New Cingular v. Candia, NH, et al.

2011 DNH 063
District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided April 19, 2011·No. 09-CV-387-SM·Published

Opinion

New Cingular v . Candia, NH, et a l . 09-CV-387-SM 4/19/11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, Plaintiff

v. Case N o . 09-cv-387-SM Opinion N o . 2011 DNH 063 Town of Candia, New Hampshire, and the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Town of Candia, Defendants

O R D E R

New Cingular Wireless, PCS (“AT&T”) seeks to construct a telecommunications tower and related facilities in Candia, New Hampshire, at the site of an existing (but unrelated) radio tower. Initially, AT&T applied for a special exception and a variance to construct a 180-foot lattice tower at the site, and proposed to remove the existing tower. Subsequently, however, it amended its applications, offering to build a monopole-style tower at a height of either 150, 115, or 100 feet. The Candia Zoning Board of Adjustment (the “Board”) denied AT&T’s applications.

By prior order, the court held that because the Board addressed only one of AT&T’s four proposed tower heights (i.e., the 180-foot lattice tower), its decision to deny AT&T’s applications for a special exception and a variance was not supported by substantial evidence. Order dated August 1 1 , 2010

(document n o . 2 3 ) . Rather than enter an order directing the Board to grant a special exception (and, depending on the height of the tower, a variance), the court instead remanded the matter to the ZBA for further proceedings. In that remand order, the court instructed the Candia ZBA to “issue an adequate written decision with regard to each of the three remaining proposals, i.e., for towers of 150, 115, and 100 feet.” Id. at 1 2 .

On remand, the Board granted AT&T’s request for a special exception to the local zoning ordinance and authorized the construction of a 100-foot monopole telecommunications tower and related support facilities. It also approved AT&T’s request to employ a diesel generator at the site, to supply electrical power in case of outages. The Board denied AT&T’s proposed tower alternatives of 115 and 150 feet because, unlike the 100-foot tower, each of the taller towers would also require a variance from the “fall zone” setback provisions of the town’s zoning ordinance. And, said the Board, AT&T failed to meet its burden of proving entitlement to such a variance.

AT&T challenges the Board’s latest decision, again saying it is not supported by substantial evidence. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”), Pub.L. N o . 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). And, despite earlier

representations that it would be satisfied with a 100-foot tower, it now seeks a court order requiring the defendants to permit construction of a 120-foot monopole telecommunications tower.1 Defendants object.

Legal Background

I. The Telecommunications Act.

As the Supreme Court has observed, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996:

to promote competition and higher quality in American telecommunications services and to encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. One of the means by which it sought to accomplish these goals was reduction of the impediments imposed by local governments upon the installation of facilities for wireless communications, such as antenna towers.

To this end, the TCA amended the Communications Act of 1934, to include § 332(c)(7), which imposes specific limitations on the traditional authority of state and local governments to regulate the location, construction, and modification of such facilities.

Under this provision, local governments may not “unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services,” take actions that “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the

1 Although it applied to the Board for a 115-foot tower, AT&T asks this court to order defendants to allow it to construct a 120-foot tower, “for the simple expedient that monopoles are ordinarily manufactured in lengths divisible by 10.” Plaintiff’s memorandum (document n o . 40) at 2 0 , n . 1 4 . The parties recently came to an agreement - of sorts - on this issue. They have stipulated that, if AT&T prevails in this forum, it should be permitted to construct a 120-foot tower. I f , on the other hand, the Board prevails, AT&T will be permitted to construct the previously-approved 100-foot tower. See Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment (document n o . 4 2 ) .

provision of personal wireless services,” or limit the placement of wireless facilities “on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions.”

They must act on requests for authorization to locate wireless facilities “within a reasonable period of time,” and each decision denying such a request must “be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v . Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115-116 (2005) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Subject to the exceptions identified by the Supreme Court, however, the “TCA preserves state and local authority over the siting and construction of wireless communication facilities.” Second Generation Properties, L.P. v . Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)).

At issue in this case is the TCA’s requirement that the Board’s decision be in writing and supported by substantial evidence. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). “If a board decision is not supported by substantial evidence, . . . then under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the local law is pre-empted in order to effectuate the TCA’s national policy goals.” Second Generation Properties, 313 F.3d at 627. 2

2 Although raised in its complaint as count 3 , AT&T no longer contends that the Board’s decisions amount to an effective prohibition of the provision of wireless services in Candia. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).

II. AT&T’s Burden of Proof.

As noted above, in order to construct either a 115-foot or a 150-foot monopole tower at the site in question, AT&T must obtain a variance from the fall zone setback requirement of the Candia zoning ordinance. That ordinance provides:

No buildings, roads or driveways that are not part of the tower site shall be built within 150% of the height of any tower that is located in any zone. Towers must be set back a distance equal to 150% of the height of the tower from any unaffiliated structure, parking areas or lots, driveways, roads, developed areas or property lines.

Town of Candia Zoning Ordinance, Article V I , Section 6.01(G).

To secure the required variance, AT&T bore the burden of showing, among other things, that literal enforcement of the ordinance would impose upon it an “unnecessary hardship.” See, e.g., Garrison v . Town of Henniker, 154 N.H. 2 6 , 30 (2006). See also Second Generation Properties, 313 F.3d at 628 (“In order to qualify for a variance under New Hampshire law, the landowner must show that meeting the normal zoning requirements poses an unnecessary hardship.”). That, in turn, obligated AT&T to demonstrate that:

(1) an area variance is needed to enable the applicant’s proposed use of the property given the special conditions of the property; and (2) the benefit sought by the applicant cannot be achieved by some other method reasonably feasible for the applicant to pursue, other than an area variance.

Boccia v . City of Portsmouth, 151 N.H. 8 5 , 94 (2004). 3

Importantly, however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized that, in the context of an application for a cellular communications tower:

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