Nicholas Serrano by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Jose Anthony Serrano v. City of Stockton, County of San Joaquin, California, State of California, Does 1-10, Moes 1-50, and Roess 1-50

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00442
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 NICHOLAS SERRANO BY AND No. 2:24-cv-00442-JAM-CSK THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD 13 LITEM, JOSE ANTHONY SERRANO, 14 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING CITY OF STOCKTON’S BILL OF COSTS IN PART 15 v. 16 CITY OF STOCKTON, COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, CALIFORNIA, 17 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DOES 1- 10, MOES 1-50, AND ROES 1-50, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Plaintiff has objected to Defendant City of Stockton’s Bill 21 of Costs following the Court’s granting of partial summary 22 judgment in City of Stockton’s favor, arguing the Court should 23 reduce City of Stockton’s requested costs or, in the alternative, 24 deny the costs altogether based on Plaintiff’s inability to pay. 25 As discussed below, the Court will grant City of Stockton’s 26 request for costs in part and deny them in part. The Court will 27 award City of Stockton $6,800.12 in costs. 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Nicholas Serrano sustained serious injuries 3 following a police chase and filed the present action in state 4 court against Defendants City of Stockton, County of San Joaquin, 5 Does 1–10, Moes 1–50, and Roes 1–50 for (1) negligence; 6 (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) assault; 7 (4) battery; (5) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; 8 and (6) violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9 ECF No. 1. On February 9, 2024, City of Stockton removed the 10 case to federal court under federal question jurisdiction. Id. 11 The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Does 1–10, 12 Moes 1–50, and Roes 1–50 on April 29, 2024. ECF No. 13. City of 13 Stockton and County of San Joaquin filed Motions for Summary 14 Judgment on November 4, 2025, seeking judgment on all causes of 15 action against them. ECF Nos. 21, 22. In response, Plaintiff 16 conceded that summary judgment was appropriate on his claims for 17 battery, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and 18 violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF 19 No. 23-1 at 5; ECF No. 24-1 at 5. Thus, the Court granted 20 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fourth, fifth, and sixth causes 21 of action in favor of City of Stockton and County of San Joaquin. 22 ECF No. 30. The Court further declined to exercise supplemental 23 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s first, second, and third causes of 24 action, and dismissed those claims without prejudice. Id. 25 Judgment was entered on December 10, 2025. ECF No. 31. 26 City of Stockton filed their Bill of Costs on December 24, 27 2025, seeking $15,071.23. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff filed 28 Objections on December 31, 2025. ECF No. 33. A hearing was set 1 for February 10, 2026.1 The matter was submitted without oral 2 argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that, 5 “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order 6 provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be 7 allowed to the prevailing party.” “By its terms, the rule 8 creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing 9 party, but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to 10 award costs.” Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 11 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000). Given this presumption, “it is 12 incumbent upon the losing party to demonstrate why the costs 13 should not be awarded.” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 14 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999). If the court declines to award costs 15 as requested by the prevailing party, it should specify its 16 reasons for doing so. Berkla v. Corel Corp., 302 F.3d 909, 921 17 (9th Cir. 2002). 18 III. OPINION 19 City of Stockton requests (1) $405 in filing fees; 20 (2) $9,020.60 in deposition transcript fees; and (3) $5,645.63 in 21 “other costs” for subpoena fees. Bill of Costs at 1, ECF No. 33. 22 Plaintiff argues the Court should deny or reduce City of 23 Stockton’s requested costs because (1) the deposition transcripts 24 were not necessary for the Court to rule on summary judgment; 25 (2) the subpoena fees are overinflated; and (3) Plaintiff and his 26 Guardian ad Litem would be rendered indigent by a costs award. 27 1 County of San Joaquin also filed their Bill of Costs on December 19, 2025, 28 seeking $181.84. ECF No. 32. However, no objections were filed. 1 Objs. at 3–5, ECF No. 34. The Court will consider each objection 2 in turn. 3 A. City of Stockton’s Deposition Costs 4 Plaintiff objects that City of Stockton’s deposition fees 5 are not taxable because the depositions were not necessary for 6 the Court to rule on summary judgment. Objs. at 3–4. The Court 7 largely overrules this objection. 8 28 U.S.C. section 1920 “enumerates expenses that a federal 9 court may tax as a cost under the discretionary authority found 10 in Rule 54(d).” Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 11 U.S. 437, 441—42 (1987). These expenses include “transcripts 12 necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). 13 Depositions are typically “necessarily obtained” when they are or 14 will be used in connection with trial or summary judgment, for 15 impeachment, or to show damages. See Indep. Iron Works, Inc. v. 16 U.S. Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 678 (9th Cir. 1963). However, a 17 district court may tax costs related to deposition transcripts, 18 even if the transcripts were not ultimately used in connection 19 with summary judgment or trial. See Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. Lu- 20 Mar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2001) 21 (“[The court] can, in its discretion, tax those costs even if the 22 items in question were not used at trial.”); 23 Here, City of Stockton seeks to recoup fees related to the 24 deposition transcripts for (1) Plaintiff; (2) Richard Garcia; 25 (3) Eric Hutton; (4) Carlos Carrasquel; (5) Jason Underwood; 26 (6) Daniel Lowry; and (7) Sean Ross. Bill of Costs at 3. Of 27 those, City of Stockton relied on Plaintiff and Hutton’s 28 deposition transcripts in their Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 1 No. 21-3. City of Stockton also relied on declarations from 2 Carrasquel and Ross in seeking summary judgment. Id. Plaintiff, 3 for his part, relied on Garcia, Hutton, Carrasquel, Lowry, and 4 Ross’s deposition transcripts in his Opposition to Summary 5 Judgment. ECF No. 23-3. Given that these were important 6 witnesses to both Parties in seeking and defending against 7 summary judgment, the Court finds that fees associated with those 8 depositions are taxable. See Simons v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 9 No. 3:18-cv-00755-SB, 2021 WL 1244309, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 10 2021) (“It is well settled that depositions relied on at summary 11 judgment are ‘necessarily obtained for use in the case.’”). 12 As for Underwood, his testimony was not clearly relied on by 13 either Party in their summary judgment briefings. See ECF Nos. 14 21, 23, 28. Accordingly, the Court will discount the $1,471.00 15 sought by City of Stockton for his deposition transcript. 16 In sum, the Court finds that $7,549.60 of City of Stockton’s 17 requested deposition transcript fees are taxable. 18 B. City of Stockton’s Subpoena Costs 19 Plaintiff also objects that City of Stockton’s subpoena fees 20 should be reduced because the fees are overinflated. Objs. at 4. 21 At most, Plaintiff asks that the Court award $65 in costs per 22 subpoena, which is the amount that Plaintiff contends may be 23 charged by the United States Marshals for service of a subpoena. 24 Id. The Court disagrees. 25 Fees for the service of summons and subpoena are generally 26 recoverable under 28 U.S.C. section 1920(1). See Alflex Corp. v. 27 Underwriters Lab’ys, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177–78 (9th Cir. 1990) 28 (per curiam). That section provides that the court may award the 1 prevailing party “[f]ees of the clerk and marshal.” 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1920(1). Local Rule 292 allows the taxation of “Marshal’s fees 3 and fees for service by a person other than the Marshal under 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 to the extent they do not exceed the amount 5 allowable for the same service by the Marshal[.]” E.D. Cal. L.R. 6 292(f)(2). Marshal’s fees are governed by 28 U.S.C. section 7 1921, which allows the collection of fees for serving a subpoena 8 or summons. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a)(1)(A). Section 1920(4) also 9 allows for the recovery of “[f]ees for exemplification and the 10 costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are 11 necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). 12 Here, City of Stockton seeks to recover $5,645.63 for 13 subpoenaed records of Plaintiff’s medical providers, as well as 14 schools attended by Plaintiff, and has submitted itemized 15 invoices for each of the twenty-five subpoenas served. See Bill 16 of Costs at 15–35. These invoices include basic subpoena fees, 17 service fees, subpoena preparation fees, as well as other fees 18 including document production fees. Id. While Plaintiff 19 generally objects that City of Stockton’s fees are unsupported, 20 preparation of the subpoena and other fees listed by City of 21 Stockton are attendant to a subpoena’s service, and Plaintiff has 22 not provided any evidence the amounts sought necessarily exceed 23 those currently charged by the Marshal for the same service. Cf. 24 Fay v. Fay, No. 1:13-cv-01362-AWI-MJS, 2015 WL 7271713, at *4 25 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2015) (reducing taxable fees in light of 26 subpoena fees normally charged by the Marshals in 2015). Thus, 27 these costs are properly taxed against Plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. 28 section 1920(1). See Alfex Corp., 914 F.2d at 178 (holding 1 “private process servers’ fees are properly taxed as costs” as 2 fees of the clerk and marshal under section 1920(1)). Plaintiff 3 also fails to submit evidence that the subpoenaed records were 4 somehow duplicative or otherwise not obtained by City of Stockton 5 under a reasonable belief that the documents could be necessary 6 for issues at summary judgment or trial. See Terry v. Allstate 7 Ins. Co., No. 05-2261, 2007 WL 3231716, at *12-13 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8 31, 2007) (citing United States EEOC v. W&O Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 9 623 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n evaluating copying costs, the court 10 should consider whether the prevailing party could have 11 reasonably believed that it was necessary to copy the papers at 12 issue.”). 13 The Court finds that $5,645.63 of City of Stockton’s requested 14 subpoena fees are taxable. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Inability to Pay 16 Finally, Plaintiff argues that an award of costs to City of 17 Stockton would “render both Plaintiff and his father, his 18 Guardian ad Litem, indigent.” Objs. at 4–5. There are risks 19 associated with every litigation, including the payment of costs 20 if a litigant does not prevail. However, the Court acknowledges 21 Plaintiff’s financial plight and, for the reasons discussed 22 below, reduces the costs award to City of Stockton by 50%. 23 A district court need not give affirmative reasons for 24 awarding costs. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 25 945 (9th Cir. 2003). However, if a court declines to award costs 26 to the prevailing party, it must explain “why, in the 27 circumstances, it would be inappropriate or inequitable to [do 28 so].” Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 593. 1 “Appropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the 2 substantial public importance of the case, (2) the closeness and 3 difficulty of the issues in the case, (3) the chilling effect on 4 future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff’s limited financial 5 resources, and (5) the economic disparity between the parties.” 6 Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247–48 7 (9th Cir. 2014). “This is not an exhaustive list of good reasons 8 for declining to award costs, but rather a starting point for 9 analysis.” Id. at 1248 (quotations omitted). 10 Substantial Public Importance. The Ninth Circuit has found 11 substantial public importance in cases that carry implications 12 beyond the immediate parties involved. For instance, in 13 Association of Mexican-American Educators, plaintiffs raised an 14 issue of substantial public importance because “the action 15 affect[ed] tens of thousands of Californians and the state’s 16 public school system as a whole.” 231 F.3d at 593. Similarly, 17 in Escriba, the court noted evidence suggesting that the 18 plaintiff’s claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act was of 19 the type that could “establish the parameters of what constitutes 20 sufficient employee notice” and furthermore “potentially had a 21 much broader application to the workplace.” 743 F.3d at 1248 22 (cleaned up). Plaintiff makes no clear demonstration here that 23 the outcome of his claims carries wider consequences for the 24 public. As such, Plaintiff’s claims do not exceed the bounds of 25 a controversy between the involved parties. See Mosavi v. Mt. 26 San Antonio Coll., No. LACV-15-04147-VAP-AFMX, 2018 WL 6219864, 27 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2018) (“[T]his case amounted to a 28 dispute between two people about whether sexual assault, 1 religious harassment, retaliation, and violence took place. 2 Although every case alleging a potential civil rights violation 3 is important, the present case is not ‘extraordinary’ as defined 4 by the Ninth Circuit.”). This factor weighs against Plaintiff. 5 Closeness and Difficulty of the Issues. Courts have found 6 close and difficult issues under a variety of circumstances. For 7 instance, a case may be close and difficult because it 8 necessarily turns on a close factual or legal determination. See 9 e.g., Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1248. Surviving summary judgment, 10 though not determinative, is also evidence of a close and 11 difficult issue. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Yavapai Cmty. Coll. 12 Dist., No. CV-12-08193-PCT-GMS, 2022 WL 504474, at *2 (D. Ariz. 13 Feb. 18, 2022) (concluding that the “case was far from an easy 14 one” because “[t]he litigation lasted for the better part of a 15 decade, and several of Plaintiff’s claims survived motions to 16 dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, and for summary 17 judgment”). Plaintiff has not argued that the issues presented 18 here were close or difficult. Given that the Court granted 19 summary judgment in City of Stockton’s favor on three of 20 Plaintiff’s claims, and dismissed the rest, the Court finds that 21 this factor weighs against Plaintiff. 22 Chilling Effect. Litigation is not without its risks and 23 “liability for costs is a normal incident of defeat.” Delta Air 24 Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981). Yet the Ninth 25 Circuit recognizes a countervailing policy to not unduly 26 discourage “civil rights litigants who are willing to test the 27 boundaries of our laws[.]” Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1080. While 28 Plaintiff’s section 1983 and related state law claims ultimately 1 failed, it is possible awarding costs in this unsuccessful but 2 non-frivolous suit could cause other individuals to hesitate to 3 bring their own meritorious claims. The costs City of Stockton 4 seeks are not extraordinarily high. Cf. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. 5 Educators, 231 F.3d at 591, 593 (concluding that costs in the 6 amount of $216,443.67 were “extraordinarily high”). But “even 7 modest costs can discourage potential plaintiffs who . . . earn 8 low wages.” Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1249. Thus, this factor weighs 9 in favor of Plaintiff. 10 Plaintiff’s Limited Financial Resources. “Costs are 11 properly denied when a plaintiff ‘would be rendered indigent 12 should she be forced to pay’ the amount assessed.” Escriba, 743 13 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1080). A plaintiff 14 seeking to avoid paying costs is not required to “provide any 15 evidence of her financial situation, but she does have the burden 16 of demonstrating that [the] general presumption in favor of 17 Defendants’ costs does not apply.” Greene v. Buckeye Valley Fire 18 Dep’t, No. CV-11-02351-PHX-NVW, 2013 WL 12160997, at *1 (D. Ariz. 19 July 16, 2013). Here, Plaintiff argues that requiring him to pay 20 City of Stockton’s costs would render him and his Guardian ad 21 Litem indigent, and provides declarations attesting to this fact. 22 See Objs. at 4–5; see also Nicholas Serrano Decl., ECF No. 34-1; 23 Jose Anthony Serrano Decl., ECF No. 34-2. Accordingly, this 24 factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. 25 Economic Disparity Between the Parties. As a general 26 principle, “financial disparity almost always exists between 27 individual plaintiffs litigating against . . . large defendants 28 such as corporations or governments.” Van Horn v. Dhillon, No. em EI IIE IEE IEEE EEO I IES ee

1 O08-CV-01622-LJ0-DLB, 2011 WL 66244, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2 2011). Thus, “disparity alone is insufficient to overcome the 3 | presumption in favor of awarding costs.” Ayala v. Pac. Mar. 4 | Ass'n, No. CO8-0119-TEH, 2011 WL 6217298, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5 14, 2011). Nevertheless, disparity is a consideration. 6 | Undoubtedly, there is a substantial economic disparity between 7 Plaintiff and City of Stockton. This factor weighs in favor of 8 Plaintiff. 9 On balance, while the costs here are not extraordinary, 10 given the potential chilling effect that awarding costs might 11 create, Plaintiff’s inability to pay, and the economic disparity 12 between Parties, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce City of 13 Stockton’s costs by 50%. See, e.g., Fox v. Arizona, No. CV-21- 14 O1089-PHX-MTL, 2024 WL 1344449, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2024) 15 (reducing costs by 50% because “Plaintiff has failed to 16 demonstrate that this is an extraordinary case such that 17 Defendants should be denied their costs outright”). 18 Iv. ORDER 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that City of Stockton’s 20 Bill of Costs (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED in part. The Court awards 21 City of Stockton $6,800.12 in costs.? 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: February 5, 2026 24 Yi J Z (Paras HN A. MENDEZ. 2° SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 2 $405 (filing fees) + $7,549.60 (deposition transcript fees) + $5,645.63 28 | (subpoena fees) = $13,600.23 x .5 = $6,800.12. 11