NH Dept, of Educ. v. Adams, et al. CV-94-573-M 04/17/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire Department of Education and New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Plaintiffs
v. Civil No. 94-573-M
City of Manchester School District and Marc Adams, Defendants.
O R D E R
In November of 1994, the New Hampshire Department of
Education and the New Hampshire Department of Corrections
(collectively, the "State") a filed this civil action, appealing a
final administrative order issued pursuant to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et
seg. Defendants, the City of Manchester School District (the
"School District") and Marc Adams, responded and sought an order
affirming the administrative hearing officer's preliminary and
final orders.
In March of 1996, the court vacated the orders of the
hearing officer dated July 14 and October 6, 1994, and denied the
School District's motion for summary judgment and Adams' motion to dismiss. It then granted the State's motion for summary
judgment to the extent that it sought an order vacating the
orders of the hearing officer. Nevertheless, claiming to have
been the "prevailing party," the School District now moves for an
award of attorneys' fees. That motion is denied.1
Background
The factual background to this litigation is set forth in
detail in the court's order dated March 21, 1996, and, therefore,
it need not be recited again. The court will, however, briefly
address the facts pertinent to the present dispute.
In 1991, Adams was implicated in the death of a three year
old girl and, in July of that year, he pled guilty to a related
charge of manslaughter. He was sentenced to a term of 15 to 30
1 The IDEA authorizes the court, in appropriate circumstances, to award reasonable attorneys' fees "to the parents or guardian of a child" who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B). Here, the School District is neither the parent nor guardian of Adams. Accordingly, it is not entitled to an award of fees under the IDEA. Its claimed entitlement to such an award is based upon New Hampshire common law. Because the court concludes that the School District is not entitled to such an award on the merits, it need not consider whether the limiting provisions regarding the award of attorneys' fees established in section 1415(e)(4)(B) preempt New Hampshire's common law for purposes of this case, or whether under federal common or other statutory law an award of fees would be legally sustainable.
2 years in the New Hampshire State prison, where he is currently
incarcerated. In February of 1992, Adams requested a due process
hearing under the IDEA, asserting that he was entitled to, but
was not receiving, a "free and appropriate" education in the
prison. Prior to the due process hearing, however, the parties
executed a settlement agreement, which the hearing officer then
entered as his final order (the "Stipulated Order"). That order
provided that the School District (with input from the State)
would develop an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") for Adams
for each year of a two-year compensatory education program and
that the State would implement the IEP at the prison.
Due to his own misbehavior and failure to comply with prison
regulations, however, Adams was periodically confined to the
prison's Secure Housing Unit ("SHU"), which precluded the State
from fully implementing the IEP as written. Adams and the School
District then requested another due process hearing, at which
they argued that the State had breached the terms of the
Stipulated Order by failing to implement the IEP as written,
notwithstanding any change in his circumstances. The hearing
officer agreed and, among other things, ordered the State to
implement Adams' IEP, regardless of his prison security
3 classification and notwithstanding the fact that he might
periodically be confined to SHU.
The State appealed the hearing officer's decision to this
court, which vacated the administrative orders and afforded the
parties an opportunity to resolve the dispute without further
court intervention. Failing that, the court stated that it would
likely appoint an expert and/or master to recommend an
appropriate IEP for Adams, taking into account the need to strike
a reasonable balance between the prison's legitimate penological
interests and A d a m s ' entitlement to a free and appropriate
education. The parties then reached a settlement and formulated
a new IEP for Adams. See Individual Education Plan for Marc
Adams (the "Revised IEP"), Exhibit 1 to the State's Objection.
The Revised IEP, unlike its predecessor, acknowledges the State's
authority to discipline Adams for reasons related to legitimate
security and penological concerns, notwithstanding some possibly
inconsistent provision in his IEP. See, e.g.. Revised IEP at 3
and 8 .
Discussion
Notwithstanding the court's vacation of the hearing
officer's administrative orders (which the School District sought
4 to uphold) and notwithstanding that the parties have negotiated a
settlement (in the form of the Revised IEP) which expressly
acknowledges that the State's legitimate security interests are
not subordinate to A d a m s ' right to a free and appropriate
education (contrary to the School District's earlier position in
this litigation ) , the School District says it "prevailed" in the
litigation and should be reimbursed by the State for amounts
spent on attorneys' fees.
Although the parties appear to have been able to resolve the
dispute in a way that satisfies both Adams' claim to appropriate
compensatory education and the prison's legitimate security
concerns, the position initially taken by both Adams and the
School District was not reasonable. As noted by the hearing
officer, Adams and the School District sought an order
"compelling the State Departments to implement the [original] IEP
by allowing [Adams] to take his courses in the Education Building
at the State Prison regardless of his classification within the
prison system." Decision of hearing officer John LeBrun, dated
July 14, 1994. In other words, Adams and the School District
asserted that the State was reguired to provide Adams with
educational programming in the prison's separate educational
facility, notwithstanding the fact that A d a m s ' prison behavior
5 resulted in his being confined in the prison's Secured Housing
Facility 24 hours a day. The court disagreed:
At the outset it should be recognized that the tail of Adams' IEP cannot wag the dog of his prison sentence, nor can it serve to exempt him from legitimate administrative and disciplinary systems in place within the prison.
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NH Dept, of Educ. v. Adams, et al. CV-94-573-M 04/17/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire Department of Education and New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Plaintiffs
v. Civil No. 94-573-M
City of Manchester School District and Marc Adams, Defendants.
O R D E R
In November of 1994, the New Hampshire Department of
Education and the New Hampshire Department of Corrections
(collectively, the "State") a filed this civil action, appealing a
final administrative order issued pursuant to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et
seg. Defendants, the City of Manchester School District (the
"School District") and Marc Adams, responded and sought an order
affirming the administrative hearing officer's preliminary and
final orders.
In March of 1996, the court vacated the orders of the
hearing officer dated July 14 and October 6, 1994, and denied the
School District's motion for summary judgment and Adams' motion to dismiss. It then granted the State's motion for summary
judgment to the extent that it sought an order vacating the
orders of the hearing officer. Nevertheless, claiming to have
been the "prevailing party," the School District now moves for an
award of attorneys' fees. That motion is denied.1
Background
The factual background to this litigation is set forth in
detail in the court's order dated March 21, 1996, and, therefore,
it need not be recited again. The court will, however, briefly
address the facts pertinent to the present dispute.
In 1991, Adams was implicated in the death of a three year
old girl and, in July of that year, he pled guilty to a related
charge of manslaughter. He was sentenced to a term of 15 to 30
1 The IDEA authorizes the court, in appropriate circumstances, to award reasonable attorneys' fees "to the parents or guardian of a child" who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B). Here, the School District is neither the parent nor guardian of Adams. Accordingly, it is not entitled to an award of fees under the IDEA. Its claimed entitlement to such an award is based upon New Hampshire common law. Because the court concludes that the School District is not entitled to such an award on the merits, it need not consider whether the limiting provisions regarding the award of attorneys' fees established in section 1415(e)(4)(B) preempt New Hampshire's common law for purposes of this case, or whether under federal common or other statutory law an award of fees would be legally sustainable.
2 years in the New Hampshire State prison, where he is currently
incarcerated. In February of 1992, Adams requested a due process
hearing under the IDEA, asserting that he was entitled to, but
was not receiving, a "free and appropriate" education in the
prison. Prior to the due process hearing, however, the parties
executed a settlement agreement, which the hearing officer then
entered as his final order (the "Stipulated Order"). That order
provided that the School District (with input from the State)
would develop an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") for Adams
for each year of a two-year compensatory education program and
that the State would implement the IEP at the prison.
Due to his own misbehavior and failure to comply with prison
regulations, however, Adams was periodically confined to the
prison's Secure Housing Unit ("SHU"), which precluded the State
from fully implementing the IEP as written. Adams and the School
District then requested another due process hearing, at which
they argued that the State had breached the terms of the
Stipulated Order by failing to implement the IEP as written,
notwithstanding any change in his circumstances. The hearing
officer agreed and, among other things, ordered the State to
implement Adams' IEP, regardless of his prison security
3 classification and notwithstanding the fact that he might
periodically be confined to SHU.
The State appealed the hearing officer's decision to this
court, which vacated the administrative orders and afforded the
parties an opportunity to resolve the dispute without further
court intervention. Failing that, the court stated that it would
likely appoint an expert and/or master to recommend an
appropriate IEP for Adams, taking into account the need to strike
a reasonable balance between the prison's legitimate penological
interests and A d a m s ' entitlement to a free and appropriate
education. The parties then reached a settlement and formulated
a new IEP for Adams. See Individual Education Plan for Marc
Adams (the "Revised IEP"), Exhibit 1 to the State's Objection.
The Revised IEP, unlike its predecessor, acknowledges the State's
authority to discipline Adams for reasons related to legitimate
security and penological concerns, notwithstanding some possibly
inconsistent provision in his IEP. See, e.g.. Revised IEP at 3
and 8 .
Discussion
Notwithstanding the court's vacation of the hearing
officer's administrative orders (which the School District sought
4 to uphold) and notwithstanding that the parties have negotiated a
settlement (in the form of the Revised IEP) which expressly
acknowledges that the State's legitimate security interests are
not subordinate to A d a m s ' right to a free and appropriate
education (contrary to the School District's earlier position in
this litigation ) , the School District says it "prevailed" in the
litigation and should be reimbursed by the State for amounts
spent on attorneys' fees.
Although the parties appear to have been able to resolve the
dispute in a way that satisfies both Adams' claim to appropriate
compensatory education and the prison's legitimate security
concerns, the position initially taken by both Adams and the
School District was not reasonable. As noted by the hearing
officer, Adams and the School District sought an order
"compelling the State Departments to implement the [original] IEP
by allowing [Adams] to take his courses in the Education Building
at the State Prison regardless of his classification within the
prison system." Decision of hearing officer John LeBrun, dated
July 14, 1994. In other words, Adams and the School District
asserted that the State was reguired to provide Adams with
educational programming in the prison's separate educational
facility, notwithstanding the fact that A d a m s ' prison behavior
5 resulted in his being confined in the prison's Secured Housing
Facility 24 hours a day. The court disagreed:
At the outset it should be recognized that the tail of Adams' IEP cannot wag the dog of his prison sentence, nor can it serve to exempt him from legitimate administrative and disciplinary systems in place within the prison. Stated somewhat differently, Adams is not entitled to an IEP which effectively insulates him from prison discipline and control, particularly if a different IEP could be developed which might serve both his educational needs and the prison's valid security and disciplinary interests, or at least one that did not undermine legitimate penological interests.
N.H. Department of Education v. City of Manchester, No. 94-573-M,
slip op. at 18 (D.N.H. March 21, 1996).
In the end, neither Adams nor the School District can
properly be viewed as a "prevailing party." The School District
is not entitled to reimbursement of its attorneys' fees under any
of the theories articulated in its motion. The State never
denied A d a m s ' entitlement to a free and appropriate education
while in the custody of the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections, nor did it dispute its obligation to fund that
education. It simply asserted, properly, that Adams could not
use his IEP as a special exemption from legitimate and valid
prison regulations. On that point, the State, not the School
District, prevailed.
6 Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the School District is not
entitled to an attorneys' fees award. Accordingly, its motion
for summary judgment on counterclaim for attorneys' fees
(document no. 46) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
April 17, 1997
cc: Nancy J. Smith, Esg. Peter S. Smith, Esg. H. Jonathan Meyer, Esg. Dean B. Eggert, Esg.