Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc. v. D-Link Corp.

433 F. Supp. 2d 795, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16545, 2006 WL 760214
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedMarch 23, 2006
Docket2:05-cv-00291
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 433 F. Supp. 2d 795 (Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc. v. D-Link Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc. v. D-Link Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 795, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16545, 2006 WL 760214 (E.D. Tex. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVIS, District Judge.

After thoroughly considering the parties’ written submissions and hearing oral arguments at the February 7, 2006 scheduling conference and motion hearing, the Court denied from the bench D-Link’s motions to transfer venue to the Southern District of New York. This Memorandum Opinion explains the Court’s reasons for its ruling.

BACKGROUND

Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc. brought this patent-infringement action against D-Link Corporation and D-Link Systems, Inc. (collectively “D-Link”) on August 10, 2005. Network-1 is a Delaware corporation and maintains its principal place of business in New York. D-Link Corporation is a Taiwanese company, and its headquarters are in Taipei, Taiwan. *797 D-Link Systems is incorporated in and maintains its principal place of business in California. Network-1 alleges D-Link infringes U.S. Patent No. 6,218,930, “Apparatus And Method For Remotely Powering Equipment Over A10/100 Switched Ethernet Network.”

On March 31, 2004, PowerDsine, 1 an unrelated company, sued Network-1 in the Southern District of New York seeking a declaratory judgment that its chips do not infringe Network-l’s ’930 patent. Pow-erDsine supplies a chip D-Link uses in some of D-Link’s accused products. D-Link moved the Judicial Panel on Multidis-trict Litigation (“JPML”) to consolidate the two actions. D-Link moved this Court to stay this litigation pending the JPML’s decision, to dismiss the case against D-Link Corporation for insufficiency of service, and to transfer this case to the Southern District of New York. On November 3, 2005, this Court granted D-Link’s motion to stay this case pending the JPML’s decision. However, on December 1, 2005, the JPML issued an order deeming the motion to transfer moot because the PowerDsine action had settled and been dismissed, and this Court accordingly lifted its stay on December 9, 2005.

Network-1 attempted to serve D-Link Corporation three times. After each attempt, D-Link Corporation filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the Southern District of New York. D-Link Systems joined in the motions to transfer. During the February 7, 2006 hearing, D-Link Corporation stated that it would have been willing to waive service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, but Network-1 had never asked it to waive service. Network-1 stated that when it asked Mr. Palmatier if D-Link Corporation would waive service, he responded that he did not represent D-Link Corporation. The Court then asked Network-1 if it would like to ask Mr. Palmatier if D-Link would waive service, which Network-1 then did. Mr. Palmatier agreed on D-Link’s behalf to waive service, as provided in Rule 4, but insisted that it still receive an additional 90 days to answer. Network-1 had first attempted to serve D-Link over four months earlier and objected to another 90 day delay. Rather than prolong the case further, the Court denied D-Link Corporation’s motions to dismiss for insufficiency of process and ordered Network-1 to effect service of process on D-Link Corporations’s counsel of record, Mr. Palmatier, thus requiring D-Link Corporation to answer in 20 days.

As alternative relief, D-Link moved the Court to transfer this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to New York, where the Poiv-erDsine litigation was pending. The vast bulk of D-Link’s arguments centered around the pending PowerDsine litigation. During the briefing on the motions, the PowerDsine case settled. D-Link still sought transfer to New York and only briefly discussed the impact of the Pow-erDsine settlement on this case. 2 The par *798 ties briefly argued the transfer motion at the February 7 hearing, and the focus of their argument was the extent of PowerD-sine chips’ importance in this litigation. See Transcript, pp. 7:14 — 10:17, Docket No. 61. 3 After hearing these arguments, the Court denied D-Link’s motions to transfer.

APPLICABLE LAW

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The first determination to be made under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is whether the claim could have been filed in the judicial district to which transfer is sought. In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004). If so, under § 1404(a), a court examines “the convenience of the parties and witnesses.” Id. The convenience determination involves examining several private and public interest factors, none of which are given dispositive weight. Id.

The private factors include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of the compulsory process to secure witnesses’ attendance; (3) the willing witnesses’ cost of attendance; and (4) all other practical problems that make the case’s trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. The public factors include: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having local issues decided at home; (3) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary conflict of law problems involving foreign law’s application. Id.

A court should also consider the plaintiffs forum choice, but the plaintiffs forum choice by itself is not conclusive or determinative. In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir.2003). But see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947) (“But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”); Syndicate 420 at Lloyd’s London v. Early Am. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 821, 828 (5th Cir.1986) (“Once the Court has determined that an adequate, available forum exists, the next step is to proceed to a balancing of the public and private interest factors, bearing always in mind that ‘unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.’ ”) (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. 839). A court must consider these factors in light of all the claims alleged in the case and not restrict its analysis to only the plaintiffs claims.

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433 F. Supp. 2d 795, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16545, 2006 WL 760214, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/network-1-security-solutions-inc-v-d-link-corp-txed-2006.