New England Terminal Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp.

1 F.R.D. 411, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1979
CourtDistrict Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedAugust 22, 1940
DocketNo. 2660
StatusPublished

This text of 1 F.R.D. 411 (New England Terminal Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
New England Terminal Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp., 1 F.R.D. 411, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1979 (D.R.I. 1940).

Opinion

HARTIGAN, District Judge.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence which was commenced in-this court on November 4, 1933. The plaintiff is claiming damages alleged to-have arisen from the collapse of a circular metal storage tank, designed to contain a large amount of liquids, including' petroleum products, erected by the defendant on land adjoining and lying, to wit, north of the premises of the plaintiff. It is alleged that the tank collapsed by reason of some defect or defects therein caused by careless and negligent construction thereof by the defendant and after the defendant had placed about 80,000 barrels of water in; it.

Three amended declarations and a substituted amended first count of the third amended declaration have been filed. The defendant has filed at least two motions for bills of particulars and the plaintiff has filed a bill of particulars; an amended bill of particulars; a supplement to plaintiff’s amended bill of particulars and a further supplement to plaintiff’s amended bill of particulars.

The case has been before the court on numerous questions over a period of nearly seven years and the pleadings are voluminous. The matter now comes before the court on the plaintiff’s objection to interrogatories addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff required to be answered in writing under oath pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

The court heard arguments on the plaintiff’s objection to the interrogatories of the defendant. The plaintiff contends that much of the information sought by the interrogatories has been furnished in its bills of particulars, that certain interrogatories require extensive and voluminous description which should not be allowed by interrogatories, that others are not relevant to the issues in the case, and that the number is so great and the details so in[413]*413volved that they do not come within the scope of interrogatories and that the defendant should take steps under Rule 26, F. R.C.P.

At the hearing the defendant agreed that interrogatory V-J might be stricken. The defendant admitted that in interrogatory III- 2 the words “in detail” might be deleted and that it is not pressing IV-A or IV- K, and that in V-B the word “approximate” might be substituted for the word “exact”.

The question confronting the court in this particular case, having due regard to the length of time this case has been pending before the court, the fact that the pleadings have been completed, the large number of interrogatories, the details of evidence which they seek to have answered separately and fully in writing under oath by an officer of the plaintiff corporation, nearly seven years after the matter complained of, is whether upon objection to the interrogatories the court should find that they are being utilized to discover matters which can be better or more conveniently discovered by oral examination, it may order that the discovery be had only by taking the objecting party’s depositions upon oral examination. Moore’s Federal Procedure under the New Federal Rules, Vol. 2, p. 2619.

In Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, D. C., 30 F.Supp. 275, 277, in a learned opinion by Judge Chesnut, we read:

“One important object of the new rules was to require simplicity and brevity in the pleadings, but with the most ample provision for facilities of discovery of facts before trial, so that surprise at the trial and possible miscarriage of justice thereby could be avoided. * * *
“Despite the wide latitude of subject matter now permissibly embraced within the scope of interrogatories under rule 33, there are necessarily some implied and inherent limitations affecting proper practice regarding them. By the rule the interrogatories are required to be separately and fully answered in writing under oath and signed by the person making them within fifteen days after service; and objections thereto may be presented to the court within ten days. And by rule 37, on refusal to answer, interrogatories without substantial justification ‘the court shall require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney advising the refusal or either of them to pay to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney’s fees. If the motion is denied and if the court finds that the motion was made without substantial justification, the court shall require the examining party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees.’ As the answer must be in writing under oath, and made within fifteen days, unless the time is expressly extended by court order, the necessary inference would seem to be that the party interrogated need only answer matters of fact within his knowledge, and this would seem to exclude the propriety of interrogatories which merely seek to elicit opinions, or which require research and compilation of data and information not readily known to the party interrogated; and of course only matters that are relevant to the particular case can properly be the subject of interrogatories.
“It should also importantly be borne in mind that extensive examination of the adverse party by interrogatories is cumbersome and likely to prove inefficient, as compared with the now available method of taking his deposition. There is, therefore, now no further necessity under the F.R.C.P. to resort to interrogatories where an extended examination is desired. Cf. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., D.C.N.Y., 241 F. 964, 967; Zolla v. Grand Rapids, etc., Corp., D.C.N.Y., 46 F. 2d 319, 320. See also 42 Yale Law Journal, 875, 876, where Prof. Sunderland in discussing the subj ect has this to say:
“ ‘In actual effectiveness interrogatories are far inferior to the oral examination. Their defects are quite obvious. In the first place, they give the party to whom they are addressed more time to study their effect, which furnishes a better opportunity to frame protective answers which conceal or evade. In the next place, as a means of forcing a specific, detailed and thorough disclosure from a reluctant party, there is a tendency for the interrogatories to grow in number, complexity and variety of form, so as to call for as many aspects of the proof as possible, with the result that they often become difficult to administer. Cases have been reported where more than two thousand interrogatories were employed. To meet this sort of abuse, the questions must either be authorized by court order [414]*414or there must he an arbitrary limit to their number, both of which methods of dealing with the matter are unsatisfactory. * * *
“ ‘In view of these limitations upon the effectiveness of written interrogatories, it is evident that they are not well adapted for the purpose of a general examination. It is only when the facts sought are few, formal and isolated, that this method can be satisfactorily employed.

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Related

Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc.
30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Maryland, 1939)
Zolla v. Grand Rapids Store Equipment Corporation
46 F.2d 319 (S.D. New York, 1931)
Graver Tank & Mfg. Corp. v. James B. Berry Sons Co.
1 F.R.D. 163 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1940)
Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.
241 F. 964 (S.D. New York, 1917)

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Bluebook (online)
1 F.R.D. 411, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/new-england-terminal-co-v-graver-tank-mfg-corp-rid-1940.