Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedOctober 30, 2019
Docket3:19-cv-05326
StatusUnknown

This text of Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security (Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Wash. 2019).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 BAILEY N., 8 Plaintiff, Case No. C19-5326 RSL 9 v. ORDER AFFIRMING DENIAL OF 10 BENEFITS COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 11 SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 Plaintiff Bailey N. appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social 14 Security Administration (“Commissioner”), which denied her application for 15 Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 16 U.S.C. §§1381-83f, after a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). For the 17 reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED and the case is 18 19 DISMISSED with prejudice. 20 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 21 Plaintiff is a 28-year-old woman with a high school education. See Admin. 22 Record (“AR”) at 48, 69. Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability as of 23 September 7, 2007. Id. at 69, 155-60. Her claims were denied on initial administrative 1 review and on reconsideration. Id. at 68-88. On September 13, 2017, ALJ Gerald Hill 2 held a hearing, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. Id. at 30-67. 3 On March 1, 2018, ALJ Hill issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for 4 benefits. Id. at 15-22. The Appeals Council denied review. Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff then 5 sought review before this Court. Compl. (Dkt. #3). 6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 7 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), the Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial 8 of social security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not 9 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 10 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, less than a 11 12 preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 13 adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); 14 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for 15 determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other 16 ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may neither reweigh the 18 evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. Barnhart, 19 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one 20 rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that must be upheld. Id. 21 III. EVALUATING DISABILITY 22 Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is disabled within the meaning of the 23 1 Act. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The Act defines disability as 2 the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to a physical or mental 3 impairment that has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than 4 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Act only if her 5 impairments are of such severity that she is unable to do her previous work, and cannot, 6 considering her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial 7 gainful activity existing in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B); see also 8 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for 10 determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. 11 12 §416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proof during steps one through four. 13 Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). At step 14 five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. If a claimant is found to be disabled at 15 any step in the sequence, the inquiry ends without the need to consider subsequent steps. 16 Step one asks whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 17 20 C.F.R. §416.920(b).1 If she is, disability benefits are denied. If she is not, the 18 Commissioner proceeds to step two. Id. At step two, the claimant must establish that she 19 has one or more medically severe impairments, or combination of impairments, that limit 20 her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(c). If the 21 22 1 Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial, i.e., involves 23 significant physical and/or mental activities, and gainful, i.e., performed for profit. 20 C.F.R. §416.972. 1 claimant does not have such impairments, she is not disabled. Id. If the claimant does 2 have a severe impairment, the Commissioner moves to step three to determine whether 3 the impairment meets or equals any of the listed impairments described in the regulations. 4 20 C.F.R. §416.920(d). A claimant whose impairment meets or equals one of the listings 5 for the required 12-month duration is disabled. Id. 6 When the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of the impairments 7 listed in the regulations, the Commissioner must proceed to step four and evaluate the 8 claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §416.920(e). Here, the 9 Commissioner evaluates the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant 10 work to determine whether she can still perform that work. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(f). If the 11 12 claimant is able to perform her past relevant work, she is not disabled; if the opposite is 13 true, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant can 14 perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, taking into 15 consideration the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 16 §416.920(g); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099-1100. If the Commissioner finds the claimant is 17 unable to perform other work, then the claimant is found disabled and benefits may be 18 awarded. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(g). 19 IV.

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Related

Richardson v. Perales
402 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 1971)
William Ludwig v. Michael Astrue
681 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue
539 F.3d 1169 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Johnson v. Shalala
60 F.3d 1428 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
Meanel v. Apfel
172 F.3d 1111 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Tackett v. Apfel
180 F.3d 1094 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)

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Nelson v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nelson-v-commissioner-of-social-security-wawd-2019.