Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. Emerson

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedJuly 28, 1998
Docket0497981
StatusUnpublished

This text of Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. Emerson (Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. Emerson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. Emerson, (Va. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis

NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0497-98-1 PER CURIAM JULY 28, 1998 DENNIS D. EMERSON

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(Jonathan H. Walker; Mason & Mason, on brief), for appellant. (Richard B. Donaldson, Jr.; Kevin W. Grierson; Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, on brief), for appellee.

Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (hereinafter

referred to as "employer") contends that the Workers'

Compensation Commission erred in finding that employer's evidence

failed to rebut the statutory presumption available to Dennis D.

Emerson under Code § 65.2-402(B). Upon reviewing the record and

the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's

decision. See Rule 5A:27.

"Code § 65.2-402(B) creates a presumption that

[firefighters'] heart diseases are occupationally related,

'unless such presumption is overcome by a preponderance of

competent evidence to the contrary.'" Augusta County Sheriff's Dept. v. Overbey, 254 Va. 522, 526, 492 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1997). * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. "[T]he term 'firefighter' shall include persons who are employed

by . . . private employers primarily to perform firefighting

services." Code § 65.2-402(A).

"Code § 65.2-402(B) requires [employer] to establish a

non-work-related cause for [Emerson's] heart condition and that

job stress was not the cause." Overbey, 254 Va. at 526, 492

S.E.2d at 633. "[I]n order to overcome the statutory

presumption, the employer merely 'must adduce competent medical

evidence of a non-work-related cause of the disabling disease.'" Id. at 527, 492 S.E.2d at 634 (quoting Doss v. Fairfax County

Fire & Rescue Dept., 229 Va. 440, 442, 331 S.E.2d 795, 796

(1985)).

In ruling that employer's evidence was insufficient to rebut

the statutory presumption, the commission found as follows: [T]wo of three physicians, both treating physicians, Dr. [Peter J.] Zullo and Dr. [Paul] Micale, implicate [Emerson's] work-related exposure to smoke and fumes as a causative factor. Only Dr. [Warren] Israel, who did not examine [Emerson], maintains that [Emerson's] heart disease is explained by other risk factors. Dr. Israel, while articulating a thorough foundation for his opinion that stress was not a factor, failed to so thoroughly explain why [Emerson's] occupational exposure to smoke and fumes did not, in his opinion, contribute to [Emerson's] disease. We therefore do not find Dr. Israel's conclusory dismissal of occupational exposure to smoke and fumes persuasive. Based on that finding, and the conflicting medical evidence, we conclude the employer failed to establish, by a preponderance of competent evidence, a non-work-related cause of [Emerson's] coronary artery disease.

- 2 - "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is

subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."

Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401

S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991). As fact finder, the commission was

entitled to give greater weight to the opinions of the treating

physicians, Drs. Zullo and Micale, and to reject Dr. Israel's

opinion. Based upon its weighing of the medical evidence, the

commission was entitled to conclude that Dr. Israel's opinion did

not constitute competent evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption. "Questions raised by conflicting medical opinions

must be decided by the commission." Penley v. Island Creek Coal

Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989).

In light of the opinions of Drs. Zullo and Micale, we cannot

say as a matter of law that employer's evidence rebutted the

statutory presumption provided under Code § 65.2-402(B).

For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.

Affirmed.

- 3 -

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Related

Augusta County Sheriff's Department v. Overbey
492 S.E.2d 631 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1997)
Doss v. FAIRFAX CTY. FIRE AND RESCUE DEPT.
331 S.E.2d 795 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1985)
Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson
401 S.E.2d 213 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1991)
Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co.
381 S.E.2d 231 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
Doss v. Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department
331 S.E.2d 795 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1985)

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