Neville, Jr., Robert James

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 6, 2006
DocketWR-48,694-02
StatusPublished

This text of Neville, Jr., Robert James (Neville, Jr., Robert James) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Neville, Jr., Robert James, (Tex. 2006).

Opinion



IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS



WR-48,694-02/03
EX PARTE ROBERT JAMES NEVILLE, JR.


ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS

IN CAUSE NO. 0685474 FROM THE

371
ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY



Cochran, J., filed a statement concurring in the dismissal of the writ and denial of a stay of execution, in which Johnson and Keasler, JJ., joined.

In this subsequent writ application, (1) filed pursuant to Article 11.071, § 5, of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, applicant presents a claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia. (2) I join in the Court's Order dismissing applicant's subsequent writ application because he has failed to make a prima facie showing that he is, in fact, mentally retarded.

In Atkins, the Supreme Court stated that any "serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded." (3) Thus, the Supreme Court left it to the individual states to develop appropriate standards, definitions, and procedures to determine which offenders are so mentally impaired that their execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (4) Because the Texas Legislature has not yet enacted a statutory basis for implementing Atkins, this court provided interim guidelines in Ex parte Briseno. (5)

Under the guidelines set out in Briseno, a person is considered mentally retarded under Texas law if he has these three characteristics: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, an IQ of about 70 or below; (2) related limitations in adaptive functioning; and (3) onset of the above two characteristics before age eighteen. (6)

Applicant has failed to make a prima facie showing on any of these three prongs. He asserts that, to the best of his knowledge, he has never had an I.Q. test. Instead, he points to evidence from his trial that he suffers from a blood disease known as systemic lupus erythematosus (lupus) which is similar to cancer or AIDS. Lupus is an autoimmune disease which can attack multiple organs, including the brain. It may cause those who are affected by lupus to behave irrationally, erratically, and emotionally. Lupus, according to the defense expert who testified at applicant's trial, is not curable, but it is treatable. The expert also stated that applicant suffers from a mental illness called "lupus-induced bipolar disorder" which resulted in "pseudopsychopathic syndrome." But this evidence, though it may explain applicant's irrationality, erratic behavior, and emotional outbursts, does not show that lupus causes mental retardation or that there is any necessary scientific correlation between lupus and significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.

The second prong of a mental-retardation claim requires an analysis of the person's adaptive behavior. Some people whose IQs fall at or below the general range of mental retardation are nonetheless able to function well (although perhaps by pursuing a career in criminality), while others whose IQs fall at or above the general range of mental retardation are wholly unable to function in society. In Briseno, this Court set out a list of seven non-exclusive factors which courts might consider when evaluating this second prong of mental retardation. (7)

Relevant to this second adaptive-behavior prong, applicant's counsel has submitted an affidavit with this subsequent application in which he states:

[Applicant] consistently acted inappropriately in making decisions. He waived his direct appeal in open court. I was so angry that I called [applicant] a goddamn fool on the record. At that time, I thought [applicant] was an absolute idiot. In addition, against my wishes, [applicant] did a videotape interview with [a prosecutor] of the Tarrant County District Attorney's Office. I told [applicant] not to do the interview; however, he was hellbent to grant the interview. As a result, I believe that the Tarrant County District Attorney's Office probably has a copy of the interview in their possession. Again, I thought [applicant] was 2x an idiot.

I am not in a position to decide whether [applicant] is mentally retarded. All I can honestly say is that he acted in a fashion that I characterized as stupid given the context of his decisions. Stupid plus other factors may indicate mental retardation. However, I am not a mental health professional and can make no medical or psychological claim about [applicant's] mental status.



Although a client might be unwise to ignore or reject his attorney's legal advice, that rejection is not prima facie evidence of his mental retardation. "Stupid" in such a context may relate to the wisdom of the decision made, not to the client's mental inability to make decisions. We cannot conclude from his attorney's affidavit that applicant's "stupid" decisions concerning legal proceedings were caused by or connected to mental retardation generally or limitations in adaptive behavior in particular.

Another of applicant's attorneys has filed an affidavit stating that applicant's execution should be postponed because applicant has not had his I.Q. tested and he could be mentally retarded. This puts the cart before the horse. An inmate must make a prima facie showing of mental retardation before he is entitled to a stay of execution and further evidentiary development of that claim. The reverse is not true: an inmate is not entitled to a stay of execution simply because he does not have evidence of an IQ test. Applicant's second attorney states that applicant "exhibits some of the same traits and characteristics as those exhibited by other clients who have been found to be mentally retarded." But what are the relevant traits and characteristics that applicant displays and what evidence shows that these traits, characteristics and behavior are caused by mental retardation?

Finally, applicant has failed to make any showing that the onset of any purported mental impairment or adaptive functioning deficiency (as opposed to an inherited physical disease such as lupus) occurred before age eighteen.

Because applicant has failed to make a prima facie showing of mental retardation, I join in the Court's Order dismissing applicant's subsequent writ application under article 11.071, §5, of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.



Cochran, J.

Filed: February 6, 2006

Do Not Publish

1. Applicant's execution is scheduled for February 8, 2006. This subsequent writ application was filed on January 31, 2006.

2.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Atkins v. Virginia
536 U.S. 304 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Ex Parte Briseno
135 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2004)
Hall v. State
160 S.W.3d 24 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Neville, Jr., Robert James, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neville-jr-robert-james-texcrimapp-2006.