Nelson v. State

210 S.W.3d 477, 2007 Mo. App. LEXIS 18, 2007 WL 28986
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 5, 2007
Docket27693
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 210 S.W.3d 477 (Nelson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nelson v. State, 210 S.W.3d 477, 2007 Mo. App. LEXIS 18, 2007 WL 28986 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

JEFFREY W. BATES, Chief Judge.

Jeremy Nelson (Nelson) appeals from an order denying his amended Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 1 Because Nelson fled the state and thereby delayed his sentencing for over 31 months, we apply the escape rale and dismiss his appeal.

In March 2000, Nelson was charged by information in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County with committing three class B felonies. Counts I and II of the information charged Nelson with the sale of cocaine base, a controlled substance. See § 195.211. Count III charged Nelson with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Id. On April 5, 2000, Nelson was released on bond. A few weeks later, the case was transferred to New Madrid County on a change of venue.

On November 14, 2000, Nelson appeared in the Circuit Court of New Madrid County and pled guilty to Count II of the information. The State dismissed Counts I and III in exchange for the plea. Nelson agreed to enter into an open plea, knowing that the State intended to ask for a 15-year sentence and that his lawyer would *479 recommend a lesser punishment be imposed. After finding Nelson’s plea to be freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given, the plea court ordered a presentence investigation. Formal sentencing was set for January 5, 2001. In the interim, Nelson remained free on bond.

Nelson failed to appear for sentencing, and a capias warrant for his arrest was issued by the court. On July 24, 2003, Nelson was arrested pursuant to that warrant and incarcerated in the New Madrid County jail. On August 12, 2003, Nelson was finally sentenced. During the hearing, Nelson admitted that he “panicked” and fled to Illinois while free on bond, instead of appearing at his original sentencing hearing as required. The court sentenced Nelson to serve 15 years in prison.

In September 2003, Nelson filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief. Counsel was appointed, and an amended motion was filed. This motion alleged, inter alia, that Nelson’s guilty plea was accepted without a factual basis for the plea having been established as required by Rule 24.02(e). In March 2006, the amended motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Insofar as relevant here, the motion court ruled that the transcript of the guilty plea hearing refuted Nelson’s allegation concerning the lack of a factual basis for his guilty plea.

In Nelson’s lone point on appeal, he seeks to challenge this ruling by the motion court. The State, however, requests that we dismiss Nelson’s appeal pursuant to the escape rule. Given the long delay in sentencing that resulted from Nelson’s flight to Illinois, we grant the State’s request and dismiss this appeal.

“The escape rule is a judicially-created doctrine that operates to deny the right of appeal to a criminal defendant who escapes justice.” Crawley v. State, 155 S.W.3d 836, 837 (Mo.App.2005). This rule applies to appeals arising from the disposition of Rule 29.15 and Rule 24.035 motions as well as direct appeals. Pargo v. State, 191 S.W.3d 693, 698 (Mo.App.2006); Wagner v. State, 172 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Mo.App.2005); Nichols v. State, 131 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Mo.App.2004). A defendant’s willful failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an escape within the meaning of this rule. Smith v. State, 174 S.W.3d 74, 75 (Mo.App.2005); Wagner, 172 S.W.3d at 924; Crawley, 155 S.W.3d at 837. Even though the motion court addressed the merits of Nelson’s post-conviction motion, we may still invoke the escape rule and dismiss Nelson’s appeal. See, e.g., Smith, 174 S.W.3d at 75; Wagner, 172 S.W.3d at 924; Crawley, 155 S.W.3d at 837. Application of the escape rule does not violate Nelson’s constitutional rights; he has no constitutional right to appeal his conviction or challenge his conviction in a state post-conviction proceeding. Laws v. State, 183 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Mo.App.2006); Echols v. State, 168 S.W.3d 448, 451 (Mo.App.2005).

“The escape rule is applicable to those errors occurring before and up to the escape.” Crawley, 155 S.W.3d at 837. The only point asserted by Nelson in his appeal is that no factual basis for his guilty plea was established at the plea hearing. As noted above, this hearing took place several months before Nelson failed to appear for sentencing. Therefore, if the escape rule applies, it would bar Nelson’s appeal. See State v. Ore, 192 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo.App.2006).

Missouri does not follow a per se dismissal rule in the event of a defendant’s escape. State v. Surritte, 35 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Mo.App.2001). Whether to dismiss an appeal for this reason is left to the sound discretion of the appellate tribunal. State v. Troupe, 891 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. *480 banc 1995); Crawley, 155 S.W.3d at 837. “There is no threshold amount of time an appellant must have escaped justice before dismissal is allowed.” Holmes v. State, 92 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Mo.App.2002). 2 “The relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape rule is deciding whether the escape adversely affected the criminal justice system.” Smith v. State, 174 S.W.3d 74, 75 (Mo.App.2005). Barring the appeal of an escaping defendant has been justified on a number of different grounds: (1) the need for a court to have control over the defendant before making a decision on appeal; (2) curtailment of administrative problems caused by the defendant’s long absence; (3) preventing prejudice to the State in the event of remand for a new trial; (4) preventing defendants from selectively abiding by court decisions; (5) discouraging escape; (6) encouraging voluntary surrender; (7) preserving respect for the criminal justice system; and (8) promoting the dignified operation of the appellate courts. State v. Brown, 974 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Mo.App.1998).

All of these justifications except the first are applicable to the case at bar.. Nelson was scheduled to appear on January 5, 2001, to be sentenced.

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210 S.W.3d 477, 2007 Mo. App. LEXIS 18, 2007 WL 28986, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nelson-v-state-moctapp-2007.