New York City Transit Authority v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

New York City Transit Authority v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.

16 A.D.2d 959, 229 N.Y.S.2d 787, 1962 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12295

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 18, 1962

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 16 A.D.2d 959 (New York City Transit Authority v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

New York City Transit Authority v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 16 A.D.2d 959, 229 N.Y.S.2d 787, 1962 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12295 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action by an assignee of a contract to recover moneys claimed to be due and owing under the contract, plaintiff, by permission of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, appeals from its order dated June 29, 1961, which affirmed a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York, Borough of Brooklyn, First District, entered September 19, 1960, in favor of defendant, pursuant to an order of said Municipal Court, dated November 20, 1959, denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or for alternative relief, and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment (20 Misc 2d 659). Order of Appellate Term affirmed, with costs. At the time of the making of the contract on November 6, 1936, plaintiff’s remote assignor had been operating a street surface railroad along Jamaica Avenue, west of 168th Street, in the Borough of Queens, City of New York. The defendant had been granted a franchise by the City of New York to operate omnibuses along certain streets in that borough, including part of this portion of Jamaica Avenue, and, in accordance with law, defendant had applied to the then extant Transit Commission of the State of New York for a certificate of convenience and necessity. The commission had scheduled a hearing on the application. Said assignor opposed the application, but it desisted because it entered into the contract in question with defendant. The contract provided that the assignor would withdraw its opposition and that defendant would make certain payments to the assignor. In our opinion the contract, being one to pay for another’s refraining from opposing a legal [960]*960proceeding such as the one -here, was against public policy and therefore is unenforcible (cf. Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.

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In an action by an assignee of a contract to recover moneys claimed to be due and owing under the contract, plaintiff, by permission of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, appeals from its order dated June 29, 1961, which affirmed a judgment of the Municipal Court of the City of New York, Borough of Brooklyn, First District, entered September 19, 1960, in favor of defendant, pursuant to an order of said Municipal Court, dated November 20, 1959, denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or for alternative relief, and granting defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment (20 Misc 2d 659). Order of Appellate Term affirmed, with costs. At the time of the making of the contract on November 6, 1936, plaintiff’s remote assignor had been operating a street surface railroad along Jamaica Avenue, west of 168th Street, in the Borough of Queens, City of New York. The defendant had been granted a franchise by the City of New York to operate omnibuses along certain streets in that borough, including part of this portion of Jamaica Avenue, and, in accordance with law, defendant had applied to the then extant Transit Commission of the State of New York for a certificate of convenience and necessity. The commission had scheduled a hearing on the application. Said assignor opposed the application, but it desisted because it entered into the contract in question with defendant. The contract provided that the assignor would withdraw its opposition and that defendant would make certain payments to the assignor. In our opinion the contract, being one to pay for another’s refraining from opposing a legal [960]*960proceeding such as the one -here, was against public policy and therefore is unenforcible (cf. Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147). Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

16 A.D.2d 959, 229 N.Y.S.2d 787, 1962 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-york-city-transit-authority-v-green-bus-lines-inc-nyappdiv-1962.

Opinion

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