New York Pepsi-Cola Distributors Ass'n v. Pepsico, Inc.

240 A.D.2d 315, 659 N.Y.S.2d 441, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6724
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJune 24, 1997
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 240 A.D.2d 315 (New York Pepsi-Cola Distributors Ass'n v. Pepsico, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New York Pepsi-Cola Distributors Ass'n v. Pepsico, Inc., 240 A.D.2d 315, 659 N.Y.S.2d 441, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6724 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered July 2, 1996, dismissing the action for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The IAS Court properly held that plaintiffs, independent wholesale distributors who purchase soft drinks for resale from an independent bottler not a party to this action, are not third-party beneficiaries of any contracts between the bottler and defendants, the bottler’s licensor, it being settled that a sublicensee is not a third-party beneficiary of a contract between a licensor and direct licensee (see, Artwear, Inc. v Hughes, 202 AD2d 76, 83-84), and since any benefits that plaintiffs derive from such contracts are incidental (see, Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314, 336). Nor does defendants’ alleged failure to prevent other distributors from transshipping licensed products into plaintiffs’ exclusive territories state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of a contract between the parties (see, Mandelblatt v Devon Stores, 132 AD2d 162, 167-168), or allegations showing an " 'intimate relationship’ ” (Brasport, S. A. v Hoechst Celanese [316]*316Corp., 747 F Supp 199, 202). The court also properly dismissed the causes of action for tortious interference with contract since no contracts were breached (see, Artwear, Inc. v Hughes, supra, at 85), and for tortious interference with prospective business relations absent allegations of culpable conduct (see, Guard-Life Corp. v Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 50 NY2d 183, 191). Leave to replead was properly denied in the absence of a "proposed new pleadingt ] supported by evidence as on a motion for summary judgment” (Abbott v Herzfeld & Rubin, 202 AD2d 351, 352, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 83 NY2d 995). Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Nardelli, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)
240 A.D.2d 315, 659 N.Y.S.2d 441, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-york-pepsi-cola-distributors-assn-v-pepsico-inc-nyappdiv-1997.