New York Bay Cemetery Co. v. Buckmaster

49 N.J. Eq. 439
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedFebruary 15, 1892
StatusPublished

This text of 49 N.J. Eq. 439 (New York Bay Cemetery Co. v. Buckmaster) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New York Bay Cemetery Co. v. Buckmaster, 49 N.J. Eq. 439 (N.J. Ct. App. 1892).

Opinion

Pitney, V. C.

The bill is filed by the New York Bay Cemetery Company, a corporation organized under a special act of the legislature, approved March 5th, 1850, and it seeks to restrain an action of ejectment. The defendants, plaintiffs in the ejectment, are a portion of the devisees of Thomas H. Buckmaster, deceased, who claim title to some two thousand and one hundred burial lots in the cemetery enclosure of the complainant, by virtue of divers conveyances made by the cemetery company in the fall of 1853, which conveyances purported to convey in the aggregate thirty thousand burial lots in the cemetery—

“ in common and undivided in all the lands as the same are laid out on the registered map or plan of the said cemetery, and now remaining unsold and belonging to said company, said grounds and cemetery containing in all remaining unsold at this time thirty thousand lots.”

The title to nine hundred and sixty-nine of these lots, derived through these conveyances to Thomas H. Buckmaster, were involved in the case of The New York Bay Cemetery Company v. Clara Buckmaster, 20 Vr. 449.

Clara Buckmaster is not a party to this suit, and the lots here involved do not include the nine hundred and sixty-nine which were the subject of judicial action in the case just cited.

[441]*441The gravamen of the bill is that no consideration was paid by 'Thomas H. Buckmaster to the complainant for the conveyances just mentioned, and that he was an officer of the company at the time, and that the result of the conveyances was to make Buckmaster a trustee for the company, and it sets up circumstances which it alleges render the conveyance so made void in' equity as against the complainant.

During the hearing, the complainant asked and obtained leave to amend the bill by alleging that if any consideration was paid by Buekmaster to the company, it was by way of loan, and that the conveyance to him was by way of mortgage, and that the •amount so paid has been repaid by a sale of a portion of the mortgaged premises.

The answer sets up a consideration and denies that anything which has occurred entitles the complainant to turn the absolute conveyances into a mortgage, and pleads the statute of limitations.

There is a cross-bill which alleges that the complainant has •sold to individual purchasers for the purposes of sepulture, and .•received payment for several lots belonging to defendants, and .-prays an account for money so received, and that defendants’ .title to the unsold lots may be established by decree of this court.

An answer was filed to the cross-bill, and the cause brought to hearing.

[The statement of the facts of the case is here omitted.]

The complainant rests- its claim for relief- on two grounds— first, that it was beyond the power of the complainant to make an absolute conveyance of all its property in the manner in which it was done, and that if the legal title passed, as it must be held to have done under the decision in the ease of Clara Buckmaster, that it was, and is, held in trust for the complainant; and, second, if any consideration was paid by Buekmaster to the company for the conveyance, the result was to make him a mortgagee only, and that the proof is abundant to show that he has been paid all that he advanced.

[442]*442I think neither of these positions tenable. Both are founded on what seems to me to be a plain misconception of the situation and of the rights of the parties resulting from the peculiar provisions of the act of incorporation and of the so-called by-laws-annexed to the deed of conveyance from Broomhead to the corporation. The corporators named in the act occupied a peculiar-position. They were — -first, corporators simply, such as were always-inserted in the old special acts of incorporation entrusted by the-legislature with power of organization; second, they were managers of the affairs of the corporation until superseded by an election held under the provisions of the third section; and, then,. third, they were proprietors of the land to be conveyed, and, by the first subdivision of the second section, were entitled to take-to “ their only proper use and behoof ” the proceeds of the sale,, subject, however, as I think, to the-duty of devoting sufficient of such proceeds to the purpose of completing the work of putting-the grounds in order, as provided in the third subdivision of the-second section.

Then, again, by the terms of the deed of conveyance, they expressly reserved to themselves the right to take all the proceeds-of the sale of all the lots to themselves, subject to certain charges-therein specified, and they fixed a price below which none should' be sold.

Complainant argued that those corporators were themselves-the corporation, because the grant, in the charter, to them of the-right to take the proceeds of the sale “ to their only proper use- and behoof” was to them and their successors and assigns, and,, therefore, the statutory reservation of the proceeds to the complainants was in effect a reservation to the corporation itself. But the language relied on must be construed in connection with-the sections which declared that the corporation should be composed only of persons who should be owners of lots, and in view of the fact that the persons named were the proprietors of the-land and were entitled to compensation for it upon its conveyance to the corporation.

If the individual lot-owners had combined, at the end of the-first year, to elect new trustees, they could not thereby have-[443]*443divested the right of the proprietors to the proceeds of the sales,, and by the terms of the by-laws annexed to the deed from Broom-head to the corporation those proprietors would still, have had' the right to substantially control the corporation and to demand all the proceeds of the sales of the lots.

Coming to the several deeds of conveyance made by the corporation in September, 1853, to Buckmaster and the other grantees above mentioned, it seems to me that those deeds were simply and no more than a means adopted by the proprietors by which they assigned to those grantees all the proceeds of the-sales of those lots precisely the same as if each of the nine hundred and sixty shares of stock issued to the original proprietors-had been transferred to them. This view is in consonance with the verbiage found in the deeds where the lots are not located and described by numbers or other description but are designated as being “in common and undivided and now remaining unsold ” &c., and with the subsequent conduct of Buckmaster in» making title to actual purchasers by deed executed by the company.

In addition to transferring the right to these proceeds of actual sales, the intention of the parties undoubtedly was to give Buck-master and the other grantees the voting power based upon the-ownership of the lots, and through that voting power the ability to control the corporation until the majority of them had been sold to outsiders. Whether the deeds actually vested the grantees-with any such voting power it is not necessary to decide. But that they did- vest them with the right to take the proceeds of the-sales I can have no doubt.

This consideration also disposes of the question whether the-conveyances should be considered as a mere mortgage to secure Buckmaster for moneys advanced with a reversion in favor of the corporation.

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Bluebook (online)
49 N.J. Eq. 439, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-york-bay-cemetery-co-v-buckmaster-njch-1892.