NEXTEEL Co. v. United States

227 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 2017 CIT 59, 2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 60, 2017 WL 2126603
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 15, 2017
DocketSlip Op. 17-59; Court 17-00091
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 227 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (NEXTEEL Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
NEXTEEL Co. v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 2017 CIT 59, 2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 60, 2017 WL 2126603 (cit 2017).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

Kelly, Judge:

Pending before the court is Plaintiff-Intervenor Husteel Co., Ltd.’s (“Husteel”) partial consent motion 1 for preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendant United States from liquidating Husteel’s entries of certain oil country tubular goods (“OCTG”) from the Republic of Korea (“Korea”) that were produced and/or exported by Husteel and that are subject to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final results of the administrative review of the antidumping duty order on OCTG from Korea covering the period July 18, 2014 to August 31, 2015. Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea, 82 Fed. Reg. 18,105 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 17, 2017) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review; 2014-2015) (“Final Results”), and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2014-2015 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea (Apr. 10, 2017), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/koreasouth/2017-07684-1.pdf (last visited May 15, 2017). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Plaintiff-Intervenor’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

BACKGROUND

Commerce published the Final Results on April 17, 2017. Final Results, 82 Fed. Reg. at 18,105. Plaintiff NEXTEEL Co., Ltd. (“NEXTEEL”), a selected mandatory respondent, commenced this action on April 27, 2017, contesting the Final Results. See Summons, Apr. 27, 2016, ECF *1325 No. 1. Plaintiffs complaint made four substantive challenges to Commerce’s Final Results, arguing that the Final Results were neither supported by substantial evidence nor in accordance with law. Complaint, Apr. 28, 2017, ECF No. 7. The court granted NEXTEEL’s motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the liquidation of its entries on May 3, 2017. See Consent Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, May 2, 2017, ECF No. 14; Order, May 3, 2017, ECF No. 16.

Husteel, a producer and exporter of OCTG from Korea subject to, the Final Results, moved to intervene in the present action on May 2, 2017. Consent Mot. to Intervene as of Right, May 2, 2017, ECF No. 9. Husteel was not selected for individual examination by Commerce in this review, and thus is subject to the “non-examined company” antidumping duty rate based on the average of the rates calculated for the mandatory respondents. See Final Results, 82 Fed. Reg. at 18,106, 18,-108. The court granted Husteel’s motion to intervene on May 3, 2017. Order, May 3, 2017, ECF No. 15. Husteel then filed the instant motion for a preliminary injunction on May 8, 2017. Partial Consent Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, May 8, 2017, ECF No. 24. Defendant opposes Husteel’s motion. Def.’s Resp. Opp.’n to Husteel Co., Ltd.’s Mot. Prelim. Injunction, May 12, 2017, ECF No. 32.

DISCUSSION

“In international trade cases, the CIT has authority to grant preliminary injunctions barring liquidation in order to preserve a party’s right to challenge the assessed duties.” Qingdao Taifa Grp. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To obtain the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish that (1) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction, (2) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (3) the balance of the equities favors the movant, and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

Defendant does not oppose Hus-teel’s motion on the basis of the four factor test of eligibility for injunctive relief. Defendant argues instead that Husteel’s motion for preliminary injunction should be denied because the motion seeks to enlarge the issues in the case by requesting an injunction for entries not the subject of Plaintiff’s complaint. Def.’s Br. 2-7. Defendant contends that that court lacks the authority to grant Husteel its requested relief, see id. at 6, and that granting Hus-teel’s motion would impermissibly alter the nature of the action by enjoining entries not included in NEXTEEL’s complaint. Id. at 4. Defendant additionally contends that, as a Plaintiff-Intervenor, Husteel’s role in the litigation is inherently limited to supporting Plaintiffs positions in advancing Plaintiffs own claims. Id. at 2.

Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive. As explained by this Court in pri- or opinions, “[t]he concept of enlargement is one that is best ‘reserved for situations in which an intervenor adds new legal issues to those already before the court.’ ” Tianjin Wanhua Co. Ltd, v. United States, 38 CIT -, -, 11 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1285 (2014), quoting NSK Corp. v. United States, 32 CIT 161, 166, 547 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (2008); see also Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Limited v. United States, 40 CIT -, -, 195 F.Supp.3d 1324, 1329-30 (2016); Union Steel v. United States, 33 CIT 614, 624, 617 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1382 (2009); Union Steel v. United States, 34 CIT 567, 570-72, 704 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1350-52 (2010). A Plaintiff-Intervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction which does' not raise additional substantive issues *1326 does not enlarge the Plaintiffs complaint, since it simply ensures that the judicial opinion resulting from the present litigation will govern entries that are already covered by the administrative review and subject to the Final Results being challenged. There is no indication in Husteel’s motion for preliminary injunction that Husteel is introducing new substantive issues into the litigation that were not raised in NEXTEEL’s complaint. See Partial Consent Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, May 8, 2017, ECF No. 24. Husteel’s motion for a preliminary injunction does “not, in any meaningful sense, ‘compel an alteration of the nature of the proceeding.’” Union Steel, 33 CIT at 624, 617 F.Supp.2d at 1382, quoting Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489, 498, 64 S.Ct. 731, 88 L.Ed. 883 (1944).

Defendant relies upon Vinson, 321 U.S. at 498, 64 S.Ct. 731, and Laizhou Auto Brake Equip. Co. v. United States, 31 CIT 212, 213-15, 477 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1299-1301 (2007), to support its position that an intervenor may not expand the case in which it has intervened. Def.’s Br. 2. In Vinson the Supreme Court held that an intervenor may not enlarge the issues pending before a court in the action. Vinson, 321 U.S. at 498, 64 S.Ct. 731. The court agrees with the prior holdings of this Court that have found that “that a grant under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
227 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 2017 CIT 59, 2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 60, 2017 WL 2126603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nexteel-co-v-united-states-cit-2017.