Newlin, B. v. Vita Healthcare Group

Opinions

J-A18034-25 2026 PA Super 175

BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA : O'DONNELL, DECEASED : : Appellants : : : v. : No. 259 EDA 2024 : : VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON : MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A : BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER, : LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, : IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, : BM REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, : LLC D/B/A BRINTON MANOR : NURSING AND REHABILITATION : CENTER, BH OPCO HOLDCO, LLC, : IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, : LLC, AND CHAIM STEG :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2020-008216

BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA : O'DONNELL, DECEASED : : : v. : : : No. 260 EDA 2024 VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON : MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A : BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER, : LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, : IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, : BM REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, : J-A18034-25

LLC D/B/A BRINTON MANOR : NURSING AND REHABILITATION : CENTER, BH OPCO HOLDCO, LLC, : IMPERIAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, : LLC, AND CHAIM STEG : : : APPEAL OF: BM REHAB AND : NURSING CENTER, LLC D/B/A : BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND : REHAB CENTER :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2020-008216

BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA : O'DONNELL, DECEASED : : : v. : : : No. 284 EDA 2024 VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON : MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A : BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER, IMPERIAL : HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, IMPERIAL : HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, BM : REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, LLC : D/B/A BRINTON MANOR NURSING : AND REHABILITATION CENTER, : LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, : BH OPCO HOLDCO AND CHAIM STEG : : : APPEAL OF: BRINTON MANOR : CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A BRINTON : MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024

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In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2020-008216

BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA : O'DONNELL, DECEASED : : : v. : : : No. 654 EDA 2024 VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON : MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A : BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER, IMPERIAL : HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, IMPERIAL : HEALTCARE SERVICES, LLC, BM : REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, LLC : D/B/A BRINTON MANOR NURSING : AND REHABILITATION CENTER, : LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, : BH OPCO HOLDCO AND CHAIM STEG : : : APPEAL OF: BRINTON MANOR : CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A BRINTON : MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2020-008216

BEVIN NEWLIN AND STACEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOEHRS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS : PENNSYLVANIA OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA : O'DONNELL, DECEASED : : : v. : : : No. 660 EDA 2024 :

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VITA HEALTHCARE GROUP, BRINTON : MANOR CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A : BRINTON MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER, IMPERIAL : HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC, IMPERIAL : HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC, BM : REHAB AND NURSING CENTER, LLC : D/B/A BRINTON MANOR NURSING : AND REHABILITATION CENTER, : LIGHTNING HEALTH HOLDCO, LLC, : BH OPCO HOLDCO AND CHAIM STEG : : : APPEAL OF: BRINTON MANOR : CENTER SNF, LLC F/D/B/A BRINTON : MANOR NURSING AND : REHABILITATION CENTER

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 7, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2020-008216

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED AUGUST 4, 2026

In these cross-appeals, Appellants, Bevin Newlin and Stacey Loehrs, co-

administrators of the Estate of Patricia O’Donnell (“Decedent”) (collectively,

“Estate”); Cross-Appellants, Vita Healthcare Group (“Vita”) and Brinton Manor

SNF, LLC f/d/b/a Brinton Manor Nursing & Rehabilitation Center (“BM-SNF”)

(collectively, “Vita Entities”); and Cross-Appellants, Imperial Healthcare

Group, LLC, Imperial Healthcare Services, LLC (“Imperial”), and BM Rehab

and Nursing Center, LLC d/b/a Brinton Manor Nursing and Rehabilitation

Center (“BM Rehab”) (collectively “Imperial Entities”), appeal from the June

7, 2024 judgment entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas in

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this nursing home negligence action. During the relevant time, BM-SNF and

BM Rehab were the operators of the nursing home (collectively referred to as

“Operating Company Defendants”) and Imperial and Vita provided

management services (collectively referred to as “Management Company

Defendants”). After careful review, we:

1. Affirm the trial court’s grant of a motion for JNOV in favor of the

Management Company Defendants;1

2. Affirm the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants

Motion for JNOV on sufficiency of the evidence grounds;

3. Affirm the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants’

Motion for a New Trial based on evidentiary challenges;

4. Reverse the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendant’s

Motion for a New Trial and remand for a new trial on compensatory

damages; and

5. Reverse the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants’

Motion to Vacate the Punitive Damages Award. 2

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1 We note that we are troubled by the poor care that the various entities provided to Decedent; we, however, are constrained, to affirm the trial court’s grant of a JNOV in favor of the Management Company Defendants because the Estate failed to establish corporate liability against them as a matter of law. This is not an indication, however, that we sanction the Management Company Defendants’ conduct.

2 Richard Scampone and The Pennsylvania Association of Justice have filed

amicus briefs regarding these cross-appeals.

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The relevant facts and procedural history, as gleaned from our review

of the record, are as follows. In early 2018, Decedent, who suffered from

health problems, began to experience increased difficulty in managing her

diabetes, resulting in decreased mobility and exposing her to an increased

risk of falling. Because of these safety concerns, on March 18, 2018,

Decedent became a resident of Brinton Manor Nursing and Rehabilitation

Center (“Brinton Manor”),3 which, at the time, was owned by an entity called

Genesis.4

On June 1, 2018, BM-SNF purchased Brinton Manor from Genesis and

contracted with Vita to manage the facility. On July 1, 2019, 21 days prior to

Decedent’s final day of residency at Brinton Manor, BM Rehab purchased

Brinton Manor from BM-SNF and Imperial assumed management

responsibilities.5 A licensed nursing home administrator was in place at

Brinton Manor at all relevant times.

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3 Decedent remained a resident of Brinton Manor until July 21, 2019.

4 Genesis is not a party to this action.

5 By way of background, the management agreements required, inter alia, the

Management Company Defendants to prepare a budget for operating the facility for the Operating Company Defendants’ approval and to provide various services for the operation of the facility including pharmacy, consults, resident relations, maintaining visibility of a management presence, helping with personnel, and service contracts. See N.T., 1/18/23, at 123-25, 127- 28. In exchange for providing these services, BN-SNF paid Vita more than $432,000 in management fees and for the fiscal year 2019, BM Rehab paid Imperial $484,000. Id. at 125-26, 128.

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In December 2018, Decedent fell, fractured her hip, and required

surgery. Brinton Manor staff documented the fall and created an event report

that Brinton Manor’s director of nursing, Bridget Alvanos, filed with the

Pennsylvania Department of Health that represented that the care plan in

place for Decedent was appropriate at the time of her fall. When Decedent

returned to Brinton Manor after her surgery, its staff evaluated Decedent and

updated her care plan.

Following her fall, Decedent’s general condition began to worsen,

including Decedent suffering from anxiety, depression, malnutrition, and skin

deterioration, which caused her to develop a painful stage-four sacral wound.

Decedent required extensive assistance from at least two staff members for

services such as bed mobility, turning and repositioning in bed, transferring

into and out of bed to a chair, toilet use, and personal hygiene. As a result of

Decedent’s increased level of anxiety and depression—conditions which

Brinton Manor’s nurses and physical therapists documented in Decedent’s

records—Decedent was transferred to an inpatient psychiatric facility for a

short period of time. She returned to Brinton Manor on March 12, 2019.

Brinton Manor’s records reflect that, after her return to Brinton Manor,

Decedent remained anxious, particularly about falling, and was incontinent of

bowel and bladder, but had no skin breakdown.

In April 2019, Decedent again suffered a fall. Around the same time, a

dietician noted in Brinton Manor’s records that Decedent was losing weight

and she had lost her dentures. Records also reflect that around June and July

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2019, Decedent required at least one skilled intervention because she did not

have dentures and, thus, was unable to chew certain foods. Brinton Manor’s

dietitian recommended that Decedent receive nutritional supplements, and a

staff member referred Decedent to speech and occupational therapy.

Meanwhile, in May 2019, Decedent developed pressure ulcers and

Brinton Manor’s records reflect, and Decedent’s family reported to staff, that

Decedent was in pain. A wound physician, who was an independent

contractor, saw Decedent weekly, and her pressure wounds had healed by

July 2, 2019.6

Decedent developed additional pressure wounds, however, and, on July

21, 2019, an ambulance transported her to Riddle Hospital for treatment for

an infected, stage-four sacral wound. Eventually, the pain caused by the

sacral wound became difficult to manage due to the wound’s location and

extent, resulting in Decedent’s placement on hospice on August 1, 2019, and

death on August 5, 2019. The Delaware County medical examiner concluded

that Decedent’s immediate cause of death was hydromorphone intoxication

due to the palliative care that she received while receiving hospice care, and

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6The wound care physician who treated Decedent testified that he did not have any concerns that Brinton Manor had not taken proper steps to prevent Decedent from developing facility-acquired pressure wounds or that Decedent had not received proper care from the nursing staff. N.T., 11/18/23, at 321.

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the proximate cause of her death was complications from the sacral decubitus

ulcer.7

During the time Decedent resided at Brinton Manor, the facility received

citations for various deficiencies, including deficiencies for care planning,

nutrition, hydration, and pain management; none of the deficiencies,

however, were based on the care provided to Decedent.

On December 14, 2020, the Estate initiated this nursing home

negligence case, alleging that, while she was a resident Brinton Manor,

Decedent sustained a series of injuries that ultimately resulted in her death.

The Estate alleged that, inter alia, changes in ownership and management of

Brinton Manor, high turnover in administration and nursing staff, and lack of

implementation of nursing policies and procedures affected the continuity of

Decedent’s care. The Estate alleged claims of negligence (through vicarious

liability) and corporate negligence against all the Defendants. The Estate

sought compensatory and punitive damages under Pennsylvania’s wrongful

death and survival statutes.

Following discovery, the parties filed numerous motions in limine,

including, on December 1, 2022, the Defendants’ joint motions to preclude

the Estate from admitting into evidence certain Pennsylvania Department of

Health Survey Reports (“Survey Reports”) and the “Nursing Home Compare”

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7 A Riddle Hospital doctor’s records reported Decedent’s cause of death as sepsis, osteomyelitis, and severe protein malnutrition.

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Five-Star Ratings Profile (“Profile Evidence”) derived from the Medicare.gov

website.

On January 3, 2023, the trial court entered orders denying both motions

in limine, explaining that the contested evidence was relevant to the Estate’s

corporate negligence claims. Trial Ct. Order, 1/3/23, at 2. The court further

agreed with the Estate that “any ‘unfair prejudice’ to [the Defendants] . . .

can be cured with a limiting instruction to the jury.” Id. at 3. Furthermore,

the court left open the opportunity for the Defendants to object on a different

basis at trial. Id.

Trial commenced with jury selection on January 17, 2023. Relevant to

the instant appeal, the Estate presented the testimony of numerous witnesses,

including expert testimony from nurse Suzanne Frederick, who testified

regarding standard-of-care and breaches thereof; Ernest Tosh, J.D., by

videotaped deposition, regarding staffing analysis and cost-reporting analysis

for nursing homes, and Dr. David Seignious, an expert in internal medicine

and geriatrics, regarding, inter alia, the cause of Decedent’s death.

On February 2, 2023, the jury returned a verdict of $4,000,000 in

compensatory damages in favor of the Estate. In particular, the jury awarded

the Estate:

 $600,000 from BM-SNF

 $2,400,000 from Vita

 $800,000 from BM Rehab

 $200,000 from Imperial.

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The jury also assessed $15,000,000 in punitive damages. In particular,

the jury imposed the following punitive damages:

 $5,000,000 against BM-SNF

 $6,500,000 against Vita

 $2,000,000 against BM Rehab

 $1,500,000 against Imperial.

On February 6, 2023, the Defendants filed post-trial motions raising

numerous grounds for relief.

On June 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the post-trial motions.

Notably, and crucial to our analysis, counsel for the Estate clarified which

theory of liability the Estate asserted against the Management Company

Defendants and which theory it asserted against the Operating Company

Defendants. In particular, counsel informed the court that the Estate was only

pursuing a theory of corporate negligence against the Management Company

Defendants and not pursuing a claim of negligence based on vicarious liability.

Against the Operating Company Defendants, the Estate informed the trial

court that it was only pursuing a claim of vicarious liability. See N.T., 6/6/23,

at 182-83.) (where the Estate’s counsel explains that “to be clear, the

[M]anagement [Company Defendants] were always just corporate negligence

or direct negligence and then the [Operating Company Defendants] had

vicarious [liability]. For punitives we had conceded we were only seeking for

the direct [(corporate)] negligence for all four [Defendants].”) In other words,

counsel for the Estate clarified that it was only pursuing a theory of vicarious

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liability against the Operating Company Defendants and a theory of corporate

negligence against the Management Company Defendants.

Following its consideration of the arguments presented in the parties’

motions and briefs, and the above clarification by the Estate’s counsel, the

trial court granted post-trial motions in part. In particular, the trial court

granted the motion for JNOV in favor of the Management Company Defendants

on the grounds that the Scampone cases8 precluded the Estate as a matter

of law from establishing corporate liability against the Management Company

Defendants. It found that, since counsel for the Estate informed the trial court

that it was not pursuing a theory of vicarious liability against the Management

Company Defendants, and the Estate could not as a matter of law pursue a

theory of corporate negligence against the Management Company

Defendants, the Estate failed to establish any legal liability against the

Management Company Defendants and, thus, the Management Company

Defendants were entitled to JNOV as a matter of law.

The court, however, denied the motions for JNOV that the Operating

Company Defendants filed, concluding that the Estate had established that

the Operating Company Defendants were vicariously liable for the negligence

of their employees.

____________________________________________

8 Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012)

and Scampone v. Grane Healthcare, Co., 169 A.3d 600 (Pa. Super. 2017), discussed infra.

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The trial court also remitted the jury’s assessment of punitive damages

against BM Rehab from $2,000,000 to $385,000, based on its finding that “the

$2,000,000 punitive damages award . . . is grossly excessive and shocks the

[c]ourt’s sense of justice.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at 41. The trial court

reasoned that since BM Rehab only provided services to the Decedent for 21

days, a reasonable punitive damage award should reflect the pro rata time

that BM Rehab provided services to the Decedent.9 Id.

On January 3, 2024, the trial court entered an order molding the verdict.

Following the entry of judgment, the parties filed appeals and cross-appeals.

The Estate raises the following three issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court err in granting [JNOV] on [the Estate’s] negligence claims against Vita []?

2. Did the trial court err in granting [JNOV] on [the Estate’s] negligence claims against Imperial []?

3. Did the trial court err in remitting the punitive damages award against BM Rehab?

Estate’s Br. at 5.

The Vita Entities raise the following two issues as cross-appellants:

1. Did the trial court correctly grant JNOV in Vita’s favor on [the Estate’s] negligence claims after [the Estate] renounced any claim for vicarious liability, failed to prove that Vita owed, let alone breached, a duty under Thompson v. Nason that caused Decedent’s harm and, accordingly, failed to establish a basis for corporate negligence against Vita?

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9 The court also awarded the Estate $201,205.48 in delay damages.

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2. Did the trial court correctly grant JNOV in Vita’s favor on [the Estate’s] negligence claims after [the Estate] failed to adduce expert testimony to support a corporate negligence claim against Vita?

Brief of Vita and BM-SNF (“Vita Entities’ Br.”) at 1-2.

Imperial raises the following two issues as cross-appellant:

1. Whether the trial court correctly granted JNOV and vacated the judgment against Imperial after [the Estate]: (i) failed to prove that Imperial was liable under a corporate negligence theory and (ii) expressly renounced any vicarious liability claims against this consulting company?

2. Whether the trial court correctly remitted the punitive damages award against BM Rehab [] where the evidence did not support the original excessive and shocking $2 million punitive damages award, particularly where BM Rehab [] was only involved with the facility for 21 days during Decedent’s stay?

Brief of Imperial and BM Rehab (“Imperial Entities’ Br.”) at 5.

BM-SNF raises the following issues as cross-appellant:

1. Did the trial court err in denying BM-SNF[’s] request for JNOV in circumstances where [the Estate] waived and/or abandoned any corporate negligence claim against this operator and also failed to prove a basis for vicarious liability against it?

2. Did the trial court err in denying [BM-SNF’s] request to vacate or dramatically reduce the punitive damages award in circumstances where [the Estate] failed to establish the level of wanton and willful conduct to justify an award of punitive damages against this entity and where, in any event, the amount of the punitive damages award was excessive?

3. Did the trial court err in denying [BM-SNF’s] request for a new trial, either because two of four defendants were dismissed from the case and the liability previously apportioned to those dismissed defendants was reapportioned inconsistent with the jury’s verdict, usurping its role, in a manner fundamentally unfair to the two remaining [d]efendants, or else because the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the “Nursing Home Compare” Five-Star Rating Profile and Department of Health Survey Reports?

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Vita Entities’ Br. at 29-30 (emphasis omitted).

BM Rehab raises the following issues as cross-appellant:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request for JNOV in circumstances where [the Estate] admitted that they did not pursue a corporate negligence claim against BM Rehab[] and failed to prove a basis for vicarious liability against this entity?

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request to vacate the punitive damages award where [the Estate] failed to establish the necessary wanton and willful conduct by BM Rehab[] to warrant such extraordinary damages, and an amount of punitive damages in any measure was not justified?

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request for a new trial where the judgment against two of four [d]efendants was vacated, and the trial court entered judgment in the full compensatory amount against the remaining two [d]efendants, thereby imposing on them a higher judgment (dollar-wise) than that which the jury intended?

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying BM Rehab[’s] request for a new trial to ameliorate the prejudice caused when the trial court impermissibly admitted irrelevant, prejudicial, and hearsay evidence of a “Nursing Home Compare” Five-Star Rating Profile and Department of Health Survey Report that was issued prior to BM Rehab’s operation of the facility?

Imperial Entities’ Br. at 39-40.

***

Standard of Review for Trial Court’s Grant and Denial of Motion for JNOV

Each of the parties raise issues challenging the trial court’s disposition

of the various motions for entry of JNOV. “We review the [grant or] denial of

a request for JNOV for an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case

or an abuse of discretion.” Caranci v. Monsanto Co., 338 A.3d 151, 160

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(Pa. Super. 2025). “In this context, an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial

court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or

capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

There are two bases upon which a movant is entitled to JNOV: “one, the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence

was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome

should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” Rohm and Haas Co. v.

Continental Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court determined that the Management Company Defendants

were entitled to JNOV as a matter of law.

***

Entry of JNOV in favor of the Management Company Defendants

In this case, the Estate pursued only a theory of corporate negligence,

and not one of vicarious liability, against the Management Company

Defendants. The trial court granted JNOV in favor of the Management

Company Defendants, reasoning that as a matter of law, the theory of

corporate negligence only applies to the Operating Company Defendants and

not the Management Company Defendants. Since the Estate only pursued a

corporate negligence theory against the Management Company Defendants,

the trial court concluded that it properly granted the motion for JNOV in their

favor. We agree.

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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first adopted a theory of corporate

liability against a healthcare provider in Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591

A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991). The Supreme Court explained the concept as a “doctrine

under which the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of

care owed the patient, which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-being

while at the hospital.” Id. at 707. The Supreme Court categorized the scope

of that duty into four categories:

1. A duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and

adequate facilities and equipment;

2. A duty to select and retain only competent physicians;

3. A duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls

as to patient care; and

4. A duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies

to ensure quality care for the patients.

Id. (formatting altered and internal citations omitted) (the “Thompson

duties”). The Supreme Court highlighted that this “theory of liability creates

a nondelegable duty which the hospital owes directly to a patient.” Id.

In 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the applicability of

corporate liability and the Thompson duties to a nursing home in Scampone

v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582 (Pa. 2012) (“Scampone

II”). In Scampone II, the plaintiff attempted to extend corporate liability to

the operator of a skilled nursing facility and an affiliated management

company. The Supreme Court agreed that a nursing home could be subject

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to corporate liability, holding that “a nursing home and affiliated entities are

subject to potential direct liability for negligence, where the requisite resident-

entity relationship exists to establish that the entity owes the resident a duty

of care.” Id. at 584. The Supreme Court found that if the “requisite resident-

entity relationship” exists to create a duty, the scope of the duty includes

duties “such as duties to maintain safe facilities[] and to hire and oversee

competent staff.” Id. at 598.10 The Supreme Court remanded the case back

to the trial court to determine “whether the requisite relationship exists

between the respective parties” and “any specific duties owed by [the nursing

home operator] or [the nursing home management company] to residents like

Ms. Scampone.” Id. at 607.

Upon remand, the trial court, inter alia, re-entered a compulsory non-

suit in favor of Grane Healthcare Company, the management company, on the

grounds that the management company had only agreed to provide services

to the operating company and had not agreed to provide care and treatment

to the plaintiff; rather it was the nursing home operator that agreed to provide

services to the plaintiff and thus, the entity with the non-delegable duty to the

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10 The Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff can also assert the theory

of vicarious liability against a nursing home entity in addition to a theory of corporate liability. Id. at 597-98. For a comprehensive and well-defined explanation of the differences between corporate liability and vicarious liability for a medical facility, see the concurring opinion issued by Judge Olson in Corey v. Wilks Barre Hospital Company, LLC, 307 A.3d 701, 716-28 (Pa. Super. 2023)(en banc)

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plaintiff. Scampone v. Grane Healthcare, Co., 169 A.3d 600, 609-10 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (“Scampone III”).

The plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court first interpreted the Supreme

Court’s holding in Scampone II as “indicating that both Grane [the

management company] and Highland [the operating company] could not be

held liable under a direct corporate negligence theory . . . .” Id. at 609

(emphasis added). The Superior Court, in reaching this conclusion, relied on

the Supreme Court’s finding that the “inquiry [about the corporate entity’s

relationship to the plaintiff] is individual to each appellant, although the duties

of appellants may be similar. This type of individualized inquiry into

appellants’ duties of care ensures that multiple entities are not exposed to

liability for breach of the same non-delegable duties.” 11 Id. at 608 (citation

omitted).

Applying these principles to the facts of Scampone III, the Superior

Court found that the operating company was the licensed owner and occupier

of “the nursing home facility and, by virtue of its direct contractual

relationship with [the plaintiff] to render her care, [the nursing home

operator] could be subject to any applicable non-delegable duty for a cause

of action in direct corporate negligence as outlined in Thompson.” Id. at 621 ____________________________________________

11 We agree with the Court in Scampone III that the term “non-delegable

duties is a misnomer” because the nursing home operator may delegate the “performance” of its Thompson duties to another entity and, thus, the performance of the duty is delegable. Id. at 621. The term actually means that even if an entity delegates the performance of its duty, it is still liable if the other entity breaches that duty. Id.

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(emphasis added). This Court subsequently held, in Hopkins v. Compass

Point Healthcare System, LLC, a case where, as in the instant case, the

nursing home resident had a contractual agreement with only one entity, that

“Scampone II and Scampone III make clear that only one entity can be

liable in corporate negligence for a non-delegable duty to a nursing home

patient.” 2021 WL 3465831 at *6 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 6, 2021) (non-

precedential decision) (citing Scampone II, 57 A.3d at 606-07; Scampone

III, 169 A.3d at 621). In other words, as a matter of law, when it is only the

operator of a nursing home that has the contractual relationship with the

plaintiff, only the operator of the nursing home can be held liable under a

theory of corporate liability, even if the operator delegates the performance

of its Thompson duties to a management company.12

In the instant case, it was the Operating Company Defendants who

contracted directly with Decedent. The Operating Company Defendants also

entered into management agreements with the Management Company

Defendants that required, inter alia, the Management Company Defendants to

prepare a budget for operating the facility for the Operating Company

Defendants’ approval and to provide various services for the operation of the

facility including pharmacy, consults, resident relations, maintaining visibility

____________________________________________

12 We note that this principle does not preclude a management company from

being held liable under a theory of vicarious liability. Scampone II, 57 A.3d 597-98.

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of a management presence, helping with personnel, and service contracts.

See N.T., 1/18/23, at 123-25, 127-28.

In light of the Scampone holdings and the fact that it was only the

Operating Company Defendants that had a direct contractual relationship with

Decedent, we find that it was the Operating Company Defendants that

undertook the duties set forth in Thompson. Although the Operating

Company Defendants delegated the performance of those duties to the

Management Company Defendants through the management contracts, the

duties were “non-delegable,” and the Operating Company Defendants are still

liable for a breach of those duties. Scampone III, 169 A.3d at 621. Thus,

the trial court properly found that the Estate as a matter of law could not

establish a theory of corporate liability against the Management Company

Defendants because they did not have a direct contractual relationship with

Decedent.

The Estate argues that the trial court erred because its interpretation of

Scampone permits the imposition of corporate liability on both an operator

and management company of a nursing home. Appellants’ Brief at 14-61. In

support of this claim, the Estate asserts, inter alia, that the Scampone

decisions do not preclude the Management Company Defendants as a matter

of law from having potential liability to the Estate independent from the

Operating Company Defendants’ liability because the Estate proceeded

against the Management Company Defendants as joint tortfeasors and the

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Estate “produced ample evidence regarding the direct negligence of both

Management Entities.” Id. at 33, 50-52, 55-56, 58-60.

The Estate’s argument, however, ignores the Scampone holdings that

make clear that the corporate duties set forth in Thompson are imposed only

on the corporate entity with whom the plaintiff has a contractual relationship,

i.e., a direct relationship. Scampone II, 57 A.3d at 584, 606-07; Scampone

III, 169 A.3d at 620-21. Once that entity assumes those duties, that entity

is still liable even if it delegates the performance of those duties to a different

entity. Scampone III, 169 A.3d at 621. The Supreme Court clearly and

unequivocably held that it is necessary to determine which entity or entities

has the “requisite” relationship with the plaintiff and it is that entity or entities,

that can be held liable for a breach of the Thompson duties. Scampone II,

57 A.3d at 584, 607. Similarly, the Superior Court in Scampone III explicitly

imposed the Thompson duties on the operator of the nursing home because

it was the operator that had the contractual relationship with the plaintiff.

We further note that the Estate bases its argument on the premise that

“[w]hen entering jnov in favor of [Management Company Defendants], the

trial court acknowledged that the record contained evidence to sustain a duty

of care.” Estate’s Br. at 27. While this may be true, the Estate overlooks that

it admitted it only pursued a claim of corporate liability against the

Management Company Defendants and, as discussed above, as a matter of

law the Management Company Defendants cannot owe a duty to the Decedent

under a corporate liability theory absent a contractual relationship with

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Decedent. While the Management Company Defendants might have owed a

duty of care to the Decedent through a theory of vicarious liability, the Estate

ultimately chose not to pursue that theory and, thus, its joint tortfeasor

argument fails

In sum, we find that the trial court properly concluded that there is no

legal basis to impose corporate negligence against the Management Company

Defendants. Therefore, the court properly entered JNOV in favor of the

Management Company Defendants.

***

Denial of JNOV in favor of the Operating Company Defendants

We next address the contention of the Operating Company Defendants

that the trial court erred in refusing to grant JNOV in their favor. The

Operating Company Defendants first claim that they are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law because the Estate either waived or abandoned their

corporate negligence claims and failed to prove that the Operating Company

Defendants were vicariously liable to the Estate. Vita’s Br. at 33-43, Imperial’s

Br. at 43-48. Although we agree that the Estate did not pursue a corporate

negligence claim against the Operating Company Defendants, it did pursue

one based on vicarious liability, and we find that the evidence supported a

verdict based on vicarious liability.

We will affirm the trial court’s order denying JNOV where the plaintiff

adduced sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict. See Ruff v.

York Hosp., 257 A.3d 43, 48 (Pa. Super. 2021). A trial court may only grant

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JNOV “in clear cases where the facts are such that no two reasonable minds

could fail to agree that the verdict was improper.” Id. at 48-49. We resolve

any conflict in the evidence in the verdict-winner’s favor.” Id. at 48.

“An employer is held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his

employee which causes injuries to a third party, provided that such acts were

committed during the course of and within the scope of employment.”

D’Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 431 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).

In other words, “the corporation’s liability is derivative of the agents’ breach

of their duties of care to the plaintiff.” Scampone II, 57 A.3d at 598. This

means that,

in its simplest form[], by reason of some relation existing between A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B although B has played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it. Once the requisite relationship (i.e., employment, agency) is demonstrated, the innocent victim has recourse against the principal[.]

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In addition to establishing that a corporate agent or employee acted

negligently, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the employee owed a duty

to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s decedent, that the employee breached the duty,

that the breach proximately caused the harm suffered, and that the plaintiff’s

damages were a direct result of the harm. See Nigon v. Jewell, 313 A.3d

1124, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2024). Where, as here, the plaintiff raises claims of

medical or nursing home negligence, “there is also the added requirement that

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the plaintiff must provide a medical expert who will testify as to the elements

of duty, breach, and causation.” Id. (citation omitted).

In particular, the Operating Company Defendants claim that they are

entitled to JNOV because the Estate did not establish the identity of any

specific employees involved in Decedent’s care, show that they breached the

standard of care, demonstrate that the breach caused Decedent’s harm, or

present the requisite medical testimony to prove their claim. Vita Entities’ Br.

at 34-36; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 43, 45-48.

We reject this argument. This Court has held that a plaintiff can

establish her right to recovery on a vicarious liability claim even if she does

not base that claim on the actions of an individual, specific staff member. See

Sokolsky v. Eidelman, 93 A.3d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that

“[s]imply because employees are unnamed within a complaint or referred to

as a unit, i.e., the staff, does not preclude one’s claim against their employer

under vicarious liability if the employees acted negligently during the course

and within the scope of their employment”); see also Breslin v. Mountain

View Nursing Home, Inc., 171 A.3d 818, 828 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same).

Accordingly, the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that the Estate failed

to establish their vicarious liability because the Estate did not specifically

identify which of their employees or agents acted negligently lacks merit. 13

____________________________________________

13The trial court also aptly noted that the burden was on the Operating Company Defendants to request that the verdict slip contain line items for the (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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With respect to the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that

Appellants failed to prove the remaining elements of a successful vicarious

liability claim, the trial court found, and our review of the record confirms,

that two of the Estate’s expert witnesses—Ms. Frederick and Dr. Seignious—

testified extensively, either at trial or in depositions, regarding the duty of the

employees of Operating Company Defendants, their breach of their duty,

causation, and damages. Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at 13-22. In light of this

testimony, the trial court concluded that this evidence, “taken together, was

sufficient to provide a basis for the jury[’s] finding that each [d]efendant’s

negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm” suffered by

Decedent. Id. at 22. Simply, the court concluded that “[w]hen viewing the

experts’ testimony, the testimony of lay witnesses[,] and the documentary

evidence introduced at trial as further proof of various duties and breaches

thereof, and drawing all reasonable inferences from all of that evidence, there

was sufficient basis for a jury to have made its findings that [the Operating

Company Defendants’ agents or employees] were negligent and that their

negligence was the factual cause of [Decedent’s] harm and death.” Id. at 23. ____________________________________________

jury to identify the agents or employees of the Operating Company Defendants through whom liability could be imposed on them and to ask the jury to make particular findings as to agency. Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at 23 (citing Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d. 529, 556-57 (Pa. Super. 2021) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the burden is on the plaintiff to request a special interrogatory pertaining to agency and vicarious liability); Cowher v. Kodali, 283 A.3d 794, 804 (Pa. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that under the general verdict rule, “when a litigant fails to request a special verdict slip that would have clarified the basis for a general verdict, and the verdict rests upon valid grounds, the right to a new trial is waived”)).

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Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law

in the trial court’s denial of the Operating Company Defendants’ motion for

JNOV as to its vicarious liability. Our review confirms that the Estate offered

ample evidence that agents or employees of the Operating Company

Defendants violated the requisite standard of care and that these violations

were the factual cause of Decedent’s death. See, e.g., N.T., 1/18/23, at 177-

183, 194-195, 204-05, 207-11, 215, 218-220, 223, 227, 230-31, 239-69,

276-319, 329 (Ms. Frederick’s testimony); N.T., 1/20/23, at 15-17, 33, 55-

57, 64, 85, 93 (Dr. Seignious’s Testimony). Viewing this evidence and all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Estate as the verdict-

winners, we conclude that the Estate presented sufficient evidence to prove

each of the elements of a vicarious liability claim against the Operating

Company Defendants. The trial court, therefore, properly refused to enter

JNOV in their favor, and this claim does not merit relief.

***

Operating Company Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial

We next address the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that the trial

court erred in certain of its evidentiary rulings and, thus, abused its discretion

in denying their motion for a new trial. In particular, the Operating Company

Defendants contend that the trial court erred in admitting two types of

evidence. First, the Survey Report, which is a survey that the Pennsylvania

Department of Health issues regarding a nursing home’s licensure and

certification, and second, the Profile Evidence, which is posted on the

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Medicare.gov website and whose purpose is “to ascertain that nursing homes

facilities are upholding the basic conditions of their licensure and certification”

through a “Nursing Home Compare” Five-Star Ratings Profile. Motion re:

Survey Reports, 12/1/22, at ¶ 5.

In particular, the Operating Company Defendants argue that this

evidence was not probative of the care and treatment rendered to Decedent, 14

unduly prejudicial, and constituted inadmissible hearsay because no one

involved in their production testified and the Estate did not corroborate their

contents.15 Vita Entities’ Br. at 62-66; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 61-65.

“We will reverse a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial

only if the trial court abused its discretion.” Vetter v. Miller, 157 A.3d 943,

947 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). With respect to challenged

____________________________________________

14 We note the Operating Company Defendants’ reliance on Temple v. Providence Care Ctr. LLC, 248 A.3d 464 (Pa. Super. 2021), which is a non- precedential decision of this Court, in support of their general contention that, referring to Profile Evidence, “[c]ourts have held this type of general information about a nursing home is inadmissible as evidence in a claim against a nursing home and, when admitted, give[s] rise for grounds for a new trial.” Vita Entities’ Br. at 66; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 63. We reject this argument because the Temple Court did not analyze whether and in what context Profile Evidence is admissible.

15 The Operating Company Defendants also contend that the admission of this

evidence resulted in a violation of their due process rights. Vita Entities’ Br. at 62-64; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 61, 64-65. We find this argument waived as the Operating Company Defendants did not raise this as a ground for relief in their motions in limine. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[I]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also Jones v. Ott, 191 A3d 782, 787 (Pa. 2018) (“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a litigant must place a timely, specific objection on the record.”).

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evidentiary rulings, a new trial is warranted where the rulings were in error

and the error prejudiced the moving party. Id.

Questions of evidentiary admissibility, including motions in limine, lie

within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will not disturb the court’s

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109

A.3d 682, 690 (Pa. Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion may not be found

merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion,

but requires a manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Keystone

Dedicated Logistics, Inc. v. JGB Enters., Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation omitted).

Further, we note that, “[i]n order to find that the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings constituted reversible error, such rulings must not only have been

erroneous but must also have been harmful to the complaining party.”

Oxford Presbyterian Church v. Weil-McLain Co., Inc., 815 A.2d 1094,

1100 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). An appellant “must therefore

show error in the evidentiary ruling and resulting prejudice, thus constituting

an abuse of discretion by the lower court.” Id. (citations omitted).

The threshold inquiry in considering whether to admit evidence is

whether the evidence is relevant. Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if it

logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at

issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable inference or

presumption regarding a material fact.” Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131,

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137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 401. The court

may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed

by its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the

jury, undue delay, pointlessness, or presentation of cumulative evidence.

Pa.R.E. 403.

The trial court first explained that the Profile Evidence and Survey

Reports were relevant because they showed that Operating Company

Defendants had notice and actual or constructive knowledge “of the fact that

Brinton Manor was a low-performing facility based on various objective

metrics related to patient care and failed to correct the conditions that gave

rise to the low ratings,” which was pertinent to the Estate’s then-pending claim

of corporate negligence against the Operating Company Defendants. Trial Ct.

Op., 1/3/23, at 3. In particular, the trial court noted that this evidence reflects

that management-level agents or employees of the Operating Company

Defendants were familiar with, and, in fact, tracked Brinton Manor’s “star

ratings” and reviews because “that is an important thing for the quality of care

and ensuring that the residents are taken care of.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/24, at

10. Thus, the trial court concluded that the evidence was more probative than

prejudicial and thus relevant pursuant to Pa.R.E.401. 16 ____________________________________________

16 The trial court further noted that, had the Operating Company Defendants

requested a limiting instruction, the trial court would have provided the opportunity to cure any potential prejudice with a limiting instruction. The Operating Company Defendants have not informed this Court whether they requested the trial court provide the jury with a limiting instruction regarding this evidence or if the trial court provided one sua sponte.

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Finally, the trial court explained that the Profile Evidence and Survey

Reports were not hearsay because Appellants did not seek their admission for

their truth of the matters stated, but rather to establish that the Defendants

had notice of the information in the publications. Trial Ct. Op., 1/3/23, at 3.

Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the Operating Company Defendants’ motion in limine

regarding the Profile Evidence and Survey Reports. It is clear from the record

that the trial court found the evidence relevant, and therefore admissible, to

address whether the Operating Company Defendants had notice of Brinton

Manor’s low ratings, which is relevant to establish knowledge of a breach of

the Thompson duties and, thus, corporate liability.17 Corey v. Wilkes Barre

Hospital, 307 A.3d 701, 709 (Pa. Super. 2023)(en banc).

Furthermore, we agree that the trial court properly found that the Profile

Evidence and Survey Reports were not hearsay, i.e., admitted to prove the

facts stated in the report. Rather, the trial court properly admitted them

because they addressed whether the Operating Company Defendants had

knowledge of the condition of the nursing home.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the evidence

and accordingly denied the Operating Defendant Company’s Motion for a New

Trial.

____________________________________________

17 Although the Estate abandoned its corporate liability claim at the post-trial

motions stage, the Estate pursued a claim of corporate liability against all defendants during trial.

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***

Compensatory Damages

The Operating Company Defendants next claim that the trial court erred

in not ordering a new trial after entering JNOV in favor of the Management

Company Defendants. Vita Entities’ Br. at 57-62; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 57-

61. They contend that the trial court should have ordered a new trial on

damages because, in nullifying 65% of the liability found against the

Management Company Defendants by entering JNOV in favor of them, “it

would be speculative to reapportion the liability originally apportioned to Vita

and Imperial[]” especially since “the injuries alleged by [the Estate] in this

case did not result from a single, identifiable act but from a series of alleged

acts by [the Operating Company Defendants] at distinctly different times.”

Vita Entities’ Br. at 60; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 60. In support of their claim,

the Operating Company Defendants rely on Maurer v. Trustees of Univ. of

Pennsylvania, 614 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super. 1992) (en banc), Henze v. Texaco,

Inc., 508 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Super. 1986), and Kobylinski v. Hipps, 519 A.2d

488 (Pa. Super. 1986).

In Henze, the plaintiff was injured when a loose threshold caused her

to fall at David Rice’s Texaco station. The jury apportioned negligence as

follows: 35% to plaintiff; 52% to Texaco, the lessee; and 13% to Mr. Rice,

the sublessee. On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court should

have granted JNOV to Texaco because Texaco had neither actual nor

constructive notice of the unsafe condition at the Texaco station. Then, in

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analyzing the effect of the JNOV upon the findings that the plaintiff’s causative

negligence was 35% and the sublessee’s causative negligence was 13%, the

Court concluded that “an attempt by a court to reapportion negligence in this

case would be speculative[,]” but, because the issue of damages had been

“fairly tried” and no party suggested error with respect to the damages issue,

“[t]he only issue requiring a retrial is the apportionment of negligence” of the

plaintiff and the sublessee. Henze, 508 A.2d at 546-47.

In Kobylinksi, the executrix of the decedent’s estate brought a

wrongful death and survival action after the decedent fell to his death in an

unguarded exterior stairwell attached to a residence owned by the appellant,

a landlord, and leased to a tenant. Following a jury trial, the jury apportioned

negligence as follows: 5% to decedent, 20% to the tenant, and 75% to the

landlord. This Court reversed the judgment, however, and remanded the case

for entry of JNOV in favor of the landlord and for a new trial on the causative

negligence of the tenant and the decedent. Kobylinski, 519 A.2d at 493.

Similarly, in Maurer, a medical negligence action, this Court remanded

for entry of JNOV in favor of Dr. Gennarelli, a treating physician, who the jury

had determined was 25% liable for the plaintiff’s harm, and affirmed the

judgment in favor of another physician, Dr. Rogers, and the defendant hospital

system, HUP, who the jury had determined were 25% and 50% liable,

respectively. The Maurer Court then turned to the holdings in Henze and

Kobylinksi to determine the impact that the entry of JNOV had on the amount

and allocation of causative negligence against the remaining negligent parties.

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The Court found two factors that distinguished this case from Henze and

Kobylinski: (1) the entry of JNOV in Maurer “will not leave two parties each

of whom was independently negligent, as in the other cases, but rather one

party (Dr. Rogers) who was actively negligent and one party (HUP), whose

negligence derives from that of the other[;]” and (2) Maurer “presents a more

complicated case question of damages.” Maurer, 614 A.2d at 769. The court

further explained that in Henze and Kobylinski, “the entire extent of the

plaintiff’s injuries, and therefore the entire extent of his or her damages,

resulted from a single, identifiable action[,]” i.e., falling over a loose

threshold in Hinze and falling down an unguarded stairwell in Kobylinski.

Id. (emphasis added). The Maurer plaintiff, in contrast, alleged that he was

injured by two negligent courses of conduct, but the Court found that the

appellees failed to prove that one of the courses of conduct was negligent.

Given these differences, the Maurer Court, thus, found that it was not

appropriate to assume the amount of damages should remain the same and

simply either reapportion liability or mold the verdict, which would have the

effect of cutting in half the award of damages. Therefore, the Court concluded

that “the better course is to vacate the judgment and to remand the case for

entry of [JNOV] in favor of Dr. Gennarelli and for a new trial on the issue of

damages resulting from the negligence of [the remaining defendants]. Id. at

770.

Turning to the instant case, as noted above, the jury returned a

compensatory damages verdict of $4,000,000 for the Estate, and apportioned

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liability as follows: 60% to Vita, 5% to Imperial, 15% to BM-SNF, and 20% to

BM Rehab. The jury found from the evidence at trial that Decedent’s harm

arose not from a single incident of negligence, but from a course of negligent

conduct, which it attributed in part to the Management Company Defendants

and in part to the Operating Company Defendants.

The trial court then found that the Estate was only pursuing a corporate

liability theory against the Management Company Defendants but could not

do so as a matter of law. When addressing the impact of the removal of the

Management Company Defendants from the jury verdict, the trial court

assumed that the jury verdict would remain the same without the

Management Company Defendants and, thus, denied their request for a new

trial on damages. We disagree.

We find that, like in Maurer, it is reasonable to assume that had the

Management Company Defendants’ conduct not been an issue at trial, the

jury’s award against the Operating Company Defendants may have been

different. Thus, guided by the holdings in Maurer, Hinze, and Kobylinski,

we conclude that the trial court erred in declining to order a new trial on

damages. We, therefore, vacate the compensatory damages portion of the

judgment in favor of the Operating Company Defendants and remand for a

new trial on the issue of damages resulting from the Operating Company

Defendants’ negligence.

***

Punitive Damages

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All parties raise claims regarding punitive damages. We emphasize that

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a party to

receive fair notice of the conduct that will subject him to punitive damages:

Pennsylvania juries enjoy discretion in the fixing of punitive damages. That discretion is, however, subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which imposes limits on punitive awards based on elementary notions of fairness . . . dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also to the severity of the penalty that may be imposed.

Caranci, 338 A.3d at 172 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

(emphasis added).

We review an award of punitive damages for an abuse of discretion.

Grossi v. Travelers Personal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1157 (Pa. Super.

2013). “Under Pennsylvania law the size of a punitive damages award must

be reasonably related to the State’s interest in punishing and deterring the

particular behavior of the defendant and not the product of arbitrariness or

unfettered discretion.” Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1157.

Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his[, or her,] reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier[-]of[-]fact can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause[,] and the wealth of the defendant.

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Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 61 (Pa. 2023) (quoting Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 908(2)); see also Hollock, 842 A.2d at 419 (citing cases

addressing Section 908(2); Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1157 (same). “Punitive

damages awards must be tailored to each defendant.” Bert Co., 298 A.3d at

71.

We first address the Operating Company Defendants’ claim that the trial

court erred in not vacating or dramatically reducing the punitive damages

award. Vita Entities’ Br. at 43-57; Imperial Entities’ Br. at 52-57. The

Operating Company Defendants first contend that, as a matter of law, there

is no legal basis to impose an award of punitive damages on them because

the Estate conceded that it was not pursuing a theory of corporate liability,

but only one of vicarious liability and at trial, only requested punitive damages

based on a theory of corporate liability. Vita Entities’ Br. at 44; Imperial

Entities’ Br. at 52. The Operating Company Defendants conclude that since

“the only basis upon which the jury could have imposed punitive damages on

the [Operating Company Defendants] was for their own, direct conduct,” and

not vicarious liability, there is no underlying theory to support a claim of

punitive damages. Vita Entities’ Br. at 44 ((citing N.T., 1/25/23, at 148 (where

the jury delivered its verdict in open court finding that the “conduct of [the

Operating Company Defendants] was willful and wanton or exhibited reckless

indifference to the rights of [Decedent] through their own direct conduct[]”)

(emphasis added); N.T., 1/25/23 at 37 (where the Estate argued in closing

arguments that “[t]here’s something else at play in this case, and it’s called

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punitive damages. Punitive damages are there to punish [the defendants] for

their corporate conduct.”) (emphasis added)); Imperial Entities’ Br. at 52

((citing the written Jury Verdict Sheet reflecting the jury’s answer in the

affirmative to the question asking: “Do you find that the conduct of any of the

following defendants was willful or wanton, or exhibited reckless indifference

to the rights of [Decedent] through their own direct conduct?”) (emphasis

added)). We are constrained to agree.

Our review of the record confirms that the jury was asked to consider

whether the Operating Company Defendants’ direct corporate conduct was

willful, wanton, or recklessly indifferent to Decedent’s rights. In addition, the

attorney for the Estate informed the court at the hearing on the parties’ post-

trial motions that “[f]or punitives we had conceded we were only seeking for

the direct negligence for all four [Defendants].” N.T., 6/6/23, at 182-83

(emphasis added). Consequently, because the record also showed that the

Estate only pursued a vicarious liability theory of recovery—not a direct

corporate liability theory of recovery—against the Operating Company

Defendants, and the jury only considered whether punitive damages were

appropriate as a result of the Operating Company Defendants’ corporate

conduct, the Estate is precluded from obtaining punitive damages based on

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its theory of vicarious liability. We, thus, are constrained to vacate the award

of punitive damages against BM-SNF and BM Rehab. 18

Conclusion

In sum, we affirm the judgment in favor of the Management Company

Defendants. We also find that the trial court properly denied the Operating

Company Defendants’ Motion for JNOV on sufficiency of evidence grounds and

Motion for New Trial on the grounds of the evidentiary challenges. We,

however, vacate the judgment entered against the Operating Company

Defendants and order a new trial to determine the amount of compensatory

damages to which the Estate is entitled from the Operating Company

Defendants. Finally, we vacate the order of punitive damages against the

Operating Company Defendants. 19

Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Olson joins the opinion.

Judge McLaughlin files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

____________________________________________

18 In light of our disposition of this claim, we need not address the Operating

Company Defendants remaining claims regarding punitive damages and the Estate’s claim that the trial court erred in remitting the punitive damages award against BM Rehab.

19 In the years since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court last addressed the corporate liability of a nursing home management company in 2012 in Scampone II, the corporate structures and financial arrangements of nursing homes and their management companies have evolved. Although the lower courts have addressed numerous issues arising after Scampone II, we urge the Supreme Court to provide updated guidance to the bench and bar regarding the application of the principles of corporate liability to nursing home management companies.

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Date: 8/4/2026

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