RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4020-14T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v. January 10, 2017
S.W., APPELLATE DIVISION
Defendant,
and
R.W.,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF AL.W., AN.W., M.W., and N.W.,
Minors. ___________________________________________
Submitted November 9, 2016 – Decided January 10, 2017
Before Judges Messano, Guadagno, and Suter.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket No. FN-08-0052-13.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Laura M. Kalik, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Renard L. Scott, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Danielle Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GUADAGNO, J.A.D.
Defendant R.W. appeals from a Family Part order finding he
abused or neglected four of his children. We are again asked to
review a threadbare record after the trial judge permitted the
parties to proceed "on the papers" by submitting reports
prepared by Division of Child Protection and Permanency
(Division) caseworkers, rather than taking testimony and making
credibility findings. This is the third time in the last four
months we have addressed the use of this truncated practice at
fact-finding hearings in a published opinion.
In New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency
v. S.G., ____ N.J. Super. ____ (App. Div. 2016), the defendant
appealed an order that she abused or neglected her two-year-old
daughter. The judge allowed the parties to forgo the
presentation of witnesses and decided disputed material facts
based solely on redacted copies of a police report and
investigation summaries prepared by the Division. Id. at (slip
2 A-4020-14T4 op. at 3). We vacated the order and remanded for a testimonial
fact-finding hearing, concluding that testimony was required
when there are unresolved and disputed details regarding facts
of consequence to the determination of an abuse or neglect
finding. Id. at (slip op. at 16).
v. J.D., ____ N.J. Super. ____ (App. Div. 2016), the defendant
through his counsel agreed to a trial on the papers through the
admission into evidence of redacted documents. Id. at (slip op.
at 14). We affirmed the order that the defendant neglected his
son because the evidence was compelling and undisputed, but we
cautioned trial judges about the dangers inherent in
adjudicating contested trials on the papers. Id. at (slip op. at
22).
Here, the evidence of neglect is neither compelling nor
undisputed. We vacate the order finding defendant neglected his
children and again caution our trial judges: Where there are
contested facts in a Title Nine fact-finding hearing, forgoing
testimony in favor of the submission of documents serves neither
the defendant, who may be deprived an opportunity to present a
meaningful defense, nor the Division, which may be limited in
admitting all available proofs of a defendant's culpability. In
such cases, the trial judge, who possesses plenary authority
3 A-4020-14T4 over the conduct of hearings, must reject a proposal for a trial
on the papers and insist on testimony, even if the parties have
agreed to the procedure.
I.
From the record before us, we gather the following
information. Defendants R.W. and S.W. (Sophia)1 have at least
seven children together: M.W. (Martin), age five at the time of
the incident; N.W. (Norbert), age six; An.W. (Austin), age
fifteen; Al.W. (Alison), age sixteen; R.W., Jr. (Junior), age
twenty; J.W. (Julie), age twenty-one; and their oldest daughter,
Sh.W. (Sherry).
The Division's history with this family dates back to April
1997 when it received a referral that Sophia had run over Junior
with her car. Neglect was substantiated as to Sophia but there
is no indication that defendant was involved in the incident.
In July 1997, the Division received a report of neglect for
inadequate supervision. Defendant and Sophia admitted to
leaving their children unattended at home and both were
substantiated for neglect. Additional allegations of neglect in
1997, 2004, 2010, and 2011 were deemed unfounded or
unsubstantiated.
1 We employ pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the minors and for clarity.
4 A-4020-14T4 By 2012, defendant and Sophia had separated. Sophia moved
to Ocean City to live with her mother and defendant lived in a
duplex in Paulsboro. Sophia agreed to defendant having custody
of Martin, Norbert, Austin, and Alison.
Even though defendant had custody of the four children, he
was arrested on August 20, 2012, for failure to pay child
support. Following defendant's arrest, Junior brought the
children to Sophia's home. Defendant was released the same day
and contacted Sophia seeking to have the children returned to
him; Martin and Norbert returned, but Alison remained with
Sophia.
On August 22, 2012, defendant's oldest daughter Sherry,
contacted the Division and expressed concern for her younger
siblings. Sherry reported that parts of defendant's home were
without electricity and she believed defendant was using drugs.
A caseworker was assigned to investigate. Sophia told the
caseworker that after defendant's arrest, the children came to
Ocean City to stay with her, but she allowed Martin and Norbert
to return to defendant. Sophia told the caseworker that
defendant had used drugs in the past, but she left the children
with him because she believed he was doing better.
The caseworker went to defendant's home and spoke with
Sherry who confirmed defendant was arrested two days earlier for
5 A-4020-14T4 failing to pay child support. Sherry and Junior cared for the
children in defendant's absence. The caseworker spoke with
fifteen-year-old Austin who told her that after defendant's
arrest, Martin and Norbert were taken to Sophia's house. After
defendant's release, Norbert and Martin returned to defendant's
home, but Alison stayed with Sophia. Austin said there was
electricity on the second floor of his father's home, and
everyone slept upstairs. Austin told the caseworker he feels
safe with his father and would like to stay with him.
Six-year-old Norbert told the caseworker his mother left
him with defendant and Junior. His brother Austin helps him
when he takes a bath, defendant and Sherry cook for him, and
Junior takes him to school and to the doctors. The caseworker
found that Norbert appeared healthy and well groomed.
Sherry told the caseworker that defendant had been arrested
for failure to pay child support and suspected he may be using
drugs, although she has never witnessed him doing so. After his
release, defendant sent Sherry a text message stating he was
"going to get his life better," but she did not know what that
meant.
Junior interrupted the interview and when Sherry told him
that the Division had been called again, he became visibly upset
and stated "[i]f I find out who . . . called DYFS again, I am
6 A-4020-14T4 going to punch them in the face[.]" Sherry went inside to speak
with Junior and to prepare dinner for the children.
After Junior calmed down, he told the caseworker he
considers his brothers his "children" and ensures that they eat
and bathe every day. He also watches over them when defendant
leaves the home. After defendant's arrest, Junior took his
younger siblings to his mother's house. Defendant was released
the same day and Norbert and Martin returned the following day;
Alison remained with her mother in Ocean City. Junior did not
know if his father was using drugs, but told the caseworker that
he would not leave the children alone with defendant if he
appeared to be under the influence. Junior said he does not use
drugs or alcohol, and the caseworker noted that he appeared
coherent and cooperative during the interview. Junior denied
physically disciplining his younger siblings, and told the
caseworker that when the children misbehave he either makes them
sit on their bed and think about what they did, or takes away
their video game. Junior explained that the electricity to the
lower part of the duplex home was in Julie's name, and it had
been shut off. The family runs extension cords from the second
floor to the first floor in order to provide electricity for the
refrigerator and washing machine.
7 A-4020-14T4 After examining the home, Sherry and Austin agreed to clean
up and remove a couch that smelled of urine. In her report, the
caseworker stated that the children were safe in the care of
Sherry and Junior.
Later that day, defendant came home and two caseworkers
returned to interview him. Defendant denied using drugs that
day, but admitted to using crack cocaine two days earlier after
he was released from jail. When defendant was arrested he left
the children in the care of Sherry and Junior. He admitted he
used cocaine in the past in the backyard while the children were
asleep, but denied ever using drugs in the home or around the
children.
Defendant told the caseworkers he was receiving drug
treatment and was scheduled for a drug screening on August 15,
2012, but had no way to get there. Defendant said he was
prescribed Percocet for a back and leg injury, however he was
unable to show proof of his prescription. Defendant became
emotional and told the caseworkers that Sophia left him with the
children, and did not help him with caring for them or paying
the bills. Defendant was two or three months behind on rent for
the duplex.
Defendant and Sophia agreed to a safety protection plan
whereby Sherry would supervise defendant's contact with the
8 A-4020-14T4 children. Defendant agreed to submit to drug testing and on the
following day, he tested positive for cocaine and opiates.
Because of defendant's positive drug test and the Division's
discovery that police had found baggies containing a white
powdery substance during the execution of a search warrant at
defendant's home on May 11, 2012, a revised safety protection
plan was executed requiring that Sherry take custody of Austin,
Martin, and Norbert and designate an alternate caregiver when
she was at work. Sherry agreed to care for the children until
August 31, 2012. On August 30, 2012, the Division executed an
emergency removal of Martin, Norbert, Austin, and Alison and
placed them in foster care as Sherry was no longer willing to
care for them. In June 2013, the children were returned to
Sophia, but in August 2013, she informed the Division that she
was homeless and the Division again placed the children in
foster care.
On June 17, 2013, defendant appeared for a compliance
review. The judge entered an order that day scheduling a fact-
finding hearing for September 12, 2013. For reasons not
apparent on the record before us, that hearing was advanced to
September 11, 2013. When the case was called, defendant's
counsel told the judge that defendant could not be there because
he was attempting to resolve an issue with his Medicaid
9 A-4020-14T4 coverage. Counsel confirmed the fact-finding had been scheduled
for September 12, 2013, but did not seek to adjourn the hearing
even after the judge suggested that if defendant had been
present, "there might have been more basis to negotiate."
Rather, counsel agreed to proceed with the hearing in
defendant's absence and to "just move the exhibits in."
The Division then submitted four exhibits: P-1, an
investigative summary dated August 22, 2012; P-2, two screening
summaries dated August 22 and October 18, 2012; P-3, two safety
plans dated August 23 and August 28, 2012; and P-4, contact
sheets dated August 22 and 23, 2012.
Both caseworker Marangelly Ortiz, and permanency worker
Ennis Thompson were present in court and presumably available to
testify. Even though defendant was not present, the judge
offered defendant's counsel the opportunity to cross-examine
Ortiz on her observations as recorded in the documents; counsel
declined.
When defendant's counsel learned that defendant had a prior
substantiation, presumably for the July 1997 inadequate
supervision incident, he appeared to trivialize the effect of a
second finding of abuse or neglect: "Yeah, my general point is,
. . . he's in the [Child Abuse] Registry now, you know, being in
the Registry twice is really not - -."
10 A-4020-14T4 On November 19, 2013, the court entered an order finding by
a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
while responsible for the care of four of his minor children, ages 16, 15, 6 & 5, used crack cocaine, highly debilitating, addictive & expensive on & between August 20 & 21 and on August 23 testing positive & during this period also using prescription opiates for pain and drinking to excess, (alcohol) all increasing the risk, rendering him unable to plan & care for the children in a minimally adequate fashion placing the children at risk of harm.
The order states that the judge's reasons supporting this
order were stated on the record, however there is no written
decision or transcript indicating the judge placed her reasons
supporting this order on the record.
II.
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the finding; the children were not at
substantial risk of harm or facing imminent danger; the trial
judge impermissibly expanded the legal definition of the minimum
degree of care as set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:9-8.21(c)(4)(b); and
the informality of the proceedings violated the principles set
forth in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v.
J.Y., 352 N.J. Super. 245 (App. Div. 2002), thus denying
defendant due process.
11 A-4020-14T4 N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) defines an abused or neglected child
as
a child less than 18 years of age whose parent or guardian, as herein defined . . . (2) creates or allows to be created a substantial or ongoing risk of physical injury to such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ; . . . (4) or a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care (a) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical or surgical care though financially able to do so or though offered financial or other reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof[.]
The Division "must prove that the child is 'abused or
neglected' by a preponderance of the evidence, and only through
the admission of 'competent, material and relevant evidence.'"
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32
(2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)).
Our standard of review is well-settled. We are bound by
the family court's factual findings if supported by sufficient
credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C.,
12 A-4020-14T4 415 N.J. Super. 551, 577-78 (App. Div. 2010). As the judge here
made no factual findings, we review the record de novo.
Some facts are not in dispute: Defendant had custody of
the four youngest children after he and Sophia separated and she
moved to Ocean City; defendant received strong support from his
older children, Junior and Julie, who cared for their younger
siblings in his absence; when defendant was arrested on August
20, 2012, Junior took the children to Sophia's home; after
defendant's release, Martin and Norbert were returned to his
care; and Junior and Julie continued to assist defendant with
the care of the children at the home.
Significantly, there is not even a suggestion in the
present record, let alone proof by a preponderance, that any of
the children suffered harm during the three-day period addressed
by the November 19, 2013 order. As there is no evidence of
actual harm, our focus shifts to whether there is a threat of
harm, and we look to determine whether the Division has proven
"imminent danger or a substantial risk of harm to a child by a
preponderance of the evidence." N.J. Dep't of Children &
Families v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 23 (2013) (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c)(4)(b), -8.46(b)).
As the judge did not provide an oral or written opinion, we
have only the brief handwritten statement found in her order to
13 A-4020-14T4 determine the basis for her conclusion. The order indicates
that the judge's conclusion that defendant placed the children
at a risk of harm was based on her finding that defendant used
crack cocaine between August 20 and 21; tested positive for
drugs on August 23; used prescription opiates for pain; and
drank alcohol to excess.
As to defendant's use of opiates, the judge never
acknowledged that a Division caseworker confirmed that defendant
had been a patient of a local orthopedist since 2006, had last
been seen by a physician there on August 2, 2012, had been
prescribed Percocet, and there was no concern by his physician
that defendant was abusing his medication. We are at a loss to
understand why the judge referenced defendant's prescribed use
of Percocet as a basis for her finding of abuse or neglect.
Similarly, there is no proof in the record that defendant
was impaired by his use of alcohol. Indeed, a caseworker
indicated that, when she interviewed defendant on August 29,
2012, he did not appear to be under the influence. The judge's
conclusion that defendant drank alcohol to excess is untethered
to any evidence in the record.2
2 On August 29, 2012, a caseworker observed nine empty beer bottles outside of defendant's house, but defendant explained that he consumed the beer with other friends. Nothing in the record contradicts that assertion.
14 A-4020-14T4 Defendant's admitted relapse and use of cocaine, even if
the children had been under his care, is not, standing alone,
sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect as the trial
judge appeared to find. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 331-32 (App. Div. 2011). In V.T.,
the trial judge found that a father neglected his child based on
the father's refusal to attend substance abuse treatment, and
two positive drug tests for cocaine and marijuana during
supervised visits. Id. at 325-27. As in this case, the Division
presented no evidence of actual harm and no expert evidence that
the father posed a risk during visits with the child. Id. at
331.
We reversed, finding that "[a]ddiction is not easy to
successfully remediate; a failure to successfully defeat drug
addiction does not automatically equate to child abuse or
neglect." Ibid. We noted that even though drug use is illegal,
"Title 9 is not intended to extend to all parents who imbibe
illegal substances at any time. . . . [N]ot all instances of
drug ingestion by a parent will serve to substantiate a finding
of abuse or neglect." Id. at 331-32.
After defendant's arrest, the four children in his custody
were cared for by their older siblings Junior and Julie and then
taken that day to Sophia's house. There is no proof that
15 A-4020-14T4 defendant's relapse and use of cocaine after his release
following his arrest exposed any of these children to imminent
danger or a substantial risk of harm.
III.
We also find no evidence that defendant knowingly waived
his right to a fact-finding hearing, and agreed to have the
judge decide whether he abused or neglected his children solely
based on her review of reports prepared by Division caseworkers.
The fact-finding hearing is a critical element of the abuse
and neglect process. J.Y., supra, 352 N.J. Super. at 264. The
judge, as the fact-finder, must "determine whether the child is
an abused or neglected child as defined herein." N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.44. A stipulation of fact may substitute for the introduction
of reliable evidence on a point, if "the consent of the parties
to be bound by it [is] clearly established." J.Y., supra, 352
N.J. Super. at 265.
As defendant's counsel was not aware that the date for the
fact-finding hearing had been advanced from September 12 to
September 11, 2013, it is unlikely that defendant knew about the
change before he spoke with his counsel that morning. Even the
judge expressed some confusion as to the date, stating, "[w]e
were supposed to be back September 12th, and this is September
11th." Although counsel spoke with defendant earlier that day,
16 A-4020-14T4 there is no indication that they discussed defendant's waiver of
his right to a fact-finding hearing, the implications of that
waiver, or that defendant agreed to the truncated procedure of
proceeding on the papers.
We have previously held that before a defendant stipulates
to a finding of abuse or neglect at a fact-finding hearing, the
Division
after consultation with defense counsel, should advise the judge which specific provision of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) is expected to be proven by way of defendant's stipulated facts. The judge must then explicitly inform the defendant: that by agreeing to enter into a stipulation, she is waiving her right to a hearing at which [the Division] must prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . that at such a hearing, the judge would determine what documentary evidence and testimony would be admitted, and that defendant, through counsel, would have the right to challenge the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, . . . that if the judge accepts defendant's stipulated facts and concludes they demonstrate abuse and/or neglect, the judge will enter an order finding that defendant has abused and/or neglected her child; and, that as a result of that order, [the Division] may seek termination of the defendant's parental rights, and the judge may remove, or continue the removal of, the child from the defendant's custody, . . . and/or require [the Division] to provide such services as are deemed appropriate to the ends of protecting the child and rehabilitating and improving family life[.]
17 A-4020-14T4 [Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.D., 417 N.J. Super. 583, 617-18 (App. Div. 2011) (citations omitted)].
We acknowledge that agreeing to have a judge decide a Title
Nine matter based on submitted documents does not automatically
result in the entry of a finding of abuse or neglect, as does a
stipulation to abuse or neglect. Nevertheless, statutory and
constitutional rights are impacted when a defendant waives the
right to testify on his own behalf, to call witnesses, to cross-
examine witnesses who testify against him, and to have a judge
make credibility determinations. We see no reason why the same
protections afforded to defendants entering stipulations of
abuse or neglect announced in M.D., should not be required when
a defendant waives the right to a fact-finding hearing.
Therefore, before a court permits a fact-finding hearing to
proceed "on the papers" the judge must ensure that the defendant
has been informed of the rights being waived, including the
right to a hearing where the Division has the burden of proof,
the right to testify and call witnesses, the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right to have
the judge make credibility findings. The judge must then
determine that a defendant's waiver of these rights is clear and
unequivocal. As we did in M.D., supra, 417 N.J. Super. at 589,
we refer this issue to the Supreme Court's Committee on Practice
18 A-4020-14T4 in the Family Part, and the Acting Administrative Director of
the Courts, and suggest that a form be adopted and used at all
fact-finding hearings wherein the defendant waives a hearing and
agrees to a determination of abuse or neglect on the papers.
Even where a defendant makes a knowing waiver and agrees to
a determination on the papers, the judge is not required to
accede to the parties' intention to proceed in that fashion.
Trial judges are given wide discretion in exercising control
over their courtrooms, J.Y., supra, 352 N.J. Super. at 264
(citations omitted), and the trial judge has the ultimate
responsibility of conducting adjudicative proceedings in a
manner that complies with required formality in the taking of
evidence and the rendering of findings. If the record contains
conflicting facts critical to the determination, the judge must
reject the abbreviated procedure and proceed with a testimonial
hearing.
We find no evidence in the record that defendant's counsel
advised defendant that he had a right to a hearing, or that
defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right.
Due process requires that a parent charged with abuse or neglect
have "adequate notice and [an] opportunity to prepare and
respond[.]" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.D., 417 N.J.
Super. 96, 109 (App. Div. 2010). Defendant's counsel's
19 A-4020-14T4 suggestion that the significance of this proceeding was somehow
diminished because defendant had a prior substantiation is also
troubling. From the record before us, we conclude that
defendant's counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to ensure that defendant received the minimal protections he was
entitled to during this "critical stage" of the proceedings. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 401
(2009).
Even if defendant had knowingly waived his right to a
hearing, the evidence presented through the Division's documents
was insufficient to establish that defendant abused or neglected
his children.
The order of November 19, 2013 finding that defendant
abused or neglected his children is vacated and the Division is
directed to remove defendant's name from the Central Child Abuse
Registry as to this incident within thirty days of the date of
this opinion.
Reversed.
20 A-4020-14T4