replied, “you’re taking my information for trespass.” (Id. at 16 05:03–:08). Officer Sias repeated “[y]ou’re more than welcome to stand here and protest, 17 more than welcome,” but told Plaintiff that he was not free to have his plastic bag in the 18 unpaved area between the sidewalk and the curb. (Id. at 05:06–:23). After a little additional 19 discussion, Officer Sias then said 20 We’re not taking any action on it. I just have to document that you’ve been told that you are not allowed on FBI property 21 anymore. That’s it. That’s all. That’s it. You’re not going to jail. Nothing’s happening but I have to document for my own 22 job okay. 23 (Id. at 05:25–:40). 24 After confirming that the discussion was being recorded Officer Sias said 25 I’m not telling you that you cannot be here protesting. That’s not what I’m saying at all. Ok? All that I’m saying is that you 26 have to give me your information so that I can document that I have told you . . . you’re not allowed to be on their property. 27 That’s what I’m telling you. Nothing says that we’re gonna all leave and you could stay right here if you’d like and do your 28 thing. 1 (Id. at 05:45–06:19) 2 Thereafter they spent several minutes discussing whether the property between the 3 sidewalk and the curb was FBI property or public property, whether Plaintiff could have or 4 should have known as much, and whether it was an abuse of power to require Plaintiff to 5 surrender his personal information for placing his bag in the area between the paved 6 sidewalk and the curb while he was protesting on the sidewalk. (Id. at 06:20–07:45). 7 During the conversation, Officer Sias repeated to Plaintiff that the property between the 8 curb and the paved sidewalk was FBI property pursuant to the Arizona Revised Statutes 9 and that the FBI wanted him trespassed for putting his bag there. (Id.). 10 Eventually, Officer Sias said to Plaintiff: “give me a minute, give me a minute okay,” 11 before instructing Officer King to speak with Plaintiff. (Id. at 07:44–:48; Ex. G at 07:43– 12 :46). Officer Sias then walked over toward his supervisors who had come to the scene, 13 turning off the audio portion of his recording. (Ex. F at 07:46–:57). Officer Sias’s audio 14 remained silenced for approximately the next fifteen minutes. (Id. at 21:41). 15 After Officer Sias left to speak to his supervisors, Officer King asked Plaintiff 16 whether Plaintiff had only been standing on the sidewalk or if he had walked onto FBI 17 property. (Ex. G at 08:04–:14). Plaintiff confirmed that he had only been standing on the 18 sidewalk. (Id. at 08:08–:14). Plaintiff and Officer King continued to have a courteous 19 conversation, during which Officer King told Plaintiff that they would have to confirm with 20 the FBI whether the area between the sidewalk and the curb was private property because 21 there was no signage. (Id. at 09:32–:42, 10:19–:32). When Plaintiff stated that he should 22 not be “burden[ed]” by having his “personal information . . . taken” just because of his 23 presence on the sidewalk, Officer King said that Plaintiff was “correct.” (Id. at 10:32–:42). 24 Plaintiff then asked if the other officers would have to find “some kind of a blueprint 25 from the City” to determine whether the area between the sidewalk and the curb was public 26 property, to which Officer King responded: “I don’t think it’s that big of a deal, man.” (Id. 27 at 10:45–:54). Officer King pointed at the area between the sidewalk and the curb, telling 28 Plaintiff that in his opinion, the “whole strip” of property between the sidewalk and the 1 curb “belongs to the City of Phoenix.” (Id. at 10:56–11:08). Plaintiff replied: “If this whole 2 strip belongs to the City of Phoenix then I wasn’t trespassing and there would be no reason 3 to take my information, correct?” (Id. at 11:08–:14). Officer King answered: “that’s what 4 it’s lookin[g] like to me” (id. at 11:14–:16), and later, repeated his opinion that neither the 5 sidewalk nor the strip of property between the sidewalk and the curb belonged to the FBI 6 (id. at 12:48–13:10). 7 When Officer Sias turned back on the audio of his body camera, one of his 8 supervisors, Sergeant Blalock, told Plaintiff that he must let pedestrians by on the sidewalk. 9 (Ex. F at 21:43–:48). Plaintiff said that he would and then asked Sergeant Blalock where 10 he should stand if he needed to let someone by. (Id. at 21:48–:58). Sergeant Blalock 11 responded: “I would step to your right,” indicating that Plaintiff should step off the 12 sidewalk and into the area between the sidewalk and the curb. (Id. at 21:57–22:03). The 13 officers then left without bringing any charges against Plaintiff. (Id. at 22:08–:10). 14 Mr. Woodall now brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action against the Officer 15 Defendants for retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights (the “First 16 Amendment Retaliation Claim”) and for wrongful detention under the Fourth Amendment 17 (the “Wrongful Detention Claim”). He also brings a Monell action against the City for 18 failure to train and appropriately supervise its officers (the “Monell Claims”). 19 DISCUSSION 20 I. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s First 21 Amendment Retaliation Claim but Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on his Wrongful Detention Claim. 22 23 A. Legal Standard 24 Police officers are qualifiedly immune from paying damage § 1983 claims to the 25 extent that “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 26 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 27 800, 818 (1982). At summary judgment, an officer may be denied qualified immunity only 28 if the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the officer “violated a federal statutory or constitutional 1 right, and (2) the unlawfulness of [the officer’s] conduct was ‘clearly established at the 2 time’” of the violation. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (quoting 3 Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). 4 In qualified immunity cases,“[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of pointing to prior case 5 law that articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to alert these officers in this case 6 that their particular conduct was unlawful.” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1223 (9th 7 Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (quoting Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 909 (9th 8 Cir. 2017)); Shooter v. Arizona, 4 F.4th 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2021) (plaintiff has burden of 9 proof to demonstrate that the right was clearly established); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 10 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (citation omitted) (“Because the focus is on whether the officer had 11 fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of 12 the law at the time of the conduct.”). A defendant asserting qualified immunity bears “no 13 analogous burden . . . to find factually on-point cases clearly establishing the lawfulness of 14 an officer’s actions” or to “come forward with precedent showing that the unlawfulness of 15 their conduct was not clearly established.” Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 708 (9th 16 Cir. 2023). 17 B. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim Survives Summary 18 Judgment. 19 Plaintiff’s allegations that the Defendants engaged in retaliatory conduct in 20 detaining Plaintiff for approximately twenty minutes and demanding his identification 21 when he was engaged in lawful protest outside the FBI building are sufficient to survive 22 summary judgment. Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of identifying a “clearly established” 23 right and that a reasonable juror could find that the Officer Defendants violated that right. 24 Wesby, 583 U.S. at 62-63. 25 1. The Right to Be Free from First Amendment Retaliation Was Clearly Established at the Time of the Events Here. 26 A year and a half prior to the events in this case, the United States Supreme Court 27 decided Nieves v. Bartlett. 587 U.S. 391 (2019). In its opinion, the Supreme Court held 28 1 that “as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from 2 subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Id. at 398. 3 To succeed in a First Amendment retaliation action against a police officer who 4 detains or arrests a plaintiff who was involved in expressive activity based on a retaliatory 5 “forbidden motive,” the plaintiff must establish either (1) that the officer did not have 6 justifiable reason to arrest or detain him or (2) that the plaintiff had been detained when 7 otherwise similarly situated individuals not involved in First Amendment activity had not 8 been detained. Id. at 398–99, 406–08 (citing other sources). 9 In most cases, which fall under the first category of cases identified in Nieves, the 10 plaintiff has the burden of establishing a lack of probable cause for an officer’s retaliatory 11 action before the plaintiff can bring a claim for retaliation. Id. at 401–02. The second 12 category reflects a significant, though narrow, exception to this general rule. Id. at 406– 13 07. A plaintiff does not have to prove a lack of probable cause if he instead “presents 14 objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not 15 engaged in the same sort of protected [conduct] had not been.” Id. 16 For example, at many intersections, jaywalking is endemic but rarely results in arrest. If an individual who has been vocally 17 complaining about police misconduct is arrested for jaywalking at such an intersection, it would seem insufficiently 18 protective of First Amendment rights to dismiss the individual’s retaliatory arrest claim on the ground that there 19 was undoubted probable cause for the arrest. 20 Id. 21 Nieves clearly establishes the extent of Plaintiff’s right to be free from retaliation 22 for his exercise of expressive activity. He has such a right either when non-retaliatory 23 grounds are insufficient to provoke the officer’s action (i.e., when the officers lack probable 24 cause), or when the officer has not taken the same adverse action against similarly situated 25 individuals not engaged in First Amendment activity despite the existence of probable 26 cause to do so. Plaintiff has overcome the qualified immunity hurdle in each case. 27 28 1 a. Defendants Had No Probable Cause to Detain Plaintiff. 2 Rather than arguing that Plaintiff’s plastic bag on the sidewalk constituted probable 3 cause for trespass, 3 Defendants merely claim that the Officer Defendants are entitled to 4 qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for not providing 5 his true full name to Officer Sias under A.R.S. § 13-2412(A). 6 Under Arizona state law, if Defendants had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry 7 stop on Plaintiff, and Plaintiff refused to provide his true full name to the officers, the 8 officers would have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for his failure to provide his true full 9 name, but only if he continued to refuse to provide it after they had advised him that doing 10 so under the circumstances was unlawful. Id. The state law at issue specifies that: 11 It is unlawful for a person, after being advised that the person’s refusal to answer is unlawful, to fail or refuse to state the 12 person’s true full name on request of a peace officer who has lawfully detained the person based on reasonable suspicion 13 that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. 14 Id. Defendants’ insistence that Plaintiff’s conduct violated this statute—to the exclusion 15 of all other bases for probable cause—is fatal to their argument. Even assuming the Officer 16 Defendants had reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was involved in criminal activity, their 17 failure to advise him that his refusal to answer was unlawful eliminates any reasonable 18 basis for probable cause. 19 It is only unlawful for a person “to fail or refuse” to provide their true full name 20 until they have been “advised that [their] refusal to answer is unlawful.” Id. That never 21 happened here. As described above, within a short time of encountering Plaintiff, Officer 22 Sias told Plaintiff that the officers had “to document who [they] talk to.” When Plaintiff 23 asked why the officers needed his information and whether he was doing anything illegal, 24 Officer Sias responded that Plaintiff’s “stuff[] [was] on the property of the FBI.” (Ex. F at 25 01:49–02:02). But, again, Defendants have not asserted qualified immunity against 26

27 3 Arizona statutes seem to suggest that any unpaved area between the paved sidewalk and the curb are also public sidewalk. “‘Sidewalk’ means that portion of a street that is between 28 the curb lines or the lateral lines of a roadway and the adjacent property lines and this is for the use of pedestrians.” A.R.S. § 28-601(24). 1 Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim on the basis that they had probable cause 2 for trespass. Plaintiff repeatedly asked why he needed to provide his ID to the officers and 3 Officer Sias repeatedly insisted that the ID was necessary for the purposes of 4 documentation and because the FBI wanted him trespassed. (Id. at 01:49–02:02, 02:17– 5 :47, 03:47–04:04, 04:45–:53; 05:00–:03, 05:21–:23). Plaintiff also repeatedly suggested 6 that it was abusive and extreme to demand his identifying information, and that doing so 7 was unnecessary under the circumstances; Officer Sias again responded that it was 8 necessary because the information needed to be documented. (Id. at 04:45–:53, 06:05–:15, 9 06:25–:31). 10 At no point did the Officer Defendants advise Plaintiff that the refusal to provide 11 his full true name would be unlawful under the circumstances. The police therefore had no 12 probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for violating A.R.S. § 13-2412(A) because the statute 13 explicitly provides that his conduct cannot be considered criminal without that prerequisite 14 advice. Because Plaintiff has shown that the record does not provide a reasonable basis 15 for probable cause to support Defendant’s only purported non-retaliatory justification, he 16 has overcome the qualified immunity hurdle. In other words, Plaintiff has demonstrated a 17 clearly established right to be free from retaliation for expressive activities and that 18 Defendants’ purported basis for probable cause was unreasonable under the circumstances. 19 b. Defendants Had No Reasonable Suspicion to Detain 20 Plaintiff 21 Here, Defendant’s lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff.4To justify a Terry 22 stop the officer “must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized 23 suspicion’ or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity. . . . Rather, reasonable suspicion exists when an 24 4 Plaintiff was detained for approximately eighteen minutes. Certainly, Defendants had the 25 right to begin a consensual conversation with Plaintiff. United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998, 1005 (2021) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 502 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). “So long as a 26 reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” Id. (quoting Bostick, 502 27 U.S. at 434 (citation modified)). But almost immediately after the encounter between Plaintiff and Officer Sias began, Officer Sias told Plaintiff he had to provide ID. At this 28 point, Defendant was not free to go, nor was he free to go until approximately eighteen minutes later when Sergeant Blalock spoke with him. 1 officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when considered with objective and 2 reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion.” United States v. 3 Montero-Camargo 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 4 original). “The requirement of particularized suspicion encompasses two elements. . . . 5 First, the assessment must be based upon the totality of the circumstances. . . . Second, 6 that assessment must arouse a reasonable suspicion that the particular person being 7 stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis 8 in original). 9 The Defendant Officers cannot demonstrate that they had reasonable suspicion to 10 justify their Terry stop of Plaintiff. When the officers first saw Plaintiff, they observed that 11 he was engaged in a protest on a public sidewalk. Plaintiff was in the vicinity of no one. 12 He was close to no building. He had not attempted to contact anyone driving onto FBI 13 property or using its circular drive; indeed, only the police used the drive during the 14 officers’ encounter with Plaintiff. Under these circumstances, neither Plaintiff’s ski mask 15 nor his sunglass nor the riots and unrest that occurred throughout the country six months 16 earlier after the death of George Floyd can provide a basis for particularized suspicion that 17 Plaintiff had engaged, was engaging, or was about to engage in any crime. Without 18 particularized suspicion, there can be no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 19 c. Plaintiff Raises Issues of Fact as to Whether Police 20 Normally Detain People Not Engaged in Expressive Activity for Trespassing When They Encroach on the 21 Area Between a Paved Sidewalk and a Curb. 22 Further, Plaintiff has successfully raised issues of fact as to whether Defendants 23 normally detain people who are similarly situated to Plaintiff and who are not engaged in 24 expressive activity such that he is entitled to pursue his claim. Even where probable cause 25 does exist, a plaintiff’s claim is not defeated where the plaintiff can produce “objective 26 evidence that he was [treated adversely] when otherwise similarly situated individuals not 27 engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407; see 28 also Gonzalez v. Trevino, 602 U.S. 653, 658 (2024) (holding that, in the context of First 1 Amendment retaliation claims under Nieves, “the demand for virtually identical and 2 identifiable comparators goes too far.”). 3 Though Officer Sias repeatedly asserted that Plaintiff had trespassed by placing his 4 bag between the paved sidewalk and the curb, as described above, Officer King told 5 Plaintiff during the same encounter that he did not believe the property between the 6 sidewalk and the curb was private and that Plaintiff was not trespassing because it belonged 7 to the City. (Ex. G at 10:56–11:16). Indeed, when the officers first saw Plaintiff from their 8 vehicle, Officer King noted to Officer Sias that Plaintiff was “standing on the public 9 sidewalk” and that he appeared to be protesting. (Ex. F. at 01:06–:08). These facts are 10 sufficient to raise an issue as to whether Defendants normally detain people similarly 11 situated who are not engaged in expressive conduct. The Officer Defendants’ conflicting 12 statements provide some evidence of the alleged “causal connection between animus and 13 injury.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 407. 14 2. Plaintiff Has Raised Issues of Fact as to Defendant’s Motive 15 for Detaining Him. 16 Without probable cause and with genuine issues of material fact as to whether 17 similarly situated individuals who are not engaging in expressive activity are detained, the 18 Defendants may have acted with a forbidden, retaliatory motive when detaining Plaintiff. 19 Id. at 402 (holding that while the absence of probable cause will “generally provide weighty 20 evidence that the officer’s animus caused the arrest). Despite Defendants’ stated assurance 21 to Plaintiff that he was free to protest, the circumstances of his detention at least raise an 22 issue of fact regarding their motives. 23 Moreover, the Officer Defendants’ comments when they first saw Plaintiff provide 24 further evidence upon which a jury could find that they acted with animus towards Plaintiff 25 because of their distaste for his protest in front of the FBI building: 26 King: Oh. This guy. Sias: Apparently. What’s he doing. 27 King: Oh my God! Standing there with a sign. Sias: I know. 28 King: Standing on the public sidewalk. Probably I don’t know protest maybe. 1 Sias: Watch. Just watch. 2 (Ex. F at 01:02–:16; Ex. G at 01:00–:13). These comments, and Officer King’s later 3 comments that were described above, further support Plaintiff’s challenge to the accuracy 4 of Officer Sias’s repeated statement that the FBI wanted him cited for trespass, when he 5 was lawfully engaged in protest activity on public property. (Doc. 265 at 7, 9–10). 6 Though Defendants do not assert reasonable suspicion or probable cause for 7 trespassing as a basis for qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s First Amendment 8 Retaliation Claim, the Officer Defendants’ lack of reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff in 9 the first place is relevant, though not dispositive, to the “forbidden motive” element of this 10 claim. See Nieves, 587 U.S. at 402. 11 In sum, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged his First Amendment Retaliation Claim to 12 survive both the qualified immunity arguments asserted by Defendants and the summary 13 judgment standards. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to this claim. 14 C. Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity on Plaintiff’s 15 Wrongful Detention Claim. Plaintiff has overcome the hurdle of qualified immunity on his First Amendment 16 Retaliation Claim but fails to do so on his Wrongful Detention Claim because he does not 17 identify any “clearly established” right. A plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of his 18 Fourth Amendment rights faces the question of whether an officer had to know under the 19 circumstances that they did not have any probable cause. Thus, the Fourth Amendment 20 plaintiff bears an especially high burden to overcome qualified immunity. 21 Indeed, beyond the general requirements of identifying a clearly established right, a 22 Fourth Amendment plaintiff must establish existing precedent to “place[] the statutory or 23 constitutional question beyond debate.” Waid v. County of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th 24 Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Supreme Court 25 has held “[s]uch specificity” is required because “it is sometimes difficult for an officer to 26 determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer 27 confronts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Cases cast at a high level 28 1 of generality are unlikely to establish rights with the requisite specificity.” Id. at 388 2 (internal quotation marks and omitted). “While a case addressing general principles may 3 clearly establish a right in an obvious case, such obvious cases are rare.” Id. (citations and 4 quotation marks omitted). “Plaintiff[] must either explain why [his] case is obvious under 5 existing general principles or, more commonly, show specific cases that control or reflect 6 a consensus of non-binding authorities in similar situations.” Id. (citing Hopson, 71 F.4th 7 at 697). 8 Here, though Plaintiff has shown that he was detained,5 his citations to generalized 9 Fourth Amendment rules governing such detentions are insufficient to survive summary 10 judgment on the Wrongful Detention claim because they do not identify a “clearly 11 established” right. While Defendants’ arguments that the officers had reasonable suspicion 12 fail as discussed above, Plaintiff has not pointed to prior case law which makes it clear that, 13 under the circumstances, Officers Sias and King had to know that they had no basis to 14 detain Plaintiff when they did. In other words, the cases Plaintiff cites are at too high a 15 level of generality to hold that Defendants had to have known that, when they saw Plaintiff 16 completely masked and close to an FBI building at night, they had no reasonable suspicion 17 to conduct a Terry stop. In the Fourth Amendment context, he is obliged to cite factually 18 analogous cases with specificity to identify a clearly established right that places the 19 question of whether the officer’s conduct was unlawful under the particular circumstances 20 beyond debate. Waid, 87 F.4th at 387–88. He has not done so. Thus, Defendants are 21 entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Wrongful Detention Claim. 22 23 24 5 Plaintiff was detained for approximately eighteen minutes. Certainly, Defendants had the 25 right to begin a consensual conversation with Plaintiff. United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 998, 1005 (2021) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 502 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). “So long as a 26 reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” Id. (quoting Bostick, 502 27 U.S. at 434 (citation modified)). But almost immediately after the encounter between Plaintiff and Officer Sias began, Officer Sias told Plaintiff he had to provide ID. At this 28 point, Defendant was not free to go, nor was he free to go until approximately eighteen minutes later when Sergeant Blalock spoke with him. 1 II. Defendants Are Also Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Monell Claims. 2 Plaintiff brings Monell claims against the City for its failure to train its officers and 3 a failure to adequately supervise them. 4 To bring a failure to train claim, Plaintiff must show the City’s deliberate 5 indifference in failing to provide such training. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 6 388 (1989). To establish such a claim, Plaintiff is obliged to “present evidence of prior 7 incidents of the same character that would have made City officials aware of the situation 8 such that the City could reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need 9 for further training.” Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation 10 modified) (quoting Merrit v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 771 n.10 (9th Cir. 11 1989)). In the alternative, Plaintiff might establish that “in light of the duties assigned to 12 specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the 13 inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers 14 of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent.” City of Canton, 15 489 U.S. at 390. 16 Yet Plaintiff does not challenge the City’s assertion that its training program 17 includes constitutional law relating to detentions and freedom of expression. (Doc. 222 at 18 ¶ 37). Though he alleges that certain materials have been destroyed, he does not do so in 19 a sufficient manner to create a material issue of fact. Nor does Plaintiff provide any facts 20 on which a reasonable jury could find that, at the time of his detention, (a) the City was 21 aware that its officers were detaining persons similarly situated to Plaintiff, or (b) the law 22 clearly prohibited the detention of persons who were similarly situated to him. Moreover, 23 he fails to establish what training he deems to be necessary such that failure to provide it 24 was “so likely to result in [a] violation of constitutional rights, that the” City can be deemed 25 to have been deliberately indifferent in failing to provide it. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 26 390. 27 28 1 Plaintiff also fails to identify any facts in the record which would suggest that the 2 City detained other persons engaged in expressive activity without probable cause, 3 reasonable suspicion, or for laws which they generally did not enforce. In general, a single 4 incident, in this case the one involving Plaintiff, does not support a failure-to-train theory. 5 Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Connick 6 v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by 7 untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for 8 purposes of failure to train.” (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 9 (1997))). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, 10 decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will 11 cause violations of constitutional rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. “A municipality’s 12 culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure 13 to train.” Id. at 61. 14 For similar reasons, Plaintiff’s failure to supervise theory fails. Davis v. City of 15 Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Canton dealt specifically with 16 inadequate training. We see no principled reason to apply a different standard to inadequate 17 supervision.”). To bring a failure to supervise claim, Plaintiff must show the City’s 18 deliberate indifference in failing to adequately supervise its officers. Id. Plaintiff does not 19 identify what the supervisors on the scene failed to do in a way that demonstrates their 20 deliberate indifference. Nor does he demonstrate that the law clearly prohibited the Officer 21 Defendants’ detention of Plaintiff in this case at the time that the officer’s engaged in it. 22 Nor does Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants failed to adequately and accurately report 23 the incident establish that the supervisory Defendants were deliberately indifferent in their 24 actions toward Plaintiff at the scene in a way that caused him damage. Accordingly, 25 summary judgment is granted to the City on Plaintiff’s failure to supervise claim. 26 III. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is Denied. 27 Plaintiff has often failed to follow the Court’s orders which has resulted in multiple 28 stricken pleadings and time delays. (See, e.g., Doc. 260). Nevertheless, the sanction of 1 || dismissal is extreme. The Court has stricken many of Plaintiff’s filings and specified the 2|| ones to which Defendants were to respond. (Doc. 298). Those are the appropriate and 3|| lesser sanctions here. Defendants do not demonstrate sufficient prejudice to justify dismissal. Further, a resolution on the merits is favored. Because discovery is now closed || and Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim has survived summary judgment, the 6 || Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 7 IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Terminating Sanctions 8 Plaintiff’s motion, which the Court interprets as a motion to hold Defendants in || default on all claims is dismissed as meritless. 10 CONCLUSION 11 The Court, as it indicated to Plaintiff it would, will submit Plaintiff’s request for 12 || representation to the Court’s pro bono representation program to determine if it can find an 13} attorney willing to represent Plaintiff on his remaining claim at trial. Should such an 14]| attorney be found, the parties will be notified, and Plaintiff can accept or decline such 15} representation. In any event, the Court will shortly set a status conference at which it will schedule the trial of this matter. 17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 221) is DENIED in part as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim. 19 IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 221) is GRANTED in part as to Plaintiff’s Wrongful Detention and Monell Claims. 21 IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 263) is DENIED. 23 IT IS FUTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Terminating 24 || Sanctions (Doc. 290) is DENIED. 25 Dated this 8th day of April, 2026.

28 Senior United States District Judge

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