Newson v. Proctor & Gamble

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 6, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00011
StatusUnknown

This text of Newson v. Proctor & Gamble (Newson v. Proctor & Gamble) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newson v. Proctor & Gamble, (S.D. Ohio 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

YOLANDA E. NEWSOME, Case No. 1:25-cv-00011

Plaintiff, McFarland, J. vs. Bowman, M.J.

PROCTOR & GAMBLE, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Yolanda Newsome a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania brings this action against defendants, Proctor and Gamble, AstraZeneca, Dr. Noel Williams and Dr. Michael Daneilwicz. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An

action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are Afantastic or delusional@ in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff brings a complaint for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s Statement of the Claim states as follows:

PROCTOR & GAMBLE et al. manufactured a medication that caused I (The Plaintiff) to have a mental and physical injury of the PRILOSEC medication. DR. NOEL WILLIAMS et al. became aware of the PRILOSEC medication In the year of 2015, and still continuously had I (The Plaintiff) to Intake this medication knowingly after the FDA said that it’s BANNED). DR. MICHAEL DANIELEWICZ et al. knowingly knew that after I (The Plaintiff) was given his guidance to use a different medication of (FAMOTIDINE), that It caused I (The Plaintiff) to be constipated, but DR. MICHAEL DANIELEWICZ et al. still sent me back to DR. NOEL WILLIAMS et al. knowing he caused il (The Plaintiff) a mental and physical Injury.

(Doc. 1-1, p4). For relief, Plaintiff asks for “Declaratory Damages of $10,000,000,000.00. Per Person of Monetary Damages $10,000,000,000.00. Per Person of Compensatory Damages $10,000,000,000.00. Per Person of Punitive Damages $10,000,000,000.00.” Id. at 5. Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in this federal court. “To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff ‘must allege that he was deprived of a right secured

by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color of state law.’” Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C., 338 F.Supp.2d 775, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (quoting Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)). Here, two defendants are corporations, and two defendants are private individuals. None appear to be or are alleged to be persons acting under color of state law. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims do not include sufficient allegations to support the existence of federal question jurisdiction. In addition, Plaintiff fails to include sufficient facts to state any plausible claim against any Defendant.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Lappin
630 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 2010)
Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C.
338 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Michigan, 2004)

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Newson v. Proctor & Gamble, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newson-v-proctor-gamble-ohsd-2025.