Newman v. Greater Columbus Arts Council

2025 Ohio 471
CourtOhio Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 23, 2025
Docket2024-00619PQ
StatusPublished

This text of 2025 Ohio 471 (Newman v. Greater Columbus Arts Council) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Newman v. Greater Columbus Arts Council, 2025 Ohio 471 (Ohio Super. Ct. 2025).

Opinion

[Cite as Newman v. Greater Columbus Arts Council, 2025-Ohio-471.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

MICHAEL NEWMAN Case No. 2024-00619PQ

Requester Special Master Todd Marti

v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GREATER COLUMBUS ARTS COUNCIL, et al.

Respondents

{¶1} This matter is before me for a R.C. 2743.75(F) report and recommendation. I recommend that the court (1) grant requester’s claim for the production of the records generated from 2020 through July 15, 2024, that are responsive to parts 1, 6, and 13 of his records request, (2) award requester his filing fees and costs, (3) require respondent to bear the balance of the costs of this case, and (4) deny all other relief. I. Background. {¶2} The Greater Columbus Arts Council (“GCAC”) and the Columbus Film Commission (“CFC”) are or were non-profit corporations. In 2020, CFC became part of GCAC and CFC no longer exists as an independent entity. GCAC has assumed CFC’s functions and conducts them in the name of CFC. Affidavit of Thomas J. Katzenmeyer, filed December 26, 2024, ¶ 2; Respondent’s Documents Filed Under Seal For In Camera Review, filed December 5, 2024 (“In Camera Records”), p. 404; Respondent’s Documents Filed Under Seal For In Camera Review Pursuant to Court’s 12/12/24 Order, filed December 26, 2024, pp. 1-16.1 {¶3} One of those functions is distributing grant funds on behalf of the City of Columbus (the “City”). GCAC has contracts with the City to distribute City funds to entities and individuals who, in GCAC’s judgment, will support the arts in the Columbus area. In

1 All references to specific pages of the In Camera Records are to the Bates stamped

pages of that filing. Case No. 2024-00619PQ -2- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Camera Records, pp. 484, 485, 487, 494, 495, 497, 504, 507, 514, 515, 517, 524, 525, 527; PQ Miscellaneous, filed December 26, 2024, Agreement Between the City of Columbus, Ohio, and the Greater Columbus Arts Council, Inc. (“Bed Tax Contract”), pp. 2, 3, 5. {¶4} Requester Michael Newman made a public records request to both GCAC and CFC for records related to the CFC’s activities and expenditures. GCAC denied that request, asserting that neither it nor CFC are public offices subject to the Public Records Act. Mr. Newman responded with a revised request, and GCAC reiterated its denial. Complaint, filed August 8, 2024. {¶5} Mr. Newman filed this case to challenge the denial. Mediation did not resolve the case, so a schedule was set for the parties to submit evidence and memoranda supporting their positions. That schedule has run its course, making this case ripe for decision. Order Terminating Mediation, entered November 19, 2024; Order, entered December 12, 2024. II. Analysis. A. Requester’s claim for production of records should be granted in part. 1. Requester has not made a clear and convincing case that GCAC is the functional equivalent of a public office. {¶6} A private entity can be subject to the Public Records Act if it is the functional equivalent of a public office. Geauga Cty. Prosecutor’s Office v. Munson Fire Dept., 2023- Ohio-3958, ¶ 6, adopted 2023-Ohio-4437 (Ct. of Cl.). The Supreme Court has considered four primary factors in determining whether a private entity is the functional equivalent of a public office: - Does the entity perform a governmental function? - What level of public funding does the entity receive? - What is the extent of government involvement in or regulation of the entity? - Was the entity created by the government or to avoid the requirements of the Public Records Act?

State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 2006-Ohio-4854, ¶ 25. An otherwise private entity can be a functional equivalent without all factors suggesting that result, and Case No. 2024-00619PQ -3- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

no one inquiry is automatically dispositive. State ex rel. Harm Reduction Ohio v. Oneohio Recovery Found, 2023-Ohio-1547, ¶ 32. {¶7} A functional equivalence analysis starts with a presumption that the private entity is not a functional equivalent. That presumption must be overcome with clear and convincing evidence. Oriana, 2006-Ohio-4854, ¶ 26. a. GCAC performs a governmental function. {¶8} An entity that distributes public funds pursuant to a contract with a public office performs a governmental function. Harm Reduction, 2023-Ohio-1547, ¶¶ 14, 18. GCAC does that. It has two separate contracts with the City that pass City funds onto GCAC for distribution through grants. In Camera Records, pp. 484, 485, 487, 494, 495, 497, 504, 507, 514, 515, 517, 524, 525, 527; Bed Tax Contract, pp. 2, 3, 5. It has performed that function at all times relevant to this case. As GCAC’s website states, “Columbus City Council designated funds to be distributed to the Columbus arts community through [] grants program[s] administered by GCAC” since 1973.2 This factor supports functional equivalency. b. GCAC receives significant amounts of public funding. {¶9} This factor considers the relative proportion of the private entity’s funding that comes from public sources. Harm Reduction, 2023-Ohio-1547, ¶¶ 22, 23. The larger the portion, the more likely it is that the entity is the functional equivalent of a public office. GCAC’s most recent filings with the IRS report that more than 98% of its funding comes from public offices. In Camera Records, pp. 15, 72, 129. That is higher than levels that other courts have found sufficient to support functional equivalence. State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay Mkt. of Cincinnati, 2012-Ohio-2074, (1st Dist.), ¶ 26 (“We further agree with the magistrate’s conclusion that the city’s funding of CFMC —which totaled nearly half of its revenue in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010—is not just significant, but overwhelming”). This factor also supports functional equivalence. c. Requester has not shown sufficient government involvement or regulation.

2Greater Columbus Arts Council, History, https://www.gcac.org/about/history/ (accessed January 22, 2025). I asked the parties if they objected to the court taking judicial notice of GCAC’s website, and neither party objected. Order entered December 12, 2024. I therefore take judicial notice of that website. Case No. 2024-00619PQ -4- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

{¶10} This factor is phrased in the disjunctive; it considers “the extent of government involvement or regulation[.]” Oriana, 2006-Ohio-4854, paragraph two of the syllabus (emphasis added). It can therefore be satisfied with proof of either a high degree of involvement with government or a high degree of regulation by government. Sheil v. Horton, 2018-Ohio-5240, ¶¶ 32-35 (8th Dist.); Munson Fire, 2023-Ohio-3958, ¶ 17. A requester seeking to prove this factor by showing a high degree of involvement with government must show that the private entity is “closely intertwined” with government. A requester relying on the regulation prong of this factor must show significant regulation of the private entity’s activities. Munson Fire, 2023-Ohio-3958, ¶¶ 17-22; Martin v. Accel Schools Ohio, 2024-Ohio-5965, ¶¶ 29-41, adopted 2025-Ohio-6143 (Ct. of Cl.). {¶11} Mr. Newman has not shown that GCAC is either closely intertwined with the City or that the City significantly regulates GCAC’s activities. This factor cuts against equivalence. d. There is no evidence that GCAC was formed by government or to evade the Public Records Act. {¶12} There is no evidence on this point. This factor does not support functional equivalence. e. Balancing the factors. {¶13} The evidence is in equipoise here; Mr. Newman has shown two factors, but failed to show two other factors. That falls short of the clear and convincing evidence required to prove functional equivalence. {¶14} That result is not changed by the fact that GCAC receives significant public funding.

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Bluebook (online)
2025 Ohio 471, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newman-v-greater-columbus-arts-council-ohioctcl-2025.