Newton v. Early Warning Services, LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-12559
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION DONALD J. NEWTON,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-12559 v. Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

EARLY WARNING SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant. __________________________________________________________________/ ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECUSAL (ECF No. 9); AND (2) REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SERVICE DOCUMENTS OR SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED In this action, pro se Plaintiff Donald J. Newton alleges that Defendant Early Warning Services, LLC, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Michigan tort law. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) He seeks money damages and injunctive relief. (See id.) Now before the Court is Newton’s Motion for Recusal. (See Mot., ECF No. 9.) The Court DENIES that motion for the reasons stated below. Additionally, because Newton has failed to comply with the Court’s August 19, 2025, Order directing him to complete service on the Defendant within 14 days (ECF No. 5), the Court directs Newton to either (1) present the required service documents to the Clerk’s Office within 14 days or (2) SHOW CAUSE in writing within 14 days why this action should not be dismissed. I On September 2, 2025, Newton filed a motion to recuse the undersigned from presiding over this case. (See Mot., ECF No. 9.) Newton says that a handful of the

Court’s previous rulings in other, unrelated matters, “demonstrate[] bias and the appearance of partiality in favor of corporate and institutional defendants.” (Id., PageID.87.) He also states that the Court’s recent denial of his motion for

emergency injunctive relief in the current action “reflects a continuation of the same pattern.” (Id.) Newton brings his motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455. (See id.) This Court recently stated the governing legal standard for a motion to recuse as

follows: [28 U.S.C. § 455] provides that a district judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The statute further provides that a district judge “shall also disqualify himself” if “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). . . .

The test for disqualification under the statute is “not based on the subjective view of a party.” Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Dandy, 989 F.2d 1344, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993)). Instead, the statute “imposes an objective standard: a judge must disqualify himself ‘where a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 837 (6th Cir. 2013)).

The analysis of a disqualification motion starts from the premise that a federal district judge “is presumed to be impartial.” Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 2006)). Thus, “[t]he burden is on the moving party to justify disqualification.” Burley, 834 F.3d at 616 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Yashinsky, 170 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 1999)). And the burden is “substantial.” Denton, 434 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, a party seeking disqualification faces an “uphill battle” where the Court’s alleged bias “ar[o]se during the course of current or prior proceedings.” Burley, 834 F.3d at 616 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has explained:

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.

(Dorman v. Township of Clinton, No. 15-cv-12552, 2025 WL 85223, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2025). The Court has carefully reviewed Newton’s motion and concludes Newton has not provided any basis for the Court to recuse itself in this matter. Newton’s short list of cases in which he believes the Court was unfair to “individual litigants and consumers” (Mot., ECF No. 9, PageID.87) falls far short of showing that the Court is biased against him. Newton offers no analysis of the rulings in those cases

and makes no attempt to show that those decisions were wrong or unfair. And he draws no plausible connection between those decisions and this case. Further, the Court’s denial of Newton’s request for emergency injunctive

relief does not indicate partiality, as Newton alleges. (See id.) The Court denied Newton’s request for an emergency temporary restraining order because Newton failed to satisfy any of the requirements for that form of extraordinary relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1). (See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion

for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 8.) Adherence to the Federal Rules does not indicate prejudice or partiality on the part of the Court. Moreover, in that denial, the Court indicated it could revisit the issue of injunctive relief after

Newton satisfied the Rule’s requirements. (See id.) For all of these reasons, Newton’s motion for recusal is DENIED. II Newton filed his Complaint in this action on August 15, 2025, and applied to

proceed in forma pauperis. (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On August 19, 2025, the Court granted Newton’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and entered an Order directing Newton to complete and present service documents to the Clerk’s Office

within 14 days of the Order. (See Order Directing Plaintiff to Complete Service Documents and for Service of Process by the U.S. Marshal, ECF No. 5, PageID.61.) Over a month has passed since the Court entered that Order, and Newton has not

completed and presented any documents to the Clerk’s Office. Nor has Newton asked for additional time to provide the documents. Without the required documents, this action cannot proceed. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that Newton shall either (1) present the service documents to the Clerk’s Office within 14 days from the date of this Order or (2) SHOW CAUSE in writing within 14 days why this action should not be dismissed. Newton’s failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Matthew F. Leitman MATTHEW F. LEITMAN Dated: September 24, 2025 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or counsel of record on September 24, 2025, by electronic means and/or ordinary mail.

s/Holly A. Ryan Case Manager (313) 234-5126