1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 NESTOR ANDRES ARRIETA Case No. 4:25-cv-10378-YGR PATERNINA, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 9 RESTRAINING ORDER v. 10 Re: Dkt. No. 4 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 11 Defendants.
13 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. TRO 14 Mot., ECF No. 4. On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 15 and an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, against Respondents Acting Field 16 Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office Sergio 17 Albarran, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of 18 the Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela 19 Bondi. ECF Nos. 1, 4. Petitioner asks this Court to (1) order his immediate release from 20 Respondents’ custody pending these proceedings, without any intrusive monitoring; (2) enjoin 21 Respondents from transferring him out of this District or deporting him during the pendency of the 22 underlying proceedings; and (3) enjoining the government from re-arresting him absent the 23 opportunity to contest that arrest at a hearing before a neutral decision maker. See Notice of Mot., 24 ECF No. 4. For the following reasons, the TRO is GRANTED as modified below. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 According to the record before the Court, Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled to the 27 United States from Colombia, likely in early 2024. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶ 1, ECF No. 1 1. When Petitioner arrived in the United States, “on information and belief, upon entry, he 2 presented himself to border patrol officials and was apprehended. He was detained in Texas. On 3 information and belief, he was later released on his own recognizance.” Id. ¶ 1. Since then, “On 4 information and belief, Mr. Arietta Paternina has been compliant with his obligations. He attended 5 two scheduled ICE appointments as well as his immigration court hearings. He filed an application 6 for asylum. He has been awaiting a master calendar hearing in immigration court, scheduled for 7 April 27, 2026.” Id ¶ 2. Petitioner “has had no known criminal history, with no intervening 8 criminal history or arrests since his release,” and “upon information and belief … is diligently 9 pursuing his immigration case.” ECF No. 4-1 at 9. 10 On December 3, 2025, Petitioner was arrested while attending a scheduled Immigrations 11 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco. Id. ¶ 4. 12 Counsel was denied access to Petitioner. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner is currently being detained at 630 13 Sansome Street in San Francisco, California. Id. ¶ 6. 14 On December 3, 2025, this Petition was filed. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel provided 15 notice of the Petition and a forthcoming motion for a TRO, along with a copy of the Petition, to 16 Respondents’ counsel. Decl. of Andrea Corena ¶ 20, ECF No. 3-2. Petitioner’s counsel contacted 17 with Respondents’ counsel and “informed her that our office would imminently be filing a motion 18 for a temporary restraining order.” Id. Later that day, counsel filed the motion for the TRO and 19 sent a copy to Respondents’ counsel. Id. In the motion, Petitioner contends that his arrest and 20 detention violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because 21 Respondents allegedly have no valid interest in detaining him) and procedurally (because he was 22 not provided with a pre-detention bond hearing). 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 25 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 26 Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 27 to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 1 the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 2 “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 3 showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 4 the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 5 satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 6 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final 7 two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 8 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 9 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 10 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 11 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 12 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 13 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 14 423, 439 (1974)). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his 17 ongoing detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 18 Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 19 entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 20 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 21 July 24, 2025) (applying the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 22 (1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 23 06487-PCP, 2025 WL 2203419, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 24 Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 25 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner faces is an 26 immediate and irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 27 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th 1 v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 2 conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that he has 3 “also carried [his] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. 4 The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 5 heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 6 procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 7 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv- 8 01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 9 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 10 constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 NESTOR ANDRES ARRIETA Case No. 4:25-cv-10378-YGR PATERNINA, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 9 RESTRAINING ORDER v. 10 Re: Dkt. No. 4 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 11 Defendants.
13 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. TRO 14 Mot., ECF No. 4. On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 15 and an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, against Respondents Acting Field 16 Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office Sergio 17 Albarran, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd M. Lyons, Secretary of 18 the Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela 19 Bondi. ECF Nos. 1, 4. Petitioner asks this Court to (1) order his immediate release from 20 Respondents’ custody pending these proceedings, without any intrusive monitoring; (2) enjoin 21 Respondents from transferring him out of this District or deporting him during the pendency of the 22 underlying proceedings; and (3) enjoining the government from re-arresting him absent the 23 opportunity to contest that arrest at a hearing before a neutral decision maker. See Notice of Mot., 24 ECF No. 4. For the following reasons, the TRO is GRANTED as modified below. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 According to the record before the Court, Petitioner is an asylum seeker who fled to the 27 United States from Colombia, likely in early 2024. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus ¶ 1, ECF No. 1 1. When Petitioner arrived in the United States, “on information and belief, upon entry, he 2 presented himself to border patrol officials and was apprehended. He was detained in Texas. On 3 information and belief, he was later released on his own recognizance.” Id. ¶ 1. Since then, “On 4 information and belief, Mr. Arietta Paternina has been compliant with his obligations. He attended 5 two scheduled ICE appointments as well as his immigration court hearings. He filed an application 6 for asylum. He has been awaiting a master calendar hearing in immigration court, scheduled for 7 April 27, 2026.” Id ¶ 2. Petitioner “has had no known criminal history, with no intervening 8 criminal history or arrests since his release,” and “upon information and belief … is diligently 9 pursuing his immigration case.” ECF No. 4-1 at 9. 10 On December 3, 2025, Petitioner was arrested while attending a scheduled Immigrations 11 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco. Id. ¶ 4. 12 Counsel was denied access to Petitioner. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner is currently being detained at 630 13 Sansome Street in San Francisco, California. Id. ¶ 6. 14 On December 3, 2025, this Petition was filed. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel provided 15 notice of the Petition and a forthcoming motion for a TRO, along with a copy of the Petition, to 16 Respondents’ counsel. Decl. of Andrea Corena ¶ 20, ECF No. 3-2. Petitioner’s counsel contacted 17 with Respondents’ counsel and “informed her that our office would imminently be filing a motion 18 for a temporary restraining order.” Id. Later that day, counsel filed the motion for the TRO and 19 sent a copy to Respondents’ counsel. Id. In the motion, Petitioner contends that his arrest and 20 detention violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because 21 Respondents allegedly have no valid interest in detaining him) and procedurally (because he was 22 not provided with a pre-detention bond hearing). 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 25 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 26 Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 27 to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 1 the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 2 “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 3 showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 4 the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 5 satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 6 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final 7 two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 8 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 9 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 10 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 11 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 12 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 13 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 14 423, 439 (1974)). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his 17 ongoing detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 18 Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 19 entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 20 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 21 July 24, 2025) (applying the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 22 (1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 23 06487-PCP, 2025 WL 2203419, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 24 Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 25 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner faces is an 26 immediate and irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 27 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th 1 v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 2 conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that he has 3 “also carried [his] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. 4 The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 5 heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 6 procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 7 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv- 8 01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 9 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 10 constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 11 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been 12 violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). As other courts in this 13 district and others have concluded under similar circumstances, “the potential harm to [Petitioner] 14 is significant, while the potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 15 2203419, at *3. At most, the government faces a short delay in detaining Petitioner if it ultimately 16 demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that his detention is necessary to prevent danger 17 to the community or flight. See Jorge M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 18 05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is not “harmed in 19 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 20 Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict between 21 [administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty 22 concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 23 F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). 24 A TRO immediately releasing Petitioner is appropriate to return him to the status quo. E. 25 Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status 26 which preceded the pending controversy.” Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1166 (W.D. 27 Wash. 2025) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). 1 cv-00663, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining 2 order requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a 3 restoration of the status quo). 4 Because Petitioner satisfies all requirements for temporary injunctive relief and such relief 5 is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO Motion is granted as detailed below. This Order 6 accords with many other recent grants of temporary relief in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Alva 7 v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676, 2025 WL 2294917, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (granting 8 temporary restraining order); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. 9 Cal. July 4, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring release of asylum seeker and a 10 pre-detention bond hearing before re-arrest); Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *10 (granting 11 preliminary injunction); Doe v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *8 (E.D. 12 Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order); see also Diaz, 2025 WL 1676854 13 (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing before re-detention of 14 noncitizen out of custody five years); Garcia v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-5070, 2025 WL 1676855, at *3 15 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing 16 before re-detention of noncitizen out of custody six years ); Enamorado v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 17 4072-NW, 2025 WL 1382859, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025). 18 Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of 19 bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [Respondents] from enjoining [their] 20 conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is 21 needed to ensure that Respondents will be reimbursed for “costs and damages sustained by . . . 22 hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 23 IV. ORDER 24 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for 25 Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further briefing 26 and a hearing on this matter. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from 27 Respondents’ custody and ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner 1 Petitioner from the United States.'! This Order shall remain in effect until December 17, 2025. 2 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in-person at a hearing in the courtroom 3 of the assigned Judge, or as otherwise ordered by that Judge, on December 17, 2025 why a 4 || preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents shall file a response to Petitioner’s motion 5 || by no later than December 10, 2025. Any reply shall be filed by December 14, 2025. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: December 3, 2025
A vonne Gonzalez Rogers 9 United States District Judge 10 11 a 12 2
15 16
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 %6 ' Petitioner also asks the Court to order that he remain within the Northern District of California in order to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction, but it is well-established that “when the Government 97 || moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction 2g || who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004).