Nemirofsky v. Seok Ki Kim

523 F. Supp. 2d 998, 2007 WL 3144860
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedOctober 24, 2007
DocketC 07-2769 JL
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 523 F. Supp. 2d 998 (Nemirofsky v. Seok Ki Kim) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nemirofsky v. Seok Ki Kim, 523 F. Supp. 2d 998, 2007 WL 3144860 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART OBJECTIONS TO THE DEPOSITION OF DEBORAH BAILEY-WELLS (Docket #96)

JAMES LARSON, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

Introduction

The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this lawsuit, a dispute regarding disposition of settlement proceeds from a previous lawsuit over patents. The parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction for all purposes, including trial, as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Discovery Dispute

The parties ask the Court to resolve their dispute regarding the parameters of the deposition of Deborah Bailey-Wells, a partner of the law firm Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis (“KL Gates”). At the time she was retained by STV Asia, her firm was known as Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP. She served as counsel for STV Asia in the lawsuit against Premier Retail Networks, among other entities, in the Northern District of California before the Honorable Joseph Spero (“PRN Litigation”).

*1000 During the PRN Litigation, the primary-contacts between Ms. Bailey-Wells and her client STV Asia were Frank Nemirof-sky, and S.K. Kim. (Letter of defense counsel D. Peter Harvey to Plaintiffs counsel Sabelli and Callahan dated September 25, 2007).

Plaintiffs counsel proposes to question Ms. Bailey-Wells on a number of subjects. On nineteen of those subjects Defendants’ counsel disputes either the relevance of the subject or the privilege of the subject, as obtained from attorney-client communications.

The parties met and conferred as previously ordered, but were not able to resolve their dispute. The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument as provided by Civil Local Rule 7—1(b).

Analysis

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 37-2, a party moving to compel discovery must “detail the basis for the party’s contention that it is entitled to the requested discovery and must show how the proportionality and other requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2) are satisfied.” See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2) (requiring that when determining the appropriateness of discovery requests courts should consider whether the discovery is duplica-tive or overly burdensome and whether the burden and expense of discovery outweighs the benefit.) The court has discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to compel. See Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir.1987). Given that Bailey-Wells was counsel for STV Asia in the underlying patent lawsuit which led to the settlement which led to this lawsuit, her deposition is unquestionably relevant to this lawsuit and Defendants do not contend that it would be duplicative or overly burdensome. What they do claim is that her responses might be precluded by the attorney-client privilege.

Bailey-Wells is a non-party, so her deposition would ordinarily be taken pursuant to subpoena under FRCP 45 and any objections would have been made in writing and then either the party seeking the deposition would have filed a motion to compel or the party opposing it would have filed a motion to quash. FRCP 45(a)(1)(C). The parties in this case agreed to a process where Defendants filed objections to the deposition and the Court ordered simultaneous briefing of the issues. Defendants object to most of the 19 categories proposed by Plaintiff on the basis of attorney-client privilege and to some on relevance. However, an objection based on relevance is not an adequate reason to preclude or terminate a deposition, absent circumstances which do not exist here. See FRCP 30(d)(1).

The attorney client privilege governs where “(1) legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advis- or in his or her capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are, at the client’s instance, permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by the client or by the legal advisor, (8) unless the protection be waived.” U.S. v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir.2002) (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev.1961)).

The burden is on the party asserting the privilege to establish all the elements of the privilege. United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.2000). The burden shifts to the party seeking to overcome the privilege by its proposal to take the deposition of opposing counsel. Carehouse Convalescent Hosp. v. Superior Court, (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1563, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 129. In this case, the proposed deposition is not of opposing counsel, but of former opposing counsel in a different case, so the normal burden ap *1001 plies. Defendants cite Carehouse and Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.App.3d 1487, 244 Cal.Rptr. 258 (1988), both of which apply to depositions of current opposing counsel, not former opposing counsel in a different case, and are therefore not on point. The burden is on Defendants to establish the existence of the privilege they claim. Munoz, Id. at 1128.

Confidential communications made by a client to an attorney to obtain legal services are protected from disclosure. Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976)). It is generally acknowledged that “[c]ommunciations within the scope of the attorney-client privilege are zealously protected.” 8 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2017 (2007); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir.1994) (stating that “[a]s the privilege serves the interests of justice, it is worthy of maximum legal protection”) (citing Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1992)).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Tumbling v. Merced Irrigation District
262 F.R.D. 509 (E.D. California, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
523 F. Supp. 2d 998, 2007 WL 3144860, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nemirofsky-v-seok-ki-kim-cand-2007.