Newbound v. Interurban Street Railway Co.

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

Newbound v. Interurban Street Railway Co.

86 N.Y.S. 68

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedJanuary 19, 1904

StatusPublished

This text of 86 N.Y.S. 68 (Newbound v. Interurban Street Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Newbound v. Interurban Street Railway Co., 86 N.Y.S. 68 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1904).

Pincite

Opinion

FREEDMAN, P. J.

After the jury had rendered their verdict in this case, the defendant’s counsel moved to set aside the verdict “as contrary to law and contrary to the evidence, and as excessive damages and on the grounds .set forth in section 999 of the Code. The order appealed from, after reciting that the justice presiding at the trial aforesaid immediately after the rendition of the said verdict having entertained a motion made on his minutes on behalf of the defendant to set aside the said verdict, and for a new trial to be granted upon the exceptions taken on behalf of the defendant at the trial and because the verdict is contrary to the evidence and contrary to law, and is for excessive damages, further says, “Ordered that said motion is granted.” The criticism made by the appellant herein that the motion was made and the order granted upon the ground that the verdict was against the [69]*69"weight of evidence,” and that such ground is not among those mentioned in section 254 of the Municipal Court act (Laws 1902, p. 1563, c. 580), and that therefore the court had no authority to grant such motion, is not well taken. It is true that in a short memorandum made by the trial judge, in which he cites several authorities, he says, “The verdict is set aside as against the weight of evidencebut this memorandum is, strictly speaking, no part of the record, and, as we have seen, the motion was made upon one or more of the grounds specified by said section of the Municipal Court act, and the order so recites. But independently of the foregoing considerations it is well to notice that the grounds specified in section 254 of the Municipal Court act are identical with the grounds specified in section 999 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that under the last-named section it has been held in quite a number of cases that it includes the power to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. Clark v. Mech. Nat. Bk., 8 Daly, 481; Cheney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 16 Hun, 415; Dunning v. Bowe, 16 Wkly. Dig. 119; Ferguson v. Gill, 74 Hun, 566, 26 N. Y. Supp. 596; Young v. Stone, 77 Hun, 395, 28 N. Y. Supp. 881; Ludeman v. 3 Ave. R. R. Co., 30 App. Div. 522, 52 N. Y. Supp. 310; Silverman v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 69 App. Div. 22, 74 N. Y. Supp. 481.

The order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

FREEDMAN, P. J.

After the jury had rendered their verdict in this case, the defendant’s counsel moved to set aside the verdict “as contrary to law and contrary to the evidence, and as excessive damages and on the grounds .set forth in section 999 of the Code. The order appealed from, after reciting that the justice presiding at the trial aforesaid immediately after the rendition of the said verdict having entertained a motion made on his minutes on behalf of the defendant to set aside the said verdict, and for a new trial to be granted upon the exceptions taken on behalf of the defendant at the trial and because the verdict is contrary to the evidence and contrary to law, and is for excessive damages, further says, “Ordered that said motion is granted.” The criticism made by the appellant herein that the motion was made and the order granted upon the ground that the verdict was against the [69]*69"weight of evidence,” and that such ground is not among those mentioned in section 254 of the Municipal Court act (Laws 1902, p. 1563, c. 580), and that therefore the court had no authority to grant such motion, is not well taken. It is true that in a short memorandum made by the trial judge, in which he cites several authorities, he says, “The verdict is set aside as against the weight of evidencebut this memorandum is, strictly speaking, no part of the record, and, as we have seen, the motion was made upon one or more of the grounds specified by said section of the Municipal Court act, and the order so recites. But independently of the foregoing considerations it is well to notice that the grounds specified in section 254 of the Municipal Court act are identical with the grounds specified in section 999 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that under the last-named section it has been held in quite a number of cases that it includes the power to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. Clark v. Mech. Nat. Bk., 8 Daly, 481; Cheney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 16 Hun, 415; Dunning v. Bowe, 16 Wkly. Dig. 119; Ferguson v. Gill, 74 Hun, 566, 26 N. Y. Supp. 596; Young v. Stone, 77 Hun, 395, 28 N. Y. Supp. 881; Ludeman v. 3 Ave. R. R. Co., 30 App. Div. 522, 52 N. Y. Supp. 310; Silverman v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 69 App. Div. 22, 74 N. Y. Supp. 481.

The order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

86 N.Y.S. 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/newbound-v-interurban-street-railway-co-nyappterm-1904.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack