2 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 3 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Nov 25, 2020 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 REANEE N., NO: 1:19-CV-03260-FVS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SECURITY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT are the parties’ cross motions for summary 14 judgment. ECF Nos. 12 and 14. This matter was submitted for consideration 15 without oral argument. The Plaintiff is represented by Attorney D. James Tree. 16 The Defendant is represented by Special Assistant United States Attorney 17 Katherine B. Watson. The Court has reviewed the administrative record and the 18 parties’ completed briefing and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, 19 the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, and 20 DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14. 21 JURISDICTION 1 Plaintiff Reanee N. protectively filed for supplemental security income on 2 December 22, 2016, alleging an onset date of October 1, 2014. Tr. 229-34. 3 Benefits were denied initially, Tr. 158-61, and upon reconsideration, Tr. 162-68. 4 A hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) was conducted on
5 September 13, 2018. Tr. 81-102. Plaintiff was represented by counsel and 6 appeared at the hearing. Id. The ALJ denied benefits, Tr. 12-30, and the Appeals 7 Council denied review. Tr. 1-6. The matter is now before this court pursuant to 42
8 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). 9 BACKGROUND 10 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and 11 transcripts, the ALJ’s decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and the Commissioner.
12 Only the most pertinent facts are summarized here. 13 Plaintiff was 26 years old at the time of the hearing. See Tr. 243. She 14 testified that she dropped out of school in her junior year of high school due to
15 anxiety. Tr. 90. Plaintiff lives with her parent. See Tr. 327. She has limited work 16 history as a babysitter, but no past relevant work. Tr. 87-88, 96. Plaintiff testified 17 that she cannot work because of her anxiety disorder; fibromyalgia; and pain in her 18 back, shoulders, and hips. Tr. 87-88, 93.
19 Plaintiff reported that she has premenstrual dysphoria disorder which causes 20 her to have problems with anger. Tr. 91. She also testified that she has insomnia 21 and night terrors, has trouble being around people, only leaves the house to go to 1 doctor’s appointments, and cannot get out of beds some days because of 2 fibromyalgia pain. Tr. 92-95. Plaintiff cannot sit or stand for “very long,” and has 3 back spasms that cause her to lie down for half an hour to two hours at a time. Tr. 4 93-94.
5 STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 7 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is
8 limited; the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported 9 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 10 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant evidence that a 11 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159
12 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to 13 “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and 14 citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a
15 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching 16 for supporting evidence in isolation. Id. 17 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 18 judgment for that of the Commissioner. If the evidence in the record “is
19 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the 20 ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the 21 record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district 1 court “may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 2 Id. An error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate 3 nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The 4 party appealing the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of establishing that
5 it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009). 6 FIVE–STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 7 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within
8 the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to 9 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 10 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 11 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be 13 “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, 14 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
15 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 16 1382c(a)(3)(B). 17 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to 18 determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §
19 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s work 20 activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial 21 1 gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 2 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 3 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis 4 proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the
5 claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from 6 “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or 7 her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to
8 step three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy 9 this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is 10 not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). 11 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to
12 severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude 13 a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 14 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the
15 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and 16 award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). 17 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the 18 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess
19 the claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), 20 defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work 21 1 activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 2 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis. 3 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 4 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in
5 the past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is 6 capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the 7 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of
8 performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 9 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 10 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 11 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner
12 must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education and 13 past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of 14 adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not
15 disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to 16 other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is 17 therefore entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). 18 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above.
19 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to 20 step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is 21 capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in significant 1 numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 2 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 ALJ’S FINDINGS 4 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful
5 activity since December 22, 2016, the application date. Tr. 17. At step two, the 6 ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: depressive disorder(s), 7 anxiety disorder(s) (including post-traumatic stress disorder), and personality
8 disorder(s). Tr. 17. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an 9 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 10 severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 19. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the 11 RFC
12 to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels. She can perform unskilled work with a specific vocational preparation (SVP) of two or less, 13 with few workplace changes and only simple routine decisions. She should not have contact with the general public. She can tolerate incidental contact 14 with coworkers. She can work in the vicinity with coworkers but should not engage[] in tandem tasks or other tasks requiring teamwork. She will be off- 15 task up to ten percent of the workday.
16 Tr. 21. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 17 24. At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 18 experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 19 economy that Plaintiff can perform, including: laundry worker, industrial cleaner, 20 and storage laborer. Tr. 25. On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not 21 1 been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since December 22, 2 2016, the date the application was filed. Tr. 25. 3 ISSUES 4 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying
5 him supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security 6 Act. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff raises the following issues for this Court’s review: 7 1. Whether the ALJ reversibly erred by not giving some res judicata
8 consideration to the ALJ’s 2014 decision; 9 2. Whether the ALJ erred at step two; 10 3. Whether the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence; and 11 4. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s symptom claims.
12 DISCUSSION 13 A. Step Two 14 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step two by finding Plaintiff did not
15 have severe physical limitations. ECF No. 12 at 3-8. First, at step two, a claimant 16 must establish that he or she suffers from a medically determinable impairment. 17 See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004-1005 (9th Cir. 2005). The claimant 18 must prove the existence of a physical or mental impairment by providing medical
19 evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. § 20 416.908 (1991). “Under no circumstances may the existence of an impairment be 21 established on the basis of symptoms alone.” S.S.R. 96-4p. Thus, in general, 1 “regardless of how many symptoms an individual alleges, or how genuine the 2 individual's complaints may appear to be, the existence of a medically 3 determinable physical or mental impairment cannot be established in the absence 4 of objective medical abnormalities, i.e., medical signs and laboratory findings.” Id.
5 Furthermore, for that medically determinable impairment to be considered 6 ‘severe’ at step two of the sequential analysis, it must significantly limit an 7 individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c);
8 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). An impairment that is ‘not 9 severe’ must be a slight abnormality (or a combination of slight abnormalities) that 10 has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities. SSR 11 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181 at *1 (July 2, 1996). Plaintiff bears the burden to
12 establish the existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 13 which prevent him from performing substantial gainful activity, and that the 14 impairment or combination of impairments lasted for at least twelve continuous
15 months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.905, 416.912(a); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 16 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2011). However, step two is “a de minimus screening device 17 [used] to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. “Thus, applying 18 our normal standard of review to the requirements of step two, we must determine
19 whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to find that the medical evidence clearly 20 established that [Plaintiff] did not have a medically severe impairment or 21 1 combination of impairments.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2 2005). 3 Here, the ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff’s “treatment records and 4 examination findings do not establish any severe physical impairment.” Tr. 18.
5 Specifically, the ALJ found that “fibromyalgia was not a medically determinable 6 impairment. Instead, [the ALJ] considered [Plaintiff’s] pain complaints and 7 occasionally positive findings (such as positive SLRs) to be consequential of a
8 medically determinable spinal impairment. [Plaintiff] otherwise does not have a 9 medically determinable physical impairment related to her chronic pain 10 complaints.” Tr. 18. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding Plaintiff did not 11 have severe physical impairments, and specifically contends that the ALJ erred by
12 failing to evaluate chronic pain disorder at step two. ECF No. 12 at 4-8. The 13 Court agrees.1 14
15 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff frames this argument, in part, as an error in not 16 “giving some res judicata consideration” to the prior ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s 17 chronic pain syndrome was a severe impairment. ECF No. 12 at 3-5; Tr. 109. 18 However, while a previous ALJ's findings concerning a claimant's RFC are entitled 19 to some res judicata consideration, the findings can be reconsidered by a 20 subsequent judge upon showing of new information that was not presented to the 21 first judge. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008) 1 The ALJ confined his analysis almost entirely to whether fibromyalgia was a 2 medically determinable impairment,2 and in support of this finding cited evidence 3 of normal strength, normal sensation, negative straight leg raises, normal gait, 4 normal balance, and normal coordination. Tr. 18, 463, 495, 512, 529, 538, 555,
5 744, 850, 970. The ALJ also cited a January 2018 ER examination finding lack of 6 tenderness in Plaintiff’s extremities, full range of motion, and full muscle strength; 7 and 2017 and 2018 ER examinations finding normal range of motion in her neck,
8 back, and extremities. Tr. 18, 584, 828, 862. In addition, the ALJ found, without 9 citation to the record, that Plaintiff’s “spinal impairment” was not severe because 10
11 (citing Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988)) As noted by 12 Defendant, the “entirety of the medical record with respect to the present 13 application is dated after the prior ALJ’s decision.” ECF No. 14 at 21. Thus, the 14 Court will address Plaintiff’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s alleged chronic pain 15 impairment at step two, and in light of the need to remand to reconsider step two 16 and the remaining sequential analysis on remand, it is unnecessary to consider 17 Plaintiff’s res judicata argument here. 18 2 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s findings that fibromyalgia was not a medically 19 determinable impairment. ECF No. 12 at 6-8. However, and in light of the need to 20 remand for proper consideration of chronic pain impairment, the Court instructs 21 the ALJ to reconsider fibromyalgia on remand, if necessary. 1 she “had no documented findings of impaired strength, ambulation, sensation, or 2 range of motion from [her] spinal impairment,” and “she has no documented 3 findings of spasms in her spine or musculoskeletal system, or any documented 4 treatment for such spasms. Instead, her previously discussed treatment records
5 document adequate pain control.” Tr. 18. 6 As to her “spinal impairment,” Defendant argues that Plaintiff “has not 7 presented any objective evidence to show that her alleged pain or muscle spasms
8 resulted in significant functional limitations.” ECF No. 14 at 13. In addition, 9 Defendant contends the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s spine impairment based 10 on “normal” examination findings and “adequate pain control.” ECF No. 14 at 12. 11 However, Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ failed to consider evidence of back
12 spasms, muscle tightness, tenderness, decreased range of motion, and positive 13 straight leg tests; Plaintiff’s reports of 7/10 to 10/10 pain; and Plaintiff’s ongoing 14 treatment for pain, including trigger point injections that helped 70-100% “but
15 wore off within a week.” ECF No. 12 at 6; Tr. 346, 352, 357, 359-60, 512, 529, 16 547, 555, 876-77, 885, 916-17, 923, 997. Moreover, the Court’s independent 17 review of the same treatment notes cited by the ALJ in support of this finding 18 reveals simultaneous findings of tenderness to palpation in Plaintiff’s neck, back
19 and arms; muscle tightness; slow gait; generalized pain; positive straight leg test on 20 both sides; and “increased trigger point [tenderness to palpation] of mid back and 21 arms.” Tr. 512, 529, 538, 555, 744, 970. 1 Finally, ALJ summarily found that aside from “spinal impairment,” 2 Plaintiff’s “chronic pain complaints” were not medically determinable. Tr. 18. 3 However, beyond the bare assertion that chronic pain was not a medically 4 determinable impairment, the ALJ did not set forth any analysis regarding how he
5 made this determination. Without the ALJ offering more than a stated conclusion, 6 the Court is unable to meaningfully review whether the ALJ’s finding that 7 Plaintiff’s chronic pain is not a medically determinable impairment is supported by
8 the evidence. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015) (a 9 court “cannot substitute [the court's] conclusions for the ALJ's, or speculate as to 10 the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions. Although the ALJ's analysis need not be 11 extensive, the ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for [the court] to
12 meaningfully determine whether the ALJ's conclusions were supported by 13 substantial evidence.”) (quoting Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 14 1103 (9th Cir. 2014)).
15 Moreover, as noted by Plaintiff, she has been in ongoing treatment for 16 diagnoses of “chronic pain” and “pain disorder with related psychological factors” 17 with multiple treating providers across the entire adjudicatory period. ECF No. 12 18 at 4-8; Tr. 346 (tightness in paraspinal, decreased range of motion, and multiple
19 myofascial tender spots), 354, 359, 529, 538, 555, 926, 931 (medication increased 20 due to pain “flareup”), 933, 935, 937, 939, 942, 946 (9/10 pain in hip), 948, 952 21 (8/10 pain), 954, 962, 964, 966 (8/10 hip pain, lower back pain, and lower left 1 extremity pain), 970 (finding pain is related to muscle spasms), 975-76, 977 2 (noting lower paraspinal trigger points, tenderness to palpation, and fibromyalgia 3 trigger points), 981 (noting multiple fibromyalgia trigger points), 983, 985, 987. 4 This treatment included trigger point injections and numerous medications
5 prescribed for her pain. Tr. 348 (administered trigger point injections), 352 (noting 6 neck spasm, tenderness, and trigger points), 357 (administered trigger point 7 injections), 930-31 (noting Lyrica “helping with some of the pain”), 944
8 (administered trigger point injections), 950-51 (refilled medications and they were 9 noted to “help control” her pain, but still experiencing 8/10 pain due to weather), 10 956-57 (increasing medication), 967-68, 973-74 (administered trigger point 11 injections), 978 , 982 (prescribing new medication for pain). Finally, as noted by
12 Plaintiff, the record includes consistent evidence of positive straight leg raises, 13 trigger point tenderness, muscle spasms, muscle tightness, tenderness, fatigue, 14 headaches, and mental health complaints. ECF No. 12 at 7.
15 For all of these reasons, the Court finds the ALJ erred by failing to consider 16 chronic pain impairment at step two. Moreover, the Court notes that this error 17 cannot be considered harmless. An error is harmless if “there remains substantial 18 evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error ‘does not negate the validity
19 of the ALJ's ultimate conclusion.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Batson v. 20 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, if a 21 claimant prevails at step two and the ALJ considers all impairments - regardless of 1 severity - in the subsequent steps, an ALJ's failure to consider an impairment 2 “severe” is harmless. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Here, Plaintiff prevailed at step two; however, as discussed in detail above, the 4 ALJ did not consider chronic pain impairment at any of the subsequent steps of the
5 sequential evaluation. Cf. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 911 (holding that ALJ’s failure to list 6 plaintiff’s bursitis as a severe impairment at step two was harmless where ALJ 7 specifically discussed bursitis and its effects when identifying the basis for
8 limitations in the RFC; and considered limitations caused by bursitis at step four). 9 Therefore, the ALJ’s error at step two in this case is not harmless. The ALJ’s 10 selective review of the record permeated the ALJ’s entire decision and impacted 11 the analysis at the subsequent steps.
12 Based on the foregoing, this case must be remanded in order to determine 13 whether Plaintiff's claimed physical impairments were medically determinable and 14 severe, and, if so, to consider any credible limitations arising out of Plaintiff's
15 physical impairments at all subsequent steps in the sequential evaluation. 16 B. Additional Assignments of Error 17 Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical 18 opinions of R. Cline, Psy.D. and J. Fitterer, M.D..; improperly considered
19 Plaintiff’s symptom claims; and erred by not giving res judicata consideration to 20 the ALJ’s prior 2014 findings. ECF No. 12 at 3-5, 8-20. However, the ALJ's error 21 at step two requires remand for proper consideration of Plaintiff's claimed 1 impairments and to reconsider each of the remaining steps in the five-step 2 sequential evaluation, incorporating any additional impairments and work 3 limitations possibly caused by Plaintiff's claimed physical impairments. As the 4 ALJ's error at step two impacts all aspects of the ALJ's decision, the ALJ is
5 instructed to reweigh the medical opinion evidence of record, reconsider Plaintiff’s 6 symptom claims, and reevaluate remaining steps of the sequential evaluation. 7 Finally, as discussed in detail above, the Court addressed Plaintiff’s arguments
8 regarding Plaintiff’s alleged chronic pain impairment at step two, and in light of 9 the need to remand to reconsider step two and the remaining sequential analysis on 10 remand, the ALJ shall give appropriate res judicata consideration to the prior 11 decision, if necessary on remand.
12 REMEDY 13 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and 14 award benefits is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan,
15 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). An immediate award of benefits is appropriate 16 where “no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, 17 or where the record has been thoroughly developed,” Varney v. Sec'y of Health & 18 Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988), or when the delay caused by
19 remand would be “unduly burdensome[.]” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1280 20 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (noting that a 21 district court may abuse its discretion not to remand for benefits when all of these 1 conditions are met). This policy is based on the “need to expedite disability 2 claims.” Varney, 859 F.2d at 1401. But where there are outstanding issues that 3 must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear from the 4 record that the ALJ would be required to find a claimant disabled if all the
5 evidence were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. See Benecke v. 6 Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 7 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
8 The Court finds that further administrative proceedings are appropriate. See 9 Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2014) 10 (remand for benefits is not appropriate when further administrative proceedings 11 would serve a useful purpose). Here, the ALJ erred at step two, which calls into
12 question whether the assessed RFC, and resulting hypothetical propounded to the 13 vocational expert, are supported by substantial evidence. “Where,” as here, “there is 14 conflicting evidence, and not all essential factual issues have been resolved, a
15 remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101. 16 Instead, the Court remands this case for further proceedings. On remand, the ALJ 17 should reconsider the step two finding. The ALJ should also reconsider the medical 18 opinion evidence, and provide legally sufficient reasons for evaluating the opinions,
19 supported by substantial evidence. If necessary, the ALJ should order additional 20 consultative examinations and, if appropriate, take additional testimony from a 21 medical expert. Finally, the ALJ should reconsider Plaintiff’s symptom claims, the 1 |] remaining steps in the sequential analysis, reassess Plaintiff's RFC and, if necessary, 2 || take additional testimony from a vocational expert which includes all of the 3 || limitations credited by the ALJ. 4|| ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED: 5 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED, 6 and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for additional 7 proceedings consistent with this Order. 8 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 9 3. Application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion. 10 The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to 11]| counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff and the file shall be CLOSED. 12 DATED November 25, 2020. 13 14 15 ‘
16 Sue £ 74 ee Lan. 7 Stanley A. Bastian Chief United States District Judge 18 19 20 21
ORDER