Nicholas Stephens v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

Opinion

NICHOLAS STEPHENS, Case No. 24-cv-04218-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE AND TERMINATING MOTION FOR MORE v. DEFINITE STATEMENT

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE Re: Dkt. No. 18 COMPANY, Defendant. In July 2024, Plaintiff Nicholas Stephens filed his initial complaint against Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. Magistrate Judge Ryu granted the IFP application, screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and found that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a basis for subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint did not state any federal claims, did not sufficiently establish that the parties were diverse, and did not clearly satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. Dkt. No. 9 at 3–4. Plaintiff amended his complaint, Dkt. No. 11, and the case was reassigned to this Court, Dkt. Nos. 10, 13. After screening the amended complaint, the Court found that “Plaintiff allege[d] that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties” and had “added an allegation that he is entitled to at least $1,000,000.” Dkt. No. 15 at 2–3. Nevertheless, the Court found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim and dismissed with leave to amend. Id. at 3–6. Plaintiff did not file a second amended complaint by the Court’s deadline, so the Court granted Plaintiff a one-month extension, stating that “[f]ailure to file an amended complaint by this deadline will result in the dismissal of the action in its entirety without further leave to not correct the deficiencies the Court has previously identified.” Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint by the extended deadline, alleging an invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. and Monika Hight. Dkt. No. 17 (“SAC”) at 6, 12, 24. Defendants moved for a more definite statement and to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. No. 18. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to adequately plead a basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, since Plaintiff has included a new, apparently non-diverse Defendant: Monika Hight, who is a lawyer “practicing in The State of California with a principal address of business in Sonoma County, California.” SAC at 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (requiring suit be between “citizens of different States”).1 The Court also lacks federal question jurisdiction, as all three of Plaintiff’s claims are California state law claims. As a result, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (stating that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim”). Given the leeway the Court is required to give a pro se plaintiff, the Court grants leave to amend one final time, as Plaintiff may be able to state a claim against Defendant Liberty Mutual if he can properly establish a basis for federal jurisdiction. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” (quotation omitted)). To bring a cause of action for an invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, “Plaintiff[] must show that (1) [he] possess[es] a legally protected

1 Plaintiff is a “Living Person and A Resident of Alameda County, California.” SAC at 2. However, he has removed the allegations the Court previously credited about where he was born, and he did not follow the Court’s instruction to “explicitly allege what state he is a citizen of.” See Dkt. No. 15 at 3 n.1.

Additionally, Plaintiff has removed his allegation about the amount in controversy. Plaintiff cannot rely on allegations made in a prior complaint. See SAC at 2 (claiming the Court has “Prior privacy interest, (2) [he] maintain[s] a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (3) the intrusion is ‘so serious . . . as to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms’ such that the breach is ‘highly offensive.’” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 601 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal. 4th 272, 287 (2009)). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly accessed Plaintiff’s full medical record after he withdrew his consent for them to do so.2 Accepting these allegations as true as the Court must at this stage, this could be sufficient, provided that Plaintiff can allege a basis for federal jurisdiction, which so far he has not done. See Grafilo v. Wolfsohn, 33 Cal. App. 5th 1024, 1034 (2019) (collecting California cases discussing the “well-settled” right to privacy for medical records). Given this, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is due on June 4, 2026. This is Plaintiff’s final chance to amend. Failure to submit an amended complaint by the deadline will result in immediate dismissal, though any such dismissal would be without prejudice and would still allow Plaintiff to raise his claims in state court. Plaintiff may not add any new defendants or additional claims. The Court TERMINATES AS MOOT Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, Dkt. No. 18. While the Court tends to disagree that Plaintiff’s complaint is “largely impossible to decipher enough for Defendants to draft an Answer,” id. at 3, any amended complaint should (1) contain numbered paragraphs; (2) shorten or omit unnecessary citations to legal standards unless they are paired with an explanation about their relevance; and (3) clearly and completely explain the factual background for each claim.3 The claims must be fully pleaded in the body of the complaint, and Plaintiff may not rely on voluminous attachments to state his claims. The Court will not sift through such attachments given Plaintiff’s obligation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to include a “short and plain statement of the claim.” The Court also STRIKES Plaintiff’s Definite Statement, Dkt. No. 22, which appears to 2 Plaintiff states that he attached an exhibit of his revoked authorization form. SAC at 5. However, it appears that this exhibit (and others) were not attached to the operative complaint.

3 For example, Plaintiff’s conclusory second claim references negotiations and denials of ] either be an improper sur-reply or an amended complaint, either of which would have required 2 leave from the Court. 4 Dated: 5/14/2026 ° ann S. GILLIAM, JR. / 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] a 12

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