New Jersey Coalition v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.

628 A.2d 1094, 266 N.J. Super. 195, 1991 N.J. Super. LEXIS 513
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJuly 25, 1991
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 628 A.2d 1094 (New Jersey Coalition v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New Jersey Coalition v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 628 A.2d 1094, 266 N.J. Super. 195, 1991 N.J. Super. LEXIS 513 (N.J. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinion

CIOLINO, A.J.S.C.

The plaintiff, New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East is a non-profit, unincorporated association involved in organizing public opinion and political lobbying activities directed to peace efforts aimed at halting the expansion of hostilities in the Middle East. Nine of the ten defendants may be described generically as regional shopping centers. The tenth defendant may be described as a community shopping center. (See Appendix A—Stipulations as to each malls’ description.)

Plaintiffs seek relief in the nature of a permanent, mandatory injunctive order compelling the defendants to grant access to their private property so that an organization such as plaintiff may engage in expressive activity within the confines of a privately owned and enclosed commercial establishment. Plaintiffs argue their right under the New Jersey State Constitution to go into and upon defendants’ shopping malls to distribute flyers and handbills discussing their view as to the United States’ policy in the Middle East. Plaintiffs predicate this action upon the contention that private shopping malls in New Jersey have a constitutional obligation to provide a forum for expressive activity.

APPLICABLE LAW

While counsel have generated volumes of pretrial briefs, they all agree that the applicable and controlling case law in this litigation is State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).

All counsel have acknowledged that Schmid is determinative. Plaintiffs have at times departed from Schmid and have gone on to argue that shopping malls are the equivalent of the traditional downtown center or town square. Plaintiffs argue that these private property owners are the new town squares and must accommodate the constitutional requirements of free speech and assembly. They argue that they have become quasi public forums.

[198]*198Plaintiffs’ proofs have shown that public transportation, in the form of bus service, begins and ends at some of the malls. They have also shown that in at least one of the malls, police service is provided by the municipality. Some of the shopping malls employ a mix of private security officers and off duty, local police officers for security purposes. The local police officers’ presence is one of a uniformed officer with all of the necessary equipment attendant to police duties. None of the proofs reveal that the other functions of government such as municipal buildings, police stations, post offices, etc. appear in these private shopping mall settings. Proofs do reveal large concentrations of retail establishments. Department stores and individual retail establishments cause the congregation of large populations of people. Accepting and acknowledging all of the aforementioned proofs, I am of the opinion that they do not even begin to approach the necessary requirements of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as set forth in the decision Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946). In his summation counsel for the plaintiff tacitly admits that the central issue in this litigation is not whether these shopping malls are public forums or town squares. Instead, he states, the issue is whether or not they meet the three prong test of Schmid and the requirements of the N.J. Constitution. Justice Handler states, “The United States Supreme Court has recently acknowledged in the most clear and unmistakable terms that a state’s organic and general law can independently furnish a basis for protecting individual rights of speech and assembly. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, supra 447 U.S. [74] at 80-81, 100 S.Ct. [2035] at 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d [741] at 752.” Schmid, supra 84 N.J. at 553, 423 A.2d 615.

Continuing with his discussion of the applicability of the State Constitution in this setting in Schmid, Justice Handler states:

We conclude, therefore, that the State Constitution furnishes to individuals the complementary freedoms of speech and assembly and protects the reasonable exercise of those rights. These guarantees extend directly to governmental entities as well as to persons exercising governmental powers. They are also [199]*199available against unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduet on the part of private entities that have otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of their properly. The State Constitution in this fashion serves to thwart inhibitory actions which unreasonably frustrate, infringe, or obstruct the expressional and associational rights of individuals exercised under Article I, paragraphs 6 and 18 thereof.
... This question brings us to the heart of the problem—the need to balance within a constitutional framework legitimate interests in private property with individual freedoms of speech and assembly.
In the comparable federal setting, private property not used by the public or made available for public use does not ordinarily become subject directly to restrictions in favor of the public. Hynes v. Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619-620, 96 S.Ct 1755, 1760, 48 L.Ed.2d 243, 252 (1976). Moreover, private property does not ‘lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.’ Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra, 407 U.S. [551] at 569, 92 S.Ct. [2219] at 2229, 33 L.Ed.2d [131] at 143. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, supra, 447 U.S. at 82, 100 S.Ct. at 2041, 64 L.Ed.2d at 752; Hudgens v. NLRB, supra, 424 U.S. [507] at 519-520, 96 S.Ct [1029] at 1036, 47 L.Ed.2d [196] at 206-207. Nevertheless, as private property becomes, on a sliding scale, committed either more or less to public use and enjoyment, there is actuated, in effect, a counterbalancing between expressional and property rights. Marsh v. Alabama, supra, 326 U.S. [501] at 506, 66 S.Ct [276] at 278, 90 L.Ed. [265] at 268.
There is a parallel under our State Constitution. The state constitution equipoise between expressional rights and property rights must be similarly gauged on a scale measuring the nature and extent of the public’s use of such property. Thus, even as against the exercise of important rights of speech, assembly, petition and the like, private property itself remains protected under due process standards from untoward interference with or confiscatory restrictions upon its reasonable use. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d [899] at 910-911, 592 P.2d [341] at 347-348, 153 Cal.Rptr. [854] at 860-861; see King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, supra, 66 N.J. [161] at 175 [330 A.2d 1 at 8]. The constitutional protection of private property against undue interference or ‘taking’ is secured by our own Constitution. N.J.Const. (1947), Art. I, pars. 1 and 20. Id. 84 N.J. at 561, 423 A.2d 615.

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628 A.2d 1094, 266 N.J. Super. 195, 1991 N.J. Super. LEXIS 513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-jersey-coalition-v-jmb-realty-corp-njsuperctappdiv-1991.