Nicholas Gene Alleman v. Commissioner of Public Safety

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: March 4, 2024
• Docket: a230852
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-0852

Nicholas Gene Alleman, petitioner, Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety, Respondent.

Filed March 4, 2024 Affirmed Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Crow Wing County District Court File No. 18-CV-22-3333

Richard Dahl, Dahl Law Firm PA, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ryan Pesch, Matthew McGuire, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;

and Gaïtas, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

In this appeal from the district court’s order denying appellant Nicholas Gene

Alleman’s petition to rescind the revocation of his driver’s license and impoundment of his

license plate, Alleman argues that the district court erred by concluding that the officer had

(1) reasonable suspicion to stop his motorcycle, (2) probable cause to arrest him for driving while impaired (DWI), and (3) probable cause for the search warrant to obtain a sample of

his blood or urine. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent commissioner of public safety revoked Alleman’s driver’s license and

impounded his license plate after he was arrested for DWI and refused to submit to a blood

or urine test. Alleman sought judicial review of the commissioner’s decision. At the

implied-consent hearing, the district court received testimony from Officer Peter Lindman

and various exhibits, including Officer Lindman’s squad-car video, screenshots from that

squad-car video, and the search warrant. The evidence yielded the following facts.

On August 2, 2022, around 10:00 p.m., Officer Lindman observed a motorcycle

approach an intersection “at a fast rate of speed” and then “stop[] rapidly[,] causing [the]

tires to squeal.” Because he believed that the driver was driving carelessly or recklessly,

Officer Lindman followed the motorcycle and noticed that its license plate was obstructed

by a backpack. He pulled over the motorcycle as it was driving into a gas station.

Officer Lindman identified the driver as Alleman. When Officer Lindman asked

Alleman where he was going, Alleman replied that he was going to a friend’s house whose

address was in the opposite direction of his travel. Alleman then “change[d] that story” and

said that he was in a hurry to get home to his girlfriend. Officer Lindman observed that

Alleman was “restless” and “fidgety” and described Alleman’s behavior as including

“rapid speech,” “finger twitches,” and “teeth grinding.”

Suspecting that Alleman was under the influence of a controlled substance, Officer

Lindman administered field sobriety tests. First, Officer Lindman instructed Alleman to

2 perform the modified Romberg test, which required Alleman to estimate the passage of 30

seconds. An estimate that is within five seconds of the actual 30-second mark is considered

“normal.” Alleman estimated the passage of 30 seconds at the 25-second mark, which

Officer Lindman testified was on “[t]he fast side of normal.”

According to Officer Lindman, Alleman then started to “pass[] out.” While resting

on his motorcycle, Alleman began passing out a second time, and Officer Lindman called

for an ambulance. Alleman informed Officer Lindman that he might be hypoglycemic; but

when the ambulance arrived, Alleman refused to allow the ambulance personnel to check

his blood-sugar level. He also refused treatment or transport.

Officer Lindman then resumed field sobriety testing. He had Alleman perform the

walk-and-turn test, during which he observed three “clues” of impairment—Alleman “was

unable to maintain the starting position, stepped off line, and raised his arms.” Officer

Lindman also asked Alleman if he would perform the one-legged-stand test. Alleman stated

that he was unable to perform that test because of an old knee injury, but Officer Lindman

did not observe any signs of a knee impairment.

Officer Lindman administered a preliminary breath test, which showed an alcohol

concentration of zero. Officer Lindman then requested that Alleman take an “oral drug

test,” but Alleman refused. Believing that Alleman refused to take an oral drug test because

he was under the influence of a controlled substance, Officer Lindman arrested Alleman

for DWI. Officer Lindman applied for and obtained a search warrant for a sample of

Alleman’s blood or urine. Officer Lindman advised Alleman that “refusing to comply with

the warrant is a crime.” Alleman refused to submit to a blood or urine test.

3 Based on these facts, the district court sustained the license revocation and license-

plate impoundment. Alleman appeals.

DECISION

Under the implied-consent law, Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.50 to 169A.53

(2022), a person consents to a blood or urine test to determine the presence of a controlled

substance when an officer has probable cause to believe that the person was driving while

impaired and the person has been lawfully arrested for that offense. Minn. Stat. § 169A.51,

subd. 1(a), (b)(1). “[A] blood or urine test may be conducted only pursuant to a search

warrant . . . or a judicially recognized exception to the search warrant requirement.” Id.,

subd. 3(a). If the officer certifies that there was probable cause to believe that the person

had been driving while impaired and that the person refused to submit to a blood or urine

test, then the commissioner must revoke the person’s driver’s license. Minn. Stat.

§ 169A.52, subd. 3(a); see also Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 4(a) (2022) (requiring license

revocation for refusal of blood or urine test directed by search warrant). The commissioner

must also impound the person’s license plate based on the person’s license revocation for

test refusal. Minn. Stat. § 169A.60, subds. 1(d)(1), 2(a)(1) (2022). The person may petition

for judicial review of his license revocation and license-plate impoundment. Minn. Stat.

§§ 169A.53, subd. 2 (license revocation), 171.177, subd. 11 (same), 169A.60, subd. 10

(license-plate impoundment) (2022).

The commissioner has the burden of proof in implied-consent proceedings, and the

standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,

392 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. App. 1986). We review de novo questions of law in an

4 implied-consent proceeding. See Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 920

(Minn. App. 2010). A district court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly

erroneous standard. In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings, 816 N.W.2d 525, 537 (Minn.

2012). “We hold findings of fact as clearly erroneous only when we are left with a definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety,

642 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted).

I. The district court did not err by concluding that Officer Lindman had reasonable suspicion to stop Alleman’s motorcycle.

Alleman first argues that Officer Lindman lacked the necessary reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop his motorcycle and that the evidence that

followed should have been suppressed. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions

prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,

§ 10. “But an officer does not violate the prohibition if [the officer] stops a vehicle to

conduct an investigation based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the driver is

engaging in criminal activity.” Soucie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 463-64

(Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021). Reasonable suspicion must be based

on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those

facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see

Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. App. 2005). “Generally,

if an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant the traffic

law, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting

a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004).

5 The district court explained that Officer Lindman stated two grounds for stopping

Alleman’s motorcycle: (1) Alleman was potentially driving carelessly or recklessly and

(2) the motorcycle’s license plate was obstructed by a backpack. We need not consider the

first ground because, as we explain below, the second ground was a valid basis for the stop

and is supported by the evidence.

Under Minnesota Statutes section 169.79, subdivision 7 (2022), “[t]he person

driving the motor vehicle shall keep the [license] plate legible and unobstructed . . . so that

the lettering is plainly visible at all times.” See Minn. Stat. § 169.011, subd. 44 (2022)

(defining “motorcycle” as a “motor vehicle”). Based on the squad-car video, the district

court found that it was “very clear that the backpack obstruct[ed] at least three quarters of

the license plate.” Alleman disputes the district court’s finding that his license plate was

obstructed by the backpack.

Alleman contends that two screenshots from the squad-car video show that his

license plate was not covered by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped his

motorcycle. But a review of the squad-car video plainly shows that the license plate was

partially obstructed by the backpack before Officer Lindman stopped Alleman’s

motorcycle. Because the record supports the district court’s finding that Alleman’s license

plate was obstructed by the backpack, the district court did not err by concluding that

Officer Lindman had reasonable suspicion to stop Alleman’s motorcycle.

6 II. The district court did not err by concluding that Officer Lindman had probable cause to arrest Alleman for DWI.

Alleman next argues that Officer Lindman lacked probable cause to arrest him for

DWI. To arrest a person for DWI, an officer must have probable cause to believe that the

person is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or another intoxicating

substance. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.52,

subd. 3(a) (requiring probable cause to believe that a person has violated Minn. Stat.

§ 169A.20 (2022) to revoke that person’s driver’s license). “Probable cause to arrest a

person for DWI exists when the facts and circumstances available at the time of arrest

reasonably warrant a prudent and cautious officer to believe that an individual was driving

while under the influence.” Reeves v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 751 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn.

App. 2008).

“Whether the arresting officer’s actions were reasonable is an objective inquiry,”

and “[t]he existence of probable cause depends on the facts of each individual case.” State

v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 598-99 (Minn. 1993). An officer needs only one objective

indication of intoxication to constitute probable cause to believe that a person is under the

influence. Holtz v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 340 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. App. 1983). “To

establish probable cause, facts need not exclude all innocent explanations for conduct nor

conclusively show that conduct was illegal.” State v. Hawkins, 622 N.W.2d 576, 577

(Minn. App. 2001).

The district court concluded that the following facts and circumstances

demonstrated multiple indicia of intoxication: (1) Alleman provided multiple and

7 inconsistent answers to Officer Lindman’s question about where he was going; (2) Officer

Lindman observed that Alleman was restless and fidgety; (3) Alleman exhibited rapid

speech, finger twitches, and teeth grinding; (4) Alleman started to pass out twice during

the traffic stop; and (5) Alleman failed the walk-and-turn test. In addition, it is undisputed

that Alleman refused to perform the one-legged-stand test or to take an oral drug test.

Alleman contends that there were innocent explanations for any indication of

impairment and offers alternative explanations for his conduct. He asserts that he was

traveling in the opposite direction of his friend’s house because he was confused about his

location; he was grinding his teeth because he was chewing tobacco, although he

acknowledges that Officer Lindman did not notice that he was chewing tobacco; his

activities earlier in the day, the hot weather, and the fact that he was standing next to a hot

air-cooled motorcycle for 15 minutes could have caused him to pass out; and he refused to

perform the one-legged-stand test because of an alleged knee injury. None of these

alternative explanations for Alleman’s conduct negate Officer Lindman’s observations of

objective indicia of intoxication.

Alleman also points out that his performance was “normal” on the Romberg test and

that his preliminary breath test showed an alcohol concentration of zero. However,

performing well on some field sobriety tests does not negate probable cause when there are

other indicia of intoxication. See State v. Prax, 686 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. App. 2004), rev.

denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). In addition, Alleman does not dispute that Officer Lindman

arrested him for driving under the influence of a controlled substance, not alcohol.

8 Therefore, the district court did not err by concluding that Officer Lindman had

probable cause to arrest Alleman for DWI.

III. The district court did not err by concluding that there was probable cause for the search warrant.

Finally, Alleman argues that the search warrant to obtain a sample of his blood or

urine was not supported by probable cause because it relied on his Romberg test result. “A

warrant is supported by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). There is “a

presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.” Franks

v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).

But “a search warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded, if the

application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the

findings of probable cause.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010)

(quotation omitted). When a defendant seeks to invalidate a warrant on that basis, “the two-

prong Franks test requires a defendant to show that (1) the affiant deliberately made a

statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the statement was

material to the probable cause determination.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Alleman contends that Officer Lindman’s inclusion of his Romberg test result in the

warrant application without explaining that the result was normal was a misrepresentation.

The search warrant application stated: “Officer Lindman conducted the Modified Romberg

test. Alleman estimated 30 seconds in approximately 25 seconds.” Alleman does not

9 challenge the truthfulness of this statement. But he argues that Officer Lindman’s inclusion

of the statement in the warrant application, without context, represented that he “failed the

Romberg test.”

Even if the statement in the warrant application about Alleman’s Romberg test result

could be considered a misrepresentation, the statement is not material. “A

misrepresentation or omission is material if, when the misrepresentation is set aside or the

omission supplied, probable cause to issue the search warrant no longer exists.” Andersen,

784 N.W.2d at 327. Even if the warrant application had excluded the statement about the

Romberg test result or had included the context that the result fell within the range of

normal, the warrant was still supported by probable cause because the application included

the remaining indicia of intoxication—Alleman’s fidgeting, rapid speech, twitches,

fainting, inconsistent responses to questions, poor performance on the walk-and-turn test,

and refusal to perform other tests.

Because the alleged misrepresentation in the warrant application was not material,

the district court did not err by concluding that there was probable cause for the search

warrant.

Affirmed.