Nicholas Scott Boenzi v. County of Napa, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 NICHOLAS SCOTT BOENZI, Case No. 26-cv-00516-CRB

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 10 v. RECOMMENDATION; DISMISSING CASE 11 COUNTY OF NAPA, et al., 12 Defendants.

13 Nicholas Scott Boenzi, proceeding pro se, brought suit against the County of Napa, 14 the Napa District Attorney’s Office (“DA”), and the Napa Superior Court Clerks and 15 Supervisory Clerks (“Clerks”). FAC (dkt. 8). The lawsuit arose out of events in a state 16 court action where Boenzi purportedly had difficulties in the litigation. See generally 17 FAC. As Boenzi is proceeding in forma pauperis, Magistrate Judge Alex Tse screened 18 Boenzi’s complaint. Dkt. 7. Boenzi then filed an amended complaint. See FAC. Judge 19 Tse screened the case a second time and identified numerous deficiencies that warranted 20 dismissal. Order (dkt. 9). Boenzi failed to file a second amended complaint. As a result, 21 Judge Tse issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) to dismiss the case without leave 22 to amend. R&R (dkt. 11). Boenzi did not file an objection. Having reviewed Judge Tse’s 23 well-reasoned R&R, the Court ADOPTS it in full and DISMISSES the case. 24 Judge Tse first noted that Boenzi’s seven claims for relief did not clarify which of 25 the three defendants they were brought against. R&R at 2. “A complaint must clearly 26 state the defendant(s) whom the complaint is alleging a claim(s) against.” Robledo v. Lee, 27 No. 24-CV-04893-NC, 2024 WL 6841825, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2024). The Court 1 liable for the actions of California courts, which are state agencies. See Petty v. Petty, No. 2 C 03-0548 SI, 2003 WL 21262369, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2003) (dismissing claims 3 against Alameda County based on actions of state court judges). This alone warrants 4 dismissal. 5 Judge Tse also reasoned that many of Boenzi’s claims could be barred by applicable 6 immunities. R&R at 3–4. The Court agrees. For starters, Boenzi seeks damages, 7 injunctive relief, and declaratory relief against the Clerks in their official capacity. See 8 FAC ¶¶ 27–35. Claims for retrospective relief, such as damages, against the Clerks is 9 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of 10 Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Fan v. City of Newport Beach, 2023 11 WL 8351516, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s due process claims against the 12 Orange County Superior Court, its employees acting in their official capacity, and the 13 California Court of Appeals are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Moreover, Boenzi 14 alleges that the Clerks “refused to file, docket, transmit, or process the disqualification 15 materials despite their mandatory and ministerial nature.” FAC ¶ 11. But the Clerks are 16 entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for challenged activities which are an “integral 17 part of the judicial process,” such as filing and processing papers. Haile v. Sawyer, No. C 18 02-5723 MJJ, 2003 WL 1907661, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2003) (state court clerk entitled 19 to quasi-judicial immunity where claims were based on clerk’s filing of court papers), 20 aff’d, 76 Fed. App’x 129 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 Boenzi’s claims against the DA may be similarly barred. A state prosecutor is 22 entitled to absolute immunity from liability for violating federal constitutional rights, when 23 he is engaged in activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 24 process.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Imbler v. 25 Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Boenzi does not clarify the basis of his claims 26 against the DA, merely stating that the DA is “responsible for prosecutorial policies and 27 ratification of the acts described herein.” See FAC ¶ 6. As a result, it is entirely possible 1 Judge Tse also determined that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Boenzi’s claims 2 || that seek to challenge state court decisions. R&R at 4. The Court agrees. Boenzi alleges 3 || that “[s}ummary denials under inapplicable doctrines foreclosed meaningful review,” 4 || “[t]rial courts relied on those appellate dispositions to justify continuation of proceedings,” 5 || and that he was “denied timely access to minute orders and rulings necessary to meet short 6 || appellate deadlines.” FAC 4 15-17. But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal 7 || review of state court decisions. See Missud v. Nevada, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (N.D. 8 || Cal. 2012), aff'd, 520 F. App’x 534 (9th Cir. 2013). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a 9 || well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from exercising appellate 10 || review over final state court judgments.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 11 {| 858-59 (9th Cir. 2008). “The clearest case for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman = 12 || doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous 13 |} decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 14 || decision.” Id. (quoting Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007)). 2 15 || That is precisely what Boenzi seeks here. 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DISMISSES the case 5 17 || without leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: May 14, 2026 5 —— 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28