Nicholas Geoffrey Benson v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00224-CR ___________________________

NICHOLAS GEOFFREY BENSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1814879

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Nicholas Geoffrey Benson attempts to appeal from a trial court

order placing him on deferred adjudication community supervision. But the trial

court’s order was effectuating the terms of Benson’s plea bargain with the State, and

in a plea bargain case, the defendant’s right of appeal is extremely limited. Tex. R.

App. P. 25.2(a)(2) (providing that a plea bargaining defendant “may appeal only:

(A) those matters that were raised by [pretrial] written motion . . . , (B) after getting

the trial court’s permission . . . , or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly

authorized by statute”); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02. The trial court

informed Benson of the limitations on his right of appeal, and it did not grant

permission for an exception; rather, it certified that this “is a plea[ ]bargain case, and

the defendant has NO right of appeal.”1 See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d) (requiring

a trial court to file a certification clarifying a defendant’s right of appeal).

Because a criminal appeal “must be dismissed if a [trial court] certification that

shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record,”

we notified Benson that we could dismiss his appeal unless he showed grounds for

continuing it. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. Benson responded by alleging that he

had been pressured into pleading guilty and that his trial counsel had been ineffective.

But neither allegation is a ground for continuing this appeal. See Cooper v. State, 45

The certification was signed not only by the trial court but also by Benson and 1

Benson’s trial counsel. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d).

2 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that “Rule 25.2(b) does not permit the

voluntariness of the plea to be raised on appeal” in a plea bargain case); Singleton v.

State, Nos. 02-25-00127-CR, 02-25-00128-CR, 02-25-00129-CR, 02-25-00130-CR,

2025 WL 1774450, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 26, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeals from plea bargained

judgments and noting that defendant’s claim that “he was coerced into pleading

guilty” was not a ground for continuing the appeals); Brown v. State, No. 02-21-00083-

CR, 2021 WL 3205065, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal in plea bargain case and stating

that defendant’s allegation of ineffective assistance “d[id] not provide a valid basis for

continuing the appeal”).

Thus, we dismiss Benson’s appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 31, 2025