New Orleans Real Estate Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Teutonia Insurance

54 So. 466, 128 La. 45, 1910 La. LEXIS 894
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 25, 1910
DocketNo. 17,780
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 54 So. 466 (New Orleans Real Estate Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Teutonia Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New Orleans Real Estate Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Teutonia Insurance, 54 So. 466, 128 La. 45, 1910 La. LEXIS 894 (La. 1910).

Opinions

PROVO STY, J.

The present suit is upon five fire insurance policies in as many companies, defendants in .this suit.

The disagreement between the parties is as to whether the insured building was wholly destroyed, and the defendant companies are liable in consequence for the entire amount of the policies, or was only partially destroyed, and the defendant companies are liable only for what would have been the cost of restoring the building to its former condition.

It was the Hansell building on Canal street, and the same fire destroyed the Stevens and the Dreyfous buildings on each side. The fire was fought from the front, so that the front wall of the building was practically uninjured. The side walls, which were party walls, remained standing in greater part, and much expert testimony was taken in the case upon whether or not they were [47]*47left in sufficiently sound condition to be utilized in tbe reconstruction of tbe building.

Tbe city engineer refused to allow them to be thus utilized; and, when their demolition was begun, preparatory to reconstruction, ordered the front wall itself, of which they were the support, to be immediately taken down, as likely to become a menace to the public safety as soon as left to stand by itself.

The policies are in the New York standard form, which was made compulsory in this state by section 22 of article 3 of Act No. 105 of 1898, p. 151. They exempt the insurers from liability “for loss occasioned by ordinance or law regulating construction or repair of buildings.”

The insured building did not come up to the requirements of the building ordinances adopted since its erection, and therefore these ordinances stood in the way of its being restored to its former condition. But it was not because of this the city engineer condemned the party walls. The best proof of that is that these party walls were reconstructed precisely as they were before. Nor was it on that account the front wall was required to be taken down. The testimony of the city engineer leaves no doubt whatever upon that point. The side walls were condemned because, rightly or wrongly, the city engineer thought they had been too much affected by the fire to be trusted to support so tall a building; and the front wall because, rightly or wrongly, the city engineer thought it could not be trusted to stand when deprived of the support of the side walls.

Defendants concede that the .loss would have been total, if the condemnation of these walls by the city engineer had been justified by the facts, but contend that it was not; and that plaintiff acquiesced in it simply because it chimed in with plaintiff’s secret intention not to reconstruct the building, but to receive the insurance money and sell the naked lot. Defendants also contend that the question of what was the true reason for which the city engineer condemned the walls is of little or no importance in the case, because plaintiff asserted under oath in the proof of loss and judicially in the petition, in this ease, that the reason why the loss was total was because of these ordinances; and that plaintiff is now committed to that reason and estopped from assigning any other; that plaintiff was then unaware of the existence of another ordinance which made it possible to utilize the said walls in the reconstruction of the building; and that plaintiff’s theory then was, and continued to be up to the argument of the case, that the said exemption from liability clause in the policy was inconsistent with the valued policy law of this state (Act No. 135 of 1900, p. 209), and was therefore invalid, or as if not written.

While the preponderance of the expert evidence is that considerable portions of the side walls could, have been utilized, and that the front wall could have been made safe by temporary means while the side walls were being reconstructed, we think plaintiff was clearly right in acquiescing in the opinion of the city engineer and of its own architect, and not engaging in a doubtful lawsuit with the city on the subject. The same wise course was followed by the defendant companies themselves, who had undertaken to reconstruct the Dreyfous building. It ill becomes them to blame plaintiff for doing exactly what they themselves did.

The defendant companies could have had the matter contested', if they had so desired. The order of the city engineer was promptly transmitted to them, by plaintiff “for such action as you may desire to take.” All they did was to indite a letter to the counsel of plaintiff saying that they protested against the order. The counsel very properly re[49]*49plied: Direct your protest to the city engineer, not to us, who are acting under compulsion.

The action of the city engineer was presumably right. The real parties having an interest to contest it were, as the present litigation shows, the defendant companies. Defendants had no right to require plaintiff to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them; to play buffer between them and the city authorities. If they desired to have the matter contested, the door was open to them to have it done. Under the circumstances of the case, the same principles come into play by which a person liable over is held, at common law, to be concluded by the judgment in a suit which he has had an opportunity to defend. Robbins v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657, 18 L. Ed. 427; Strong v. Phœnix, etc., Co., 62 Mo. 296, 21 Am. Rep. 422; Hoppaugh v. McGrath, 53 N. J. Law, 89, 21 Atl. 108. In Monteleone v. Insurance Co., 47 La. Ann. 1563, 18 South. 472, 56 L. R. A. 784, this court said that the exercise of the police power of the city may be erroneous, and is therefore subject to judicial control, “but courts should not interfere with it, unless on very clear grounds.” In the present case, after a full hearing of experts, the unwisdom of the action of the city engineer is by no means demonstrated.

In connection with the estoppel, we give in the margin1 the correspondence between plaintiff and the representative of the defendants, and between plaintiff and the city engineer; and we give also the proof of loss and that part of the petition relied upon in support of the estoppel, and also an extract from the testimony of the city engineer.

Thereby it appears that plaintiff, or its counsel, was under the impression that the city engineer was condemning the party walls because of the building ordinances in question; and the learned counsel for plaintiff frankly admit that they were not aware of the existence of the ordinance which allowed of the party walls being made use of in the reconstruction of the building; but we do not see why this error of plaintiff, or of its counsel, touching the grounds of the engineer’s action, should give rise to an estoppel. The vital fact as the result of which the loss became total was the condemnation of the walls by the city engineer. The proof of loss and the petition asserted that fact. The theory of the proof of loss and of the petition as to the loss being total was predicated upon that fact. And whatever reference was made to the building ordinances was merely by way of explanation or justification of the action of the city engineer. Had plaintiff stated in the proof of loss and in the petition that the city engineer had assigned no grounds for his action, and that it, plaintiff, did not know upon what the city engineer founded himself, the proof of loss and the petition would have been just as good.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Landry v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INS.
983 So. 2d 66 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2008)
Chauvin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
450 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Louisiana, 2006)
GLENS FALLS INSURANCE COMPANY v. Peters
379 S.W.2d 946 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1964)
Reliance Insurance v. Orleans Parish School Board
201 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Louisiana, 1962)
Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Corp. v. Mondzelewski
115 A.2d 697 (Superior Court of Delaware, 1955)
Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Corp. v. Mondzelewski
115 A.2d 697 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1955)
Hart v. North British Mercantile Ins. Co.
162 So. 177 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1935)
Scanlan v. Home Ins. Co.
79 S.W.2d 186 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1935)
Reed v. Warren
132 So. 250 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1931)
Lake Arthur Dredging Co. v. Mechanics' Ins. Co.
111 So. 466 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1927)
St. Landry Lumber Co. v. Mayor of Bunkie
99 So. 687 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1924)
State ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Police Jury
77 So. 503 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1918)
Briede v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
14 Teiss. 120 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1917)
Dinneen v. American Insurance
152 N.W. 307 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1915)
Palatine Insurance v. Nunn
55 So. 44 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1911)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
54 So. 466, 128 La. 45, 1910 La. LEXIS 894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-orleans-real-estate-mortgage-securities-co-v-teutonia-insurance-la-1910.