Nicholas Neal v. Tolloti, et al.

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 NICHOLAS NEAL, Case No. 3:25-cv-00166-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 TOLLOTI, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Nicholas Neal brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 13 redress constitutional violations he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Northern 14 Nevada Correctional Center. (ECF No. 8.) On November 13, 2025, the Court ordered 15 Neal to file an amended complaint by December 1, 2025. (ECF No. 7.) The Court warned 16 Neal that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that 17 deadline. (Id. at 8.) When Neal’s mail from the Court was returned as undeliverable, the 18 Court sent copies for him at his new facility, and it extended the deadline for him to file an 19 amended complaint to January 26, 2026. (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11.) That extended deadline 20 expired without any compliance or other response by Neal. 21 I. DISCUSSION 22 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 23 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 24 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 25 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 26 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 27 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 28 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 2 action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s interest in 3 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 4 of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 5 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine 6 Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 7 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 8 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Neal’s 9 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 10 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 11 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 12 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 13 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 15 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 16 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 17 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 18 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 19 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 20 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 21 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 23 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 24 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 25 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 26 unless Neal files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order 27 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 28 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here 1 || do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting another deadline is not a 2 || meaningful alternative given these circumstances. Thus, the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 || IL. CONCLUSION 4 Having thoroughly considered these factors, the Court finds that they weigh in 5 || favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice 6 || based on Neal’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Court’s 7 || November 13 and December 29, 2025 orders and for failure to state a claim. The Clerk 8 || of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. If Neal wishes to 9 || pursue his claim, he must file a complaint in a new case. 10 It is further ordered that Neal’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 11 || Nos. 1, 4) is granted. This status doesn’t relieve Neal of his obligation to pay the full $350 12 || filing fee under the statute; it just means that he can do it in installments. And the full $350 13 || filing fee remains due and owing even though this case is being dismissed. 14 To ensure that Neal pays the full filing fee, it is further ordered that the Nevada 15 || Department of Corrections must pay to the Clerk of the United States District Court, 16 || District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month’s deposits to the account of Nicholas W. 17 || Neal, #73388 (in months that the account exceeds $10.00) until the full $350 filing fee 18 || has been paid for this action. 19 The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to (1) the Finance Division of the 20 || Clerk’s Office and (2) the attention of Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department 21 || of Corrections at formapauperis @ doc.nv.gov. 22 DATED THIS 6" Day of February 2026.

24 MIRANDA M. DU 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28