NFG, LLC v. NORAG, LLC

District Court, N.D. Iowa·Decided September 25, 2024·No. 6:24-cv-02039·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

NFG, LLC, and LORI OSMUNDSON, No. 24-CV-2039-CJW-KEM Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants, vs. ORDER

NORAG, LLC, Defendant/Counter-Claimant. ___________________________ I. INTRODUCTION This matter is before the Court on a September 4, 2024, Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) filed by the Honorable Kelly K.E. Mahoney, Chief United States Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 17). Judge Mahoney recommends the Court remand this case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant filed a response to the R&R in which it states it “does not object to the remand to state court.” (Doc. 18, at 1). Plaintiffs did not file any objections and the deadline for such objections has expired. For the reasons stated below, the Court accepts Judge Mahoney’s R&R without modification. II. BACKGROUND The Court has reviewed the record and finds that Judge Mahoney accurately summarized the limited pertinent facts and procedural history of this case. In short, this breach-of-contract case was originally filed in the District Court of Fayette County, Iowa. (Doc. 4). Defendant removed the case to this Court on July 22, 2024, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). After defendant removed the case, defendant filed its answer and counterclaims against all plaintiffs. (Doc. 9). All parties have filed citizen disclosure statements. (Docs. 11, 12, & 16). III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS A. Review of Report and Recommendation A district judge must review a magistrate judge’s R&R under the following standards: Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). Thus, when a party objects to any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion. Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A district judge may, however, elect to review an R&R under a more exacting standard even if no objections are filed: Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). B. Federal Court Jurisdiction Federal courts may only hear cases which fall within their limited subject matter jurisdiction. N. Cent. F.S. v. Brown, 951 F. Supp. 1383, 1391–92 (N.D. Iowa 1996). Title 28, United States Code, Section 1332, grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different states[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “[T]he statutory formulation ‘between . . . citizens of different States’ [requires] complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.” Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)); see also Junk v. Terminix Int’l Co., 628 F.3d 439, 445 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that diversity jurisdiction requires “complete diversity, that is where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” (internal quotations omitted)). “While [Section] 1332 allows plaintiffs to invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, [Title 28, United States Code, Section 1441] gives defendants a corresponding opportunity.” Lincoln Prop. Co., 546 U.S. at 89. Under Section 1441(a): [A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

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