NH Dept, of Ed. v. Adams
This text of NH Dept, of Ed. v. Adams (NH Dept, of Ed. v. Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NH Dept, of Ed. v. Adams CV-94-573-M 02/16/96 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire Department of Education; and New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Plaintiffs,
v. Civil No. 94-573-M
City of Manchester, NH School District; and Marc Adams, Defendants.
O R D E R
Plaintiffs, the New Hampshire Department of Education and
the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (collectively, the
"State")a appeal an educational hearings officer's final order
issued pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Defendant, the City of
Manchester School District (the "School District"), moves to
dismiss the case, asserting that the State failed to file its
appeal in a timely fashion. For the reasons set forth below, the
School District's motion to dismiss is denied.
Discussion
The IDEA does not establish a specific period within which
appeals from IDEA due process hearings must be filed. And, prior
to June 30, 1992, different periods of limitation had been
applied to IDEA appeals in this district. Compare Edward B. v. Brunelle, 662 F.Supp. 1025 (D.N.H. 1986) (permitting a delay of
64 days between the issuance of the hearings officer's report and
the initiation of an appeal, because the delay was not
"unreasonable"); Mark E. v. Northland School District, No. 84-
156-L (D.N.H. November 25, 1986) (rejecting application of the
30-day limitations period prescribed for state administrative
appeals in RSA 541:6); with Bow School District v. Quentin W . ,
750 F.Supp. 546 (D.N.H. 1990) (borrowing the 30-day limitation
period of RSA 541:6); G.D. v. Westmoreland School District, 783
F.Supp. 1532 (D.N.H. 1992) (same); I.D. v. Westmoreland School
District, 788 F.Supp. 634 (D.N.H. 1992) (same).
The New Hampshire Legislature undoubtedly enacted N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 186-C:16-b, effective June 30, 1992, to bring some
needed predictability and stability to this area. That statute
provides, in pertinent part:
IV. An appeal from a final administrative decision in a special education due process hearing to a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1415 (e) shall be commenced within 120 days from receipt of the final decision. All such decisions shall be sent certified mail, return receipt reguested.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 186-C:16-b, IV ("Section 16-b"). This seems
to be the first case in which a court has been called upon to
determine whether the recently enacted 120-day limitations period
2 prescribed by Section 16-b applies to IDEA appeals brought in
federal court.
In 1993, the Court of Appeals for this circuit affirmed a
district court's holding that a 30-day statute of limitations
found in the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act was the
controlling period of limitations in IDEA cases brought in the
federal court for the District of Massachusetts. Amann v. Stow,
991 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1993) . In Amann, the court borrowed the
30-day Administrative Procedure Act limitations period because
it: (1) provided the most "suitable" and "closely analogous" rule
of timeliness; and (2) the 30-day period was not inconsistent
with federal law or policy. Amann, 991 F.2d at 931. The School
District argues here that Amann mandates application of New
Hampshire's 30-day limitation on administrative appeals (N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 541:6), rather than the 120-day period prescribed
by Section 16-b.
Plainly, Section 16-b has supplanted N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 541:6 as the "most analogous" state statute of limitations; it
could not be more analogous since it expressly establishes a
limitations period for IDEA appeals. See Murphy v. Timberlane
Regional School Dist., 22 F.3d 1186, 1191 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1994).
The only relevant inguiry, then, is whether that limitations
3 period is consistent with the federal policies underlying, and
the goals of, the IDEA. See Amann, 991 F.2d at 931 ("[0]ur task
is to borrow the most suitable statute or other rule of
timeliness from some other source. We have generally concluded
that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely
analogous statute of limitations under state law, provided that
it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.")
(citations omitted).
The School District argues that the 120-day limitations
period i_s inconsistent with at least one of IDEA'S goals: the
speedy resolution of disputes related to children's Individual
Education Plans ("lEPs"). It claims that a 120-day period
frustrates that goal, particularly given the typical 180-day
school year. Thus, the School District argues, an inordinate
delay in the implementation of valid lEPs will likely result if
the time for appeal is extended well into the school year.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 5. While it is
true that a typical school year consists of roughly 180 school
days, intervening weekends, holidays, and school vacations
stretch the school year to more than nine months. Against that
backdrop. New Hampshire's four month limitations period seems not
4 unreasonably long, nor is it hopelessly inconsistent with IDEA'S
goals.1
Of course, application of any period of limitations will
impose some hardships. Section 16-b, however, represents a
reasonable compromise that is consistent with IDEA'S goals of
achieving timely resolution of disputes, while at the same time
affording the parties, especially parents, a reasonable
opportunity to review the results of due process proceedings and
attempt to amicably resolve any remaining issues before
proceeding with further litigation. Accordingly, the court holds
that the limitations period prescribed by Section 16-b is, on the
whole, consistent with the IDEA'S multiple goals of providing
ample opportunities for parental involvement and avoiding
premature termination of legitimate claims by default (suggesting
that the limitations period should be fairly lengthy), on the one
hand, and the need to expeditiously resolve disputes concerning a
handicapped child's education (counseling a shorter limitations
period), on the other hand. See Amann, 991 F.2d at 931-32.
1 As a practical matter, it is unreasonable to expect that substantial disputes relating to a student's IEP will normally be resolved before the end of the academic year. "Judicial review invariably takes more than nine months to complete, not to mention the time consumed during the preceding state administrative hearings." Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186-87 n.9 (1982).
5 Conclusion
As the 120-day limitations period prescribed by Section 16-b
is the most analogous and appropriate state statute of
limitations, the court will borrow and apply it in this case.
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