Newton v. Dudek

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJuly 8, 2025
Docket4:23-cv-01382
StatusUnknown

This text of Newton v. Dudek (Newton v. Dudek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newton v. Dudek, (E.D. Mo. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN PATRICK NEWTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Case No: 4:23-cv-01382-RHH FRANK BISIGNANO,1 ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Petition for Award of Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,110.59, at the rates of $232.99 and $239.26 per hour for 30.9 attorney hours of work in 2023 and 2024, and the rate of $100 per hour for 7.3 hours of paralegal work. Defendant filed a response stating that although Plaintiff requested $8,110.59 in his motion, “[a]fter discussion, the parties have agreed to an award of attorney fees under the EAJA in the amount of $7,705.06.” (ECF No. 20.) Based on the following, the Court will award Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,705.06. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff John Patrick Newton filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of Defendant denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1.) On March 25, 2025, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.

1 Frank Bisignano is now the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano shall be substituted for Leland Dudek as the defendant in this suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). § 405(g). (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) Plaintiff filed a request for attorney’s fees under the EAJA on June 23, 2025. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) Defendant filed a response to the motion on July 7, 2025. (ECF No. 20.) II. Standard of Review

“A court shall award to a prevailing party. . . fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses must (1) submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and eligible to receive an award; (2) provide the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing on behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed; (3) allege that the position

of the United States was not substantially justified; and (4) make the application within thirty days of final judgment of the action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The determination of whether the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record made in the action for which the fees are sought. Id. “In sentence four [remand] cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment (“affirming, modifying, or reversing”) is entered by the Court and the appeal period has run so that the judgment is no longer appealable.” Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (“Final judgment" means a judgment that is final and not appealable.”)). “It is well-settled that in order to be a prevailing party for EAJA purposes, plaintiff must have received some, but not necessarily all, of the benefits originally sought in his action.” Stanfield v. Apfel, 985 F.Supp. 927, 929 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Swedberg v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 1986)). Obtaining a sentence four judgment reversing the Secretary’s denial of

benefits is sufficient to confer prevailing party status. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). III. Discussion In this action, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate in this matter. First, Plaintiff is a prevailing party in this action, because he has obtained a reversal of the Commissioner’s denial of his application for benefits. (ECF No. 17.) Second, Plaintiff’s application for attorney’s fees will be reduced due to the parties’ agreement, which is reasonable. Plaintiff initially requested fees in the amount of $8,110.59, at rates ranging from $100 per hour for paralegal work to $232.99 and $239.26 per hour for attorney

work in 2023 and 2024. The application includes itemized statements from his attorney stating the actual time expended. The rate at which attorney’s fees were computed was not included in the itemized statements; however, Plaintiff’s motion includes the requested rate. The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s time records and the Court agrees that a reduction in the requested fee should be taken and affirms the amount agreed to by the parties. The EAJA sets a statutory limit on the amount of fees awarded to counsel at $125.00 per hour, “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). “In determining a reasonable attorney’s fee, the court will in each case consider the following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required to handle the problems presented; the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount

involved.” Richardson-Ward v. Astrue, 2009 WL1616701, No. 4:07-CV-1301 JCH at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 9, 2009). “The decision to increase the hourly rate is at the discretion of the district court.” Id. at *2. “Where, as here, an EAJA petitioner presents uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly attorney’s fees of more than [$125.00] per hour, enhanced fees should be awarded.” Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff’s counsel cited evidence from the U.S. Department of Labor, explaining the change in the cost of living from 1996 when the $125.00 hourly limitation became effective and 2024. Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed upon an award of attorney’s fees. Upon consideration of these facts, the Court finds that the hourly rate, number of hours expended, and a total fee award of $7,705.06 is reasonable. As alleged by Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Defendant’s position

was not substantially justified.

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Related

Shalala v. Schaefer
509 U.S. 292 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Astrue v. Ratliff
560 U.S. 586 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Melkonyan v. Sullivan
501 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Stanfield v. Apfel
985 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Missouri, 1997)

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Newton v. Dudek, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newton-v-dudek-moed-2025.