Nguyen Hooker v. Sheriff Kevin McMahill, et al.

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 NGUYEN HOOKER, Case No. 2:24-cv-01214-GMN-DJA

6 Petitioner, v. ORDER 7 SHERIFF KEVIN MCMAHILL, et al., 8 Respondents. 9 10 Counseled Petitioner Nguyen Hooker filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 11 No. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the Municipal 12 Court of the City of Las Vegas in Hooker’s Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) case. Before 13 the Court is Hooker’s Motion to Alter or Amend (ECF No. 15) the order dismissing Hooker’s 14 Petition without prejudice. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Hooker’s Motion 15 to Alter or Amend Judgment. 16 Background 17 In October 2020, Hooker was charged with DUI under LVMC 10.02.010 and NRS 18 484C.110. City of Las Vegas v. Hooker, Case No. C1231065. Hooker filed a motion to dismiss 19 the criminal complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the $35 civil penalty in addition to 20 the $1000 fine enhanced his charge to a gross misdemeanor. The Las Vegas Municipal Court 21 denied his motion to dismiss. Hooker filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in state district 22 court and the state district court denied his Petition, finding that “the possibility of owing up to 23 $1035 does not make DUI-1st anything other than a misdemeanor.” ECF No. 10-1 at 29. The 24 Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the state district court’s ruling. 25 Hooker initiated this federal habeas proceeding. ECF No. 1. He challenges the subject 26 matter jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of the City of Las Vegas. He alleges that the 27 prosecution of his DUI as a misdemeanor offense violates his federal due process rights. The 28 Court directed Hooker to show cause why his Petition should not be dismissed because it is 1 barred by the Younger abstention doctrine and because Hooker is not in custody. ECF No. 2. 2 Following his response to the order to show cause, the Court found that the issues in this matter 3 would benefit from further briefing. Respondents moved to dismiss the Petition because (1) 4 Hooker is not “in custody” for purposes of his petition, and (2) the Court should abstain from 5 intervening in the ongoing state court matter pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 6 (1971). ECF No. 6. 7 The Court granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Hooker’s Petition 8 without prejudice and judgment was entered. ECF Nos. 13, 14. Hooker now moves the Court to 9 reconsider its dismissal order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing that the Court overlooked that 10 Hooker has no available or remaining state corrective remedies and that this Court’s finding that 11 Hooker was not in custody is based on a misunderstanding that Hooker has not been convicted. 12 ECF No. 15 at 2. In the alternative, Hooker requests that the Court issue a certificate of 13 appealability. Id. at 3-4. 14 Discussion 15 As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “a Rule 59(e) motion is an ‘extraordinary remedy, to 16 be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources’.” Wood v. 17 Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 18 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Absent highly unusual circumstances, reconsideration under 19 Rule 59(e) is “available only when (1) the court committed manifest errors of law or fact, (2) the 20 court is presented with newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, (3) the decision 21 was manifestly unjust, or (4) there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Rishor v. 22 Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 491–92 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 23 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Wood, 759 F.3d at 1121 (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 197 24 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc)). Rule 59(e) motions “may not be used to ‘raise 25 arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised 26 earlier in the litigation’.” Rishor, 822 F.3d at 492 (citing Herron, 634 F.3d at 1111). 27 The Ninth Circuit has set forth criteria specific to evaluating a Rule 59(e) motion for 28 reconsideration in a habeas case: 1 case must first determine whether the motion should be construed as a second or successive habeas petition: that is whether it seeks to raise an argument or ground 2 for relief that was not raised in the initial habeas petition. If so, the district court should dismiss the motion without prejudice to allow the applicant to move in the 3 Court of Appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the second habeas application. However, the district court may proceed to consider the merits 4 of a Rule 59(e) motion that is filed within twenty-eight days of judgment and asks the court to correct errors of fact or law. As always, the district court will “enjoy [ ] 5 considerable discretion in granting or denying the motion. 6 7 Rishor, 822 F.3d at 492 (quoting Herron, 634 F.3d at 1111). The Court should construe a Rule 8 59(e) motion “as a second or successive habeas petition subject to AEDPA’s restrictions” when 9 it “raises entirely new claims,” i.e., when the motion (i) seeks to add a ground for relief not 10 articulated in the original federal habeas petition, (ii) presents newly discovered evidence, or (iii) 11 seeks relief based on a subsequent change in the law. Rishor, 822 F.3d at 492. “In contrast, a 12 timely Rule 59(e) motion that asks the district court to ‘correct manifest errors of law or fact 13 upon which the judgment rests’ should not be construed as a second or successive habeas 14 petition.” Rishor, 822 F.3d at 492. 15 The Court does not construe Hooker’s Motion as a second or successive petition because 16 it does not raise new claims. Rather, the Motion attempts to provide additional reasons why this 17 Court should not have granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss 18 Nothing in Hooker’s Rule 59(e) motion convinces the Court that it clearly erred in 19 dismissing this action on the basis that Hooker is not in custody and based on federal abstention 20 under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court gave thorough consideration 21 to its prior rulings. Hooker’s Motion does not cite, let alone attempt to comply with, the 22 applicable legal standard. He improperly attempts to take a “second bite at the apple” and makes 23 arguments he should have raised in the first instance. Hooker has not stated a meritorious reason 24 to reconsider prior rulings and alter the judgment in this case. The request for 25 reconsideration is therefore denied. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 Conclusion 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 3 1. Petitioner Nguyen Hooker’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (ECF No. 15) is 4 denied. 5 2. Acertificate of appealability is denied, as reasonable jurists would not find the 6 dismissal of the federal petition to be debatable or wrong. 7 DATED: March 3, 2026 8 ? an y NAVARRO 10 UNITBD’STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28