New York Criminal & Civil Courts Bar Ass'n v. Jacoby

460 N.E.2d 1325, 61 N.Y.2d 130, 472 N.Y.S.2d 890, 1984 N.Y. LEXIS 4028
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 21, 1984
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 460 N.E.2d 1325 (New York Criminal & Civil Courts Bar Ass'n v. Jacoby) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New York Criminal & Civil Courts Bar Ass'n v. Jacoby, 460 N.E.2d 1325, 61 N.Y.2d 130, 472 N.Y.S.2d 890, 1984 N.Y. LEXIS 4028 (N.Y. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Jones, J.

A multistate law firm (consisting of partners admitted to practice in different States) may practice law in New York State if at least one of its active partners is admitted to practice in this State, and it may conduct such practice under a firm name comprised of a combination of surnames, although none of them is the surname of a partner licensed to practice in New York. The firm may use a *133 letterhead and advertisements disclosing the firm name only, but if on either there also appears the name of any individual partner or associate who is not admitted to practice in New York there shall be a clear indication of that fact.

After first making a written request to the Attorney-General, pursuant to the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 476-a of the Judiciary Law, 1 the New York Criminal and Civil Courts Bar Association obtained leave from the Supreme Court to bring the present action. The Bar Association, charging defendants with the unauthorized practice of the law, seeks to enjoin Leonard D. Jacoby, Stephen Z. Meyers and Gail J. Koff from practicing law in New York under the name and style of “Jacoby & Meyers” (see Judiciary Law, § 476-b). Supreme Court denied both defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division modified by dismissing the complaint. On further1 appeal to us, appellant has requested that we treat the appeal as though before us on cross motions for summary judgment (as appears to have been the procedural posture assumed by the Appellate Division in making its determination). We affirm.

From the allegations of the complaint and the affidavits submitted by the parties, it appears that Jacoby & Meyers *134 is a national law firm with numerous offices in the States of California and New York. Leonard D. Jacoby and Stephen Z. Meyers, the name partners, are admitted to practice law in California but not in New York. Gail J. Koff, the partner of the firm resident in New York, is a member of the New York Bar actively engaged in practice in New York who supervises the 20 or so neighborhood offices maintained by the firm in New York State. The firm uses letterheads bearing the firm name with a listing of the locations within the State of New York where the firm maintains offices and the names of its partners, identifying those who are not licensed to practice in New York. The firm also advertises in New York in the firm name without disclosure of the name of any partner or associate.

Plaintiff grounds its action in the provisions of section 478 of the Judiciary Law, which provides in pertinent part:

“Practicing or appearing as attorney-at-law without being admitted and registered

“It shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law or as an attorney and counselor-at-law for a person other than himself in a court of record in this state or in any court in the city of New York, or to furnish attorneys or counsel or an attorney and counsel to render legal services, or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law as aforesaid, or in any other manner, or to assume to be an attorney or counselor-at-law, or to assume, use, or advertise the title of lawyer, or attorney and counselor-at-law, or attorney-at-law or counselor-at-law, or attorney, or counselor, or attorney and counselor, or equivalent terms in any language, in such manner as to convey the impression that he is a legal practitioner of law or in any manner to advertise that he either alone or together with any other persons or person has, owns, conducts or maintains a law office or law and collection office, or office of any kind for the practice of law, without having first been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this state, and without having taken the constitutional oath and without having subscribed and taken the oath or affirmation required by section four hundred sixty-eight of the judiciary law and filed the same in the office of the clerk of the court of appeals as required by said section.” *135 There is no claim that either Jacoby or Meyers or any other partner or associate of the firm not admitted to practice law in New York is actually practicing law in the State of New York. Rather the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that use of the firm name is a factual misrepresentation that both of the name partners are available to render legal services in New York. We reject this contention and conclude as a matter of law that use of a firm name comprised of surnames, without more, does not constitute any holding out that there are individual partners bearing those surnames who are admitted to practice in New York, or indeed that there are partners in the firm who bear such surnames, wherever admitted. Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish instances (of which there are many in New York State, particularly in New York City) of the use of firm names made up of surnames of partners one or more of whom are deceased is not persuasive. Its assertion is that the clients, both actual and potential, of such latter firms are sufficiently sophisticated to understand that the use of such firm names constitutes no representation that there is any member of the firm who bears one of the surnames that appear in the firm name. We find no significant difference between the use in a firm name of the surname of a deceased partner and the surname of a partner not practicing in New York. In both instances the firm name is an institutional description and its use constitutes no representation that anyone bearing a surname corresponding to the names in the firm title is available to render professional services.

Disciplinary Rule 2-102(D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted to prescribe the standards of professional conduct on the part of the burgeoning number of multistate firms, provides: “A partnership shall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions; however, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.” Although the provisions of the Code of Professional Re *136 sponsibility are not entitled in all instances to be accorded the status of statute or case law (see Matter of Weinstock, 40 NY2d 1, 6), in this instance the rule fairly states the appropriate application to multistate law firms of the provisions of section 478 of the Judiciary Law.

The practice of law by firms comprised of partners and associates some of whom are not residents of the State of New York 2 and some of whom are not licensed to practice law in the State is not, as such, prohibited under our State law. 3 It is the policy of the State of New York to foster the availability of a wide range of professional services by lawyers qualified to render them.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Smolenski v. T.G.I. Friday's, Inc.
15 Misc. 3d 792 (New York Supreme Court, 2007)
DePonceau v. Pataki
315 F. Supp. 2d 338 (W.D. New York, 2004)
People v. Romero
698 N.E.2d 424 (New York Court of Appeals, 1998)
Keenan v. Mitsubishi Estate, New York, Inc.
228 A.D.2d 330 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)
Schulz v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
186 A.D.2d 941 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1992)
People v. Del Carpio
147 Misc. 2d 603 (Criminal Court of the City of New York, 1990)
Gracey v. Maddin
769 S.W.2d 497 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1989)
Marshall v. Romano
139 A.D.2d 499 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)
People ex rel. Field v. Cronshaw
138 A.D.2d 765 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
460 N.E.2d 1325, 61 N.Y.2d 130, 472 N.Y.S.2d 890, 1984 N.Y. LEXIS 4028, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-york-criminal-civil-courts-bar-assn-v-jacoby-ny-1984.