New York State National Bank v. Whitehall Water Power Co.

161 A.D. 304, 146 N.Y.S. 769, 1914 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5398
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided March 13, 1914·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Kellogg, J.:

The plaintiff’s assignor constructed an addition to the defendant’s mill and there is unpaid on the contract price $11,618.96, for which, and for certain alleged extra work, the plaintiff seeks recovery. By the contract, dated May 3, 1905, the work was to be completed September 1, 1905, within three months and twenty-eight days. It was in fact completed July 1, 1906 — thirteen months and twenty-eight days after the date of the contract and ten months after the agreed time. The contract provided $50 per day as liquidated damages to the defendant for each day’s delay in the completion of the work, and that the delays should be apportioned. The defendant, by its coun[305] terclaim, seeks to recover such liquidated damages for three hundred and three days. The judgment appealed from determines that the deepening of the wheelpit three and one-half feet, which was provided for by a supplemental agreement, extended the contract so that the time did not begin to run until January 1, 1906, thus driving the work into cold weather, which made great delay in laying the brick and placing the floor beams, and such work, which should have been completed in one month in seasonable weather, required three months, thus extending the contract time two months more, with the result that forty-seven days of the delay were chargeable to the contractor, the balance to the defendant.

This case was before us in 140 Appellate Division, 740, and it is unnecessary to repeat the facts there stated. When the contract was made it was understood that the wheelpit, which lay at the very foundation of the work, was to he lowered one foot or more below the depth specified in the contract, for which the contractor was to receive two dollars and fifty cents per cubic foot, and that the contractor was to be notified of the depth required as soon as a determination was made. We held that until the contractor was so notified the original contract practically remained in suspense and that the time intervening was not a part of the contract time. This was not upon the theory that the owner or the architect had delayed the work, but that the parties had in substance agreed that the work need not be entered upon until the nature of this foundation work was agreed upon. We also held that if this extra work necessarily required extra time for its completion, with reference to the work itself or the extra cofferdam made necessary for it, such extra time was to be added to the contract time. This did not mean that the time which the contractor might spend upon the work, or in experimenting upon the cofferdam, was to be added to the contract time, but that the situation as it actually existed was to. he considered, and if engineers competent for such work, who had full knowledge of the condition of the bed of the lake and the other conditions, with adequate machinery and appliances, proper supervision and working to capacity would be engaged a certain time in the necessary [306] performance of such work, such time should be added to the contract time. ■ The law implies that where, by a supplemental agreement, additional work, which lies at the very foundation of the contract work, is agreed upon, the term of the original contract is extended by the time which is necessary for the performance of such extra work. It is evident that the wheelpit could not be lowered three feet and a half without taking some time. It is also apparent that in agreeing to deliver the building in three months and twenty-eight days the contractor had undertaken to do a great deal of work in a very short time. It must have been within the understanding that the deepening of the wheelpit would necessarily cause some extension of the contract time. The parties not having agreed upon the extended time, it follows that the extension was for such time as the extra work at the place where it is to be performed reasonably requires under favorable conditions.

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New York State National Bank v. Whitehall Water Power Co., 161 A.D. 304, 146 N.Y.S. 769, 1914 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5398 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1914).

161 A.D. 304 (New York State National Bank v. Whitehall Water Power Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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