Nevarez v. Dean

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 23, 2024
• Docket: 23-1360
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 23 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CONRAD CESAR NEVAREZ, No. 23-1360 D.C. No. 1:23-cv-00071-BLW Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

Honorable MICHAEL DEAN, Magistrate Judge,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 16, 2024 **

Before: SILVERMAN, R. NELSON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Former Idaho state prisoner Conrad Cesar Nevarez appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action relating to state

court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)

(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Nevarez’s action because Nevarez’s

claims are barred by judicial immunity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d

1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant of whether an act is judicial

in nature and subject to absolute judicial immunity).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nevarez’s request

for leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper

where amendment would be futile); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-

79 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a district

court from exercising jurisdiction over a “de facto” appeal of a state court

decision).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nevarez’s request

for appointment counsel because Nevarez failed to demonstrate exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

2 23-1360 All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 23-1360