Newlove v. Callaghan

Michigan Supreme Court

Newlove v. Callaghan

48 N.W. 1096, 86 Mich. 297, 1891 Mich. LEXIS 926

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedJune 5, 1891

StatusPublished

Cited by30 cases

This text of 48 N.W. 1096 (Newlove v. Callaghan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Newlove v. Callaghan, 48 N.W. 1096, 86 Mich. 297, 1891 Mich. LEXIS 926 (Mich. 1891).

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Opinion

McGrath, J.

This is a judgment creditors’ bill, filed by Alvin Wood and Herbert W. Newlove, copartners as Alvin Wood & Co., to obtain satisfaction of a judgment obtained January 23, 1886, against defendant John Callaghan, for $543.17, upon a promissory note. The note was given December 1, 1884, and was protested January [300]*3003, 1885; The levy in aid of which the bill was filed was made upon a certain lot of land purchased jointly as husband and wife, October 13, 1885, for the sum of $1,850, and deeded to them jointly at that time.

The testimony is voluminous, and consists mainly of the examination of defendant John Callaghan, by complainant, under objection made by his co-defendant, Elizabeth Callaghan. The complainant sought to examine the defendant Elizabeth Callaghan, but her husband objected, and she refused to be sworn and to testify. In the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the testimony of the defendant John Callaghan,’ and therefore unnecessary to discuss the question as to whether it was admissible or not.¹

It does appear that, at the time of the purchase of this property, the defendant John Callaghan was indebted to complainant in the amount of this judgment, and that defendants jointly purchased this property, and jointly paid the sum of $1,850 therefor, and that the deed was made to them jointly. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, the defendant John Callaghan must be presumed to have paid one-half of the purchase price.

The answer sets forth that the object of taking the title in the joint names of defendants was “simply that the survivor should own the same, as they have no children." It appears from the testimony of John Callaghan, taken before objection was made thereto, that defendants owned jointly, exclusive of the lot in question, over $20,000 worth of real estate, consisting of several parcels which had been purchased prior to t.he origin of the debt in question, and that defendant John Callaghan owned no separate property.

It would be a gross injustice to permit debtors to [301]*301apply moneys which should be applied to the payment of their debts to the creation of an estate which would be beyond the reach of their creditors. Had the entire estate been placed in the wife’s name, there could have been no question but that the same would be regarded as fraudulent under the statute, and it is no less a fraud upon creditors because the title has been taken in the name of the defendants jointly. In other words, estates in entirety cannot be created at the expense of creditors, and held in fraud of the latter’s right.

The complainant is entitled to a decree for the sale of an undivided half of the premises in question, and the costs of both courts, and the same is ordered, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The other Justices concurred.

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McGrath, J.

This is a judgment creditors’ bill, filed by Alvin Wood and Herbert W. Newlove, copartners as Alvin Wood & Co., to obtain satisfaction of a judgment obtained January 23, 1886, against defendant John Callaghan, for $543.17, upon a promissory note. The note was given December 1, 1884, and was protested January [300]*3003, 1885; The levy in aid of which the bill was filed was made upon a certain lot of land purchased jointly as husband and wife, October 13, 1885, for the sum of $1,850, and deeded to them jointly at that time.

The testimony is voluminous, and consists mainly of the examination of defendant John Callaghan, by complainant, under objection made by his co-defendant, Elizabeth Callaghan. The complainant sought to examine the defendant Elizabeth Callaghan, but her husband objected, and she refused to be sworn and to testify. In the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the testimony of the defendant John Callaghan,’ and therefore unnecessary to discuss the question as to whether it was admissible or not.¹

It does appear that, at the time of the purchase of this property, the defendant John Callaghan was indebted to complainant in the amount of this judgment, and that defendants jointly purchased this property, and jointly paid the sum of $1,850 therefor, and that the deed was made to them jointly. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, the defendant John Callaghan must be presumed to have paid one-half of the purchase price.

The answer sets forth that the object of taking the title in the joint names of defendants was “simply that the survivor should own the same, as they have no children." It appears from the testimony of John Callaghan, taken before objection was made thereto, that defendants owned jointly, exclusive of the lot in question, over $20,000 worth of real estate, consisting of several parcels which had been purchased prior to t.he origin of the debt in question, and that defendant John Callaghan owned no separate property.

It would be a gross injustice to permit debtors to [301]*301apply moneys which should be applied to the payment of their debts to the creation of an estate which would be beyond the reach of their creditors. Had the entire estate been placed in the wife’s name, there could have been no question but that the same would be regarded as fraudulent under the statute, and it is no less a fraud upon creditors because the title has been taken in the name of the defendants jointly. In other words, estates in entirety cannot be created at the expense of creditors, and held in fraud of the latter’s right.

The complainant is entitled to a decree for the sale of an undivided half of the premises in question, and the costs of both courts, and the same is ordered, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The other Justices concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

48 N.W. 1096, 86 Mich. 297, 1891 Mich. LEXIS 926, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newlove-v-callaghan-mich-1891.

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