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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 KENNETH SCOTT NEPRAS, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05204-JLR-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 MARY ROBNETT, et al., Noting Date: June 2, 2025 13 Defendants. 14
15 This prisoner civil rights action has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge 16 David W. Christel. Plaintiff Kenneth Scott Nephras, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 17 initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkts. 7, 8. 18 Following an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court identified several deficiencies 19 and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be dismissed as frivolous and for 20 failure to state a claim. Dkt. 4. Plaintiff has not directly responded to the screening and show 21 cause order and, instead, filed a motion to withdraw his complaint and convert this action to a 22 federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. 9. 23 For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s motion be denied and this 24 action be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently confined at Pierce County Jail. In his complaint 3 filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff names the following Pierce County Prosecutors as 4 defendants and alleges they violated his rights in various ways during the course of his ongoing
5 state court prosecution: Mary Robnett, Loren Halshom, and Telesita Tamez. Dkt. 8 at 3, 4–8. In 6 particular, Plaintiff alleges he is being detained illegally and asserts various claims including 7 “slanderous denationalization,” kidnapping and ransom, human trafficking, warrantless arrest, 8 and a violation of due process. Id. at 4–8. Each claim is based on Plaintiff’s theory that, as a 9 “Moorish American National,” he has an “absolute right to self govern” and is not subject to the 10 laws or jurisdiction of Washington state. Id.; see also id. at 10–14 (declaration further describing 11 Plaintiff’s alleged Moorish nationality and sovereign citizenship). Plaintiff seeks immediate 12 release from pretrial confinement and $7 million in damages. Id. at 9. 13 II. SCREENING STANDARD 14 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to
15 screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 16 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 17 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 18 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 19 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Barren v. 20 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds counts as a “strike” 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 22 To sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered a violation of 23 rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and that the violation was
24 proximately caused by a person acting under color of state or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487 1 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A plaintiff must 2 provide more than conclusory allegations; he must set forth specific, plausible facts to support 3 his claims. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–83 (2009). 4 After informing a pro se litigant of any pleading deficiencies, a court must generally
5 grant leave to file an amended complaint if there is a possibility the pleading deficiencies may be 6 cured through amendment. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992); see also 7 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro 8 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 9 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 10 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, if the claims put forth in the complaint lack any arguable 11 substance in law or fact, then the complaint must be dismissed. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 12 319, 327 (1989). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Following an initial screening, the Court found the complaint deficient and subject to
15 dismissal because it (1) is premised on a frivolous legal theory, (2) seeks federal interference in 16 ongoing state criminal proceedings, (3) requests damages from immune defendants, and (4) 17 requests release from confinement, which is not relief not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 18 4. 19 First, Plaintiff’s complaint is based on a frivolous legal theory, and the PLRA requires 20 dismissal of any frivolous or malicious claims raised in prisoner civil rights actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 21 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Central to each of Plaintiff’s claims 22 is his theory that, as a “Moorish American National,” he has an “absolute right to self govern” 23 and is not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of Washington state. Dkt. 8 at 4–8. The Ninth
24 Circuit has long recognized that “advancement of such utterly meritless [sovereign-citizen] 1 arguments is now the basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise them.” See 2 also U.S. v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986). For this reason alone, Plaintiff’s 3 complaint is deficient and subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Dkt. 4 at 4–5 (collecting cases 4 dismissing claims based on purported right to self-govern and sovereign-citizen ideologies as
5 frivolous). 6 Second, Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient because it would require federal intervention in 7 ongoing state criminal proceedings, which is prohibited by the Younger abstention doctrine. See 8 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 KENNETH SCOTT NEPRAS, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05204-JLR-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 MARY ROBNETT, et al., Noting Date: June 2, 2025 13 Defendants. 14
15 This prisoner civil rights action has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge 16 David W. Christel. Plaintiff Kenneth Scott Nephras, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 17 initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkts. 7, 8. 18 Following an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court identified several deficiencies 19 and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be dismissed as frivolous and for 20 failure to state a claim. Dkt. 4. Plaintiff has not directly responded to the screening and show 21 cause order and, instead, filed a motion to withdraw his complaint and convert this action to a 22 federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. 9. 23 For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s motion be denied and this 24 action be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee currently confined at Pierce County Jail. In his complaint 3 filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff names the following Pierce County Prosecutors as 4 defendants and alleges they violated his rights in various ways during the course of his ongoing
5 state court prosecution: Mary Robnett, Loren Halshom, and Telesita Tamez. Dkt. 8 at 3, 4–8. In 6 particular, Plaintiff alleges he is being detained illegally and asserts various claims including 7 “slanderous denationalization,” kidnapping and ransom, human trafficking, warrantless arrest, 8 and a violation of due process. Id. at 4–8. Each claim is based on Plaintiff’s theory that, as a 9 “Moorish American National,” he has an “absolute right to self govern” and is not subject to the 10 laws or jurisdiction of Washington state. Id.; see also id. at 10–14 (declaration further describing 11 Plaintiff’s alleged Moorish nationality and sovereign citizenship). Plaintiff seeks immediate 12 release from pretrial confinement and $7 million in damages. Id. at 9. 13 II. SCREENING STANDARD 14 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to
15 screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 16 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 17 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 18 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 19 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Barren v. 20 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal on these grounds counts as a “strike” 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 22 To sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered a violation of 23 rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and that the violation was
24 proximately caused by a person acting under color of state or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487 1 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A plaintiff must 2 provide more than conclusory allegations; he must set forth specific, plausible facts to support 3 his claims. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–83 (2009). 4 After informing a pro se litigant of any pleading deficiencies, a court must generally
5 grant leave to file an amended complaint if there is a possibility the pleading deficiencies may be 6 cured through amendment. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992); see also 7 Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro 8 se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 9 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 10 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, if the claims put forth in the complaint lack any arguable 11 substance in law or fact, then the complaint must be dismissed. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 12 319, 327 (1989). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Following an initial screening, the Court found the complaint deficient and subject to
15 dismissal because it (1) is premised on a frivolous legal theory, (2) seeks federal interference in 16 ongoing state criminal proceedings, (3) requests damages from immune defendants, and (4) 17 requests release from confinement, which is not relief not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 18 4. 19 First, Plaintiff’s complaint is based on a frivolous legal theory, and the PLRA requires 20 dismissal of any frivolous or malicious claims raised in prisoner civil rights actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 21 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Central to each of Plaintiff’s claims 22 is his theory that, as a “Moorish American National,” he has an “absolute right to self govern” 23 and is not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of Washington state. Dkt. 8 at 4–8. The Ninth
24 Circuit has long recognized that “advancement of such utterly meritless [sovereign-citizen] 1 arguments is now the basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise them.” See 2 also U.S. v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986). For this reason alone, Plaintiff’s 3 complaint is deficient and subject to dismissal as frivolous. See Dkt. 4 at 4–5 (collecting cases 4 dismissing claims based on purported right to self-govern and sovereign-citizen ideologies as
5 frivolous). 6 Second, Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient because it would require federal intervention in 7 ongoing state criminal proceedings, which is prohibited by the Younger abstention doctrine. See 8 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 9 The Younger abstention doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from interference with pending state judicial proceedings when: “(1) there is ‘an ongoing 10 state judicial proceeding’; (2) the proceeding ‘implicate[s] important state interests’; (3) there is ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise 11 constitutional challenges’; and (4) the requested relief ‘seek[s] to enjoin’ or has ‘the practical effect of enjoining’ the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. 12 Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014)). Where these factors 13 are met, federal court must abstain unless there is “a showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention 14 inappropriate.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 Dkt. 4 at 6. Each of the Younger criteria is met here. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee with an 16 ongoing criminal prosecution in Washington State courts, and such proceedings implicate 17 important state interests. Plaintiff does not demonstrate he was denied an adequate opportunity to 18 address his concerns in state court, and the relief he requests in federal court would have the 19 practical effect of enjoining his state court proceedings. Each factor requiring abstention is 20 present, and Plaintiff has not shown bad faith, harassment, or an extraordinary circumstance that 21 would make abstention in appropriate. Therefore, the complaint is deficient and subject to 22 dismissal under the Younger abstention doctrine. 23 Third, Plaintiff’s allegations against each defendant relate directly to their traditional 24 prosecutorial functions, and the only remedy Plaintiff seeks that is available in a § 1983 action is 1 monetary damages. See Dkt. 8 at 4–8. Because Defendants Robnett, Halshom, and Tamez are 2 absolutely immune from damages claims regarding their performance of traditional prosecutorial 3 functions, the complaint is deficient and subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 4 which relief can be granted against any defendant. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427
5 (1976); Asheleman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). 6 Fourth, Plaintiff requests release from confinement, which is not a form of relief 7 available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pretrial detainees may bring an action under § 1983 for 8 “constitutional questions regarding the . . . circumstances of [their] confinement[.]” See 9 Trueblood v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 822 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2016) 10 (quoting Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003)). Importantly, however, 11 “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of [the prisoner’s] physical 12 imprisonment, and the relief [the prisoner] seeks is a determination that [the prisoner] is entitled 13 to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, [the prisoner’s] sole remedy 14 is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
15 With regard to this final deficiency, Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his complaint 16 and convert this action to a federal habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. 9. Plaintiff’s 17 request, however, would only address one of defects in his complaint. Moreover, the Ninth 18 Circuit has cautioned against converting § 1983 actions to habeas corpus actions, advising that 19 “[t]he simplest way to avoid [potential prejudice to the plaintiff] is to…state that the prisoner’s 20 claims must be addressed in a habeas petition, and dismiss the 1983 claims without prejudice.” 21 Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the Court concludes 22 it would be inappropriate to convert this action to a federal habeas action and further concludes 23 Plaintiff has failed to show cause why this action should not be dismissed as frivolous and for
24 failure to state a claim. 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the above stated reasons and those addressed in the screening and show cause order 3 (Dkt. 4), the undersigned recommends this action be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to 4 state a claim.1 In addition, Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw his complaint and convert it to federal
5 habeas corpus petition (Dkt. 9) should be denied. 6 Objections to this Report and Recommendation, if any, should be filed with the Clerk and 7 served upon all parties to this suit not later than fourteen (14) days from the date on which this 8 Report and Recommendation is signed. Failure to file objections within the specified time may 9 affect your right to appeal. Objections should be noted for consideration on the District Judge’s 10 motions calendar fourteen (14) days from the date they are filed. Responses to objections may 11 be filed by the day before the noting date. If no timely objections are filed, the matter will be 12 ready for consideration by the District Judge on June 2, 2025. 13 Dated this 16th day of May, 2025. 14 A 15 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 1 Dismissal on the recommended grounds constitutes a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).