New York City Housing Authority v. McClinton

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

New York City Housing Authority v. McClinton

184 Misc. 2d 818, 711 N.Y.S.2d 293, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 296

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedMay 26, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 184 Misc. 2d 818 (New York City Housing Authority v. McClinton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

New York City Housing Authority v. McClinton, 184 Misc. 2d 818, 711 N.Y.S.2d 293, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 296 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order entered June 17, 1998 modified by vacating the provision allowing for a postjudgment cure pursuant to RPAPL 753 (4); as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

Appeal from order entered October 27, 1998 denying renewal and/or reargument dismissed, without costs, as academic.

After due notice and a hearing, respondent’s tenancy was finally terminated by landlord New York City Housing Authority because of her failure to submit requisite information concerning her income and household composition. Subsequently, the Authority served a 30-day notice to vacate and commenced this holdover eviction proceeding. Civil Court, while granting summary judgment on the petition, afforded tenant a postjudgment opportunity to cure pursuant to RPAPL 753 (4) based upon tenant’s affidavit that “I have now complied in full” with the recertification/income verification requirements.

We do not agree that RPAPL 753 (4) is appropriately invoked here. This proceeding was not premised upon a correctable breach of tenant’s lease, but was brought to enforce an administrative determination that tenant was no longer eligible for continued occupancy because of her noncompliance with certain rules and regulations governing the tenancy (see, New York City Hous. Auth. v Williams, 179 Misc 2d 822 [App Term, 2d Dept]; North Waterside Redevelopment Co. v Flores, NYLJ, July 21, 1997, at 27, col 5 [App Term, 1st Dept]). While it is argued that Civil Court’s application of the statute was “procedural” only, what has happened, in substance, is that the court has effectively reinstated a tenancy previously terminated by the Housing Authority after exhaustion of the administrative .process. The Housing Authority, in the exercise of its adjudicatory function, retains the discretion to grant or withhold a “cure” in a given case, subject only to the more limited standard of review applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings timely commenced in Supreme Court (see, e.g., [820]*820Matter of Dukuly v Aponte, 204 AD2d 189).

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order entered June 17, 1998 modified by vacating the provision allowing for a postjudgment cure pursuant to RPAPL 753 (4); as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

Appeal from order entered October 27, 1998 denying renewal and/or reargument dismissed, without costs, as academic.

After due notice and a hearing, respondent’s tenancy was finally terminated by landlord New York City Housing Authority because of her failure to submit requisite information concerning her income and household composition. Subsequently, the Authority served a 30-day notice to vacate and commenced this holdover eviction proceeding. Civil Court, while granting summary judgment on the petition, afforded tenant a postjudgment opportunity to cure pursuant to RPAPL 753 (4) based upon tenant’s affidavit that “I have now complied in full” with the recertification/income verification requirements.

We do not agree that RPAPL 753 (4) is appropriately invoked here. This proceeding was not premised upon a correctable breach of tenant’s lease, but was brought to enforce an administrative determination that tenant was no longer eligible for continued occupancy because of her noncompliance with certain rules and regulations governing the tenancy (see, New York City Hous. Auth. v Williams, 179 Misc 2d 822 [App Term, 2d Dept]; North Waterside Redevelopment Co. v Flores, NYLJ, July 21, 1997, at 27, col 5 [App Term, 1st Dept]). While it is argued that Civil Court’s application of the statute was “procedural” only, what has happened, in substance, is that the court has effectively reinstated a tenancy previously terminated by the Housing Authority after exhaustion of the administrative .process. The Housing Authority, in the exercise of its adjudicatory function, retains the discretion to grant or withhold a “cure” in a given case, subject only to the more limited standard of review applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings timely commenced in Supreme Court (see, e.g., [820]*820Matter of Dukuly v Aponte, 204 AD2d 189).

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184 Misc. 2d 818, 711 N.Y.S.2d 293, 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-york-city-housing-authority-v-mcclinton-nyappterm-2000.

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