1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No. 2:22-cv-01319-SSS-MARx SAMI AMMARI,
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 13 CITY OF NORWALK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR 14 v. PARTIAL SUMMARY 15 JUDGMENT [DKT. 40]
16 CITY OF NORWALK, et al. 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is Defendant City of Norwalk’s (the “City”) Motion for 2 Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”). [Dkt. 40]. The 3 Motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. For the following reasons, the 4 City’s Motion is GRANTED. 5 I. BACKGROUND1 6 In August of 2020, the City began a project to widen Firestone Boulevard 7 and removed on-street parking. [Dkt. 40-3 at 2, ¶¶4–7]. Starting in October 8 2020, Plaintiff Sami Ammari began parking his vehicle on Firestone Boulevard 9 in the City of Norwalk. [Dkt. 40-1 at 2, ¶3]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 2, ¶3]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 10 19, lines 12–16]. Ammari’s vehicle is a pink van adorned with an 11 advertisement for a website associated with sex work. [Dkt. 49-2 at 4, Exhibit 12 F]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 27, lines 18–24]. Ammari parked his vehicle in locations 13 marked with signs stating, “no parking,” “street sweeping or no stopping at all,” 14 and other indicators that parking was prohibited. [Dkt. 40-1 at 3, ¶¶5–7]; [Dkt. 15 49-1 at 3, ¶¶5–7]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 28–29, lines 17–25, 1–20]. Ammari was issued 16 “between 10 to 12” parking tickets and his vehicle was impounded twice. [Dkt. 17 40-1 at 3, ¶¶8–9]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 3, ¶¶8–9]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 33, lines 22–25]; [Dkt. 18 40-2 at 22, lines 11–15]. 19 Ammari believes that the parking signs and other indicators were put in 20 place because he parked in that specific location. [Dkt. 40-1 at 3–4, ¶¶14–15]; 21 [Dkt. 49-1 at 4–5, ¶¶14–15]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 31–32, lines 22–25, 1–5]. Ammari 22 believes that the City issued him citations and towed his vehicle because it did 23 not approve of the signs on his vehicle. [Dkt. 49-1 at 8, ¶28]. Ammari states 24 that he was told “by a few people in the community and by a public works 25 officer” that the parking policy was instituted because of him. [Dkt. 40-2 at 26, 26 1 The City filed evidentiary objections in response to Ammari’s Evidence and 27 Statement of Disputed Facts [Dkt. 52] but none are dispositive to the Court’s 1 lines 9–24]. Ammari filed two requests to appeal his parking tickets. [Dkt. 40- 2 1 at 4, ¶22]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶23]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 33–34, lines 25, 1–4]. The 3 Sheriff’s department conducted a post-impound hearing. [Dkt. 40-1 at 6, ¶36]; 4 [Dkt. 49-1 at 11, ¶36]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 43–44, lines 14–25, 1–10]. The City 5 mailed Ammari notice of the parking tickets and his obligation to pay the 6 tickets. [Dkt. 40-1 at 5, ¶24]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶24]. Ammari ignored these 7 notifications and did not pay the parking tickets. [Dkt. 40-1 at 5, ¶¶25–27]; 8 [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶¶25–26]. Ammari ignored the parking tickets because he 9 believed the parking tickets were illegal. [Dkt. 40-1 at 5, ¶¶26–27]; [Dkt. 49-1 10 at 7, ¶¶25–26]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 31, lines 22–24]. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to 13 any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 14 law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the 15 court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 16 party. See Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). However, 17 “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 18 defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the 19 requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. 20 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). The 21 substantive law determines which facts are material. Id. at 248. “Only disputes 22 over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 23 properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. A dispute about a 24 material fact is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 25 return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 26 Under this standard, the moving party has the initial burden of informing 27 the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings 1 fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non- 2 moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not 3 produce evidence negating or disproving every essential element of the non- 4 moving party’s case. Id. at 325. Instead, the moving party need only prove 5 there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.; In re 6 Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). If the moving party 7 sustains its burden, the non-moving party must then show that there is a genuine 8 issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 The City argues its Motion should be granted because Ammari has 11 failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact that: (1) the City’s no parking 12 policy violated Ammari’s First Amendment rights; (2) the City deprived 13 Ammari of his constitutional rights; and (3) the City engaged in trespass or 14 conversion. [Dkt. 40 at 11–19]. The City further argues that Ammari is barred 15 from recovering punitive damages and is not entitled to equitable relief. [Dkt. 16 40 at 19]. Ammari argues that there remain triable issues of fact regarding 17 whether the City engaged in selective and discriminatory enforcement of the 18 parking policy against him. [Dkt. 49 at 7–11]. 19 As an initial matter, Ammari requests that this Court postpone its 20 ruling on the City’s Motion to allow Ammari to depose a traffic enforcement 21 officer that cited Ammari on one occasion. [Dkt. 49 at 4]. The Court notes that 22 the discovery deadline was May 26, 2023 and Ammari has failed to show good 23 cause for his request to continue the present Motion and reopen discovery. 24 [Dkt. 34 at 4]. In particular, counsel for Ammari has failed to sufficiently show 25 that the lack of deposition testimony from one of the many traffic enforcement 26 officers that cited Ammari would significantly impact the Court’s ruling. 27 Moreover, that counsel for Ammari apparently “overlooked” the discovery 1 before now does not amount to good cause. See [Dkt. 49-2 at 3]. Accordingly, 2 the Court denies the request. 3 A. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 4 There is no dispute that the City was acting under the color of state law 5 when its officers issued parking tickets to Ammari. Rather, Ammari contends 6 that the City deprived him of: (1) his First Amendment right to engage in 7 expressive speech, [Dkt. 49 at 8], and (2) his Fourteenth Amendment right to 8 Equal Protection, [Dkt. 49 at 8, line 6]. For the following reasons, the Court 9 rejects these arguments. 10 For a plaintiff to sufficiently prove his § 1983 claim, he must show: (1) 11 that the action occurred under color of state law and (2) the action resulted in the 12 deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional or federal statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983; see also Payne v. City of Los Angeles, No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No. 2:22-cv-01319-SSS-MARx SAMI AMMARI,
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 13 CITY OF NORWALK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR 14 v. PARTIAL SUMMARY 15 JUDGMENT [DKT. 40]
16 CITY OF NORWALK, et al. 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is Defendant City of Norwalk’s (the “City”) Motion for 2 Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”). [Dkt. 40]. The 3 Motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. For the following reasons, the 4 City’s Motion is GRANTED. 5 I. BACKGROUND1 6 In August of 2020, the City began a project to widen Firestone Boulevard 7 and removed on-street parking. [Dkt. 40-3 at 2, ¶¶4–7]. Starting in October 8 2020, Plaintiff Sami Ammari began parking his vehicle on Firestone Boulevard 9 in the City of Norwalk. [Dkt. 40-1 at 2, ¶3]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 2, ¶3]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 10 19, lines 12–16]. Ammari’s vehicle is a pink van adorned with an 11 advertisement for a website associated with sex work. [Dkt. 49-2 at 4, Exhibit 12 F]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 27, lines 18–24]. Ammari parked his vehicle in locations 13 marked with signs stating, “no parking,” “street sweeping or no stopping at all,” 14 and other indicators that parking was prohibited. [Dkt. 40-1 at 3, ¶¶5–7]; [Dkt. 15 49-1 at 3, ¶¶5–7]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 28–29, lines 17–25, 1–20]. Ammari was issued 16 “between 10 to 12” parking tickets and his vehicle was impounded twice. [Dkt. 17 40-1 at 3, ¶¶8–9]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 3, ¶¶8–9]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 33, lines 22–25]; [Dkt. 18 40-2 at 22, lines 11–15]. 19 Ammari believes that the parking signs and other indicators were put in 20 place because he parked in that specific location. [Dkt. 40-1 at 3–4, ¶¶14–15]; 21 [Dkt. 49-1 at 4–5, ¶¶14–15]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 31–32, lines 22–25, 1–5]. Ammari 22 believes that the City issued him citations and towed his vehicle because it did 23 not approve of the signs on his vehicle. [Dkt. 49-1 at 8, ¶28]. Ammari states 24 that he was told “by a few people in the community and by a public works 25 officer” that the parking policy was instituted because of him. [Dkt. 40-2 at 26, 26 1 The City filed evidentiary objections in response to Ammari’s Evidence and 27 Statement of Disputed Facts [Dkt. 52] but none are dispositive to the Court’s 1 lines 9–24]. Ammari filed two requests to appeal his parking tickets. [Dkt. 40- 2 1 at 4, ¶22]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶23]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 33–34, lines 25, 1–4]. The 3 Sheriff’s department conducted a post-impound hearing. [Dkt. 40-1 at 6, ¶36]; 4 [Dkt. 49-1 at 11, ¶36]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 43–44, lines 14–25, 1–10]. The City 5 mailed Ammari notice of the parking tickets and his obligation to pay the 6 tickets. [Dkt. 40-1 at 5, ¶24]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶24]. Ammari ignored these 7 notifications and did not pay the parking tickets. [Dkt. 40-1 at 5, ¶¶25–27]; 8 [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶¶25–26]. Ammari ignored the parking tickets because he 9 believed the parking tickets were illegal. [Dkt. 40-1 at 5, ¶¶26–27]; [Dkt. 49-1 10 at 7, ¶¶25–26]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 31, lines 22–24]. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to 13 any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 14 law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the 15 court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 16 party. See Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991). However, 17 “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 18 defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the 19 requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. 20 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). The 21 substantive law determines which facts are material. Id. at 248. “Only disputes 22 over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 23 properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. A dispute about a 24 material fact is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 25 return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 26 Under this standard, the moving party has the initial burden of informing 27 the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings 1 fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non- 2 moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need not 3 produce evidence negating or disproving every essential element of the non- 4 moving party’s case. Id. at 325. Instead, the moving party need only prove 5 there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id.; In re 6 Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). If the moving party 7 sustains its burden, the non-moving party must then show that there is a genuine 8 issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 The City argues its Motion should be granted because Ammari has 11 failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact that: (1) the City’s no parking 12 policy violated Ammari’s First Amendment rights; (2) the City deprived 13 Ammari of his constitutional rights; and (3) the City engaged in trespass or 14 conversion. [Dkt. 40 at 11–19]. The City further argues that Ammari is barred 15 from recovering punitive damages and is not entitled to equitable relief. [Dkt. 16 40 at 19]. Ammari argues that there remain triable issues of fact regarding 17 whether the City engaged in selective and discriminatory enforcement of the 18 parking policy against him. [Dkt. 49 at 7–11]. 19 As an initial matter, Ammari requests that this Court postpone its 20 ruling on the City’s Motion to allow Ammari to depose a traffic enforcement 21 officer that cited Ammari on one occasion. [Dkt. 49 at 4]. The Court notes that 22 the discovery deadline was May 26, 2023 and Ammari has failed to show good 23 cause for his request to continue the present Motion and reopen discovery. 24 [Dkt. 34 at 4]. In particular, counsel for Ammari has failed to sufficiently show 25 that the lack of deposition testimony from one of the many traffic enforcement 26 officers that cited Ammari would significantly impact the Court’s ruling. 27 Moreover, that counsel for Ammari apparently “overlooked” the discovery 1 before now does not amount to good cause. See [Dkt. 49-2 at 3]. Accordingly, 2 the Court denies the request. 3 A. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 4 There is no dispute that the City was acting under the color of state law 5 when its officers issued parking tickets to Ammari. Rather, Ammari contends 6 that the City deprived him of: (1) his First Amendment right to engage in 7 expressive speech, [Dkt. 49 at 8], and (2) his Fourteenth Amendment right to 8 Equal Protection, [Dkt. 49 at 8, line 6]. For the following reasons, the Court 9 rejects these arguments. 10 For a plaintiff to sufficiently prove his § 1983 claim, he must show: (1) 11 that the action occurred under color of state law and (2) the action resulted in the 12 deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional or federal statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983; see also Payne v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:17-CV-09044-CAS (KSx), 14 2023 WL 4370424, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2023) (citing Jones v. Williams, 297 15 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)). To prove that a defendant violated his First 16 Amendment rights, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he was engaged in a 17 constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s actions would chill a 18 person of ordinary firmness from continuing the protected activity, and (3) the 19 protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s 20 actions. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006) 21 (citing Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th 22 Cir. 1999)); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (“[T]he 23 First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual 24 to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” (internal quotations 25 omitted)). Plaintiff must further establish a causal connection between the 26 defendant’s retaliatory actions and the plaintiff’s resulting injury. Nieves, 139 at 27 1722; see also Johnson v. County of San Bernadino, No. EDCV 18-2523, 2020 1 “[show] a nexus between the defendant’s actions and an intent to chill speech.”). 2 Specifically, defendant’s retaliatory actions must be the but-for cause of 3 plaintiff’s injury. Colonies Partners LP, No. EDCV 18-420 JGB (SHKx), 2020 4 WL 5102160, at *20 (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006). 5 Here, Ammari was not engaged in constitutionally protected activity 6 when he chose to repeatedly park in areas clearly marked “no parking.” See 7 [Dkt. 40-1 at 3, ¶¶5–9]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 3, ¶¶5–9]. There is no constitutional right 8 to park in areas clearly prohibiting parking. Therefore, there is no First 9 Amendment violation. Moreover, Ammari is unable to show that the 10 advertisement on his vehicle was a substantial or motivating factor behind the 11 City’s imposition and enforcement of the parking policy. The City’s parking 12 policy was part of a larger project to widen Firestone Boulevard. [Dkt. 40-3 at 13 2, ¶¶4–7]. Despite Ammari’s belief that the parking policy was put in place to 14 prevent him from parking on Firestone, he provides little to no evidence to 15 support this belief. [Dkt. 40-1 at 3–4, ¶¶14–15]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 4–5, ¶¶14–15]; 16 [Dkt. 40-2 at 26, lines 9–24]. Accordingly, Ammari is unable to show a First 17 Amendment violation. 18 For the same reasons, Ammari is unable to support his selective 19 enforcement claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. “To prevail on an 20 Equal Protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must 21 demonstrate that enforcement had a discriminatory effect and the [defendants] 22 were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Lacey v, Maricopa County, 693 23 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2012). Ammari is unable to show any evidence that the 24 City had a discriminatory purpose in the creation of its parking policy. As 25 previously stated, the City’s parking policy was related to its larger street 26 widening project and Ammari has little to no evidence to support his belief that 27 the parking policy was specifically targeted at him. Accordingly, Ammari is 1 As Ammari’s Opposition fails to make any argument regarding Ammari’s 2 Due Process claim, the Court considers this argument abandoned. However, 3 even if Ammari had made argument, the Court would still find that Ammari has 4 failed to show a violation of his due process rights as a matter of law. Of the 12 5 parking tickets Ammari received, he only appealed two. [Dkt. 40-1 at 4, ¶22]; 6 [Dkt. 49-1 at 7, ¶23]; [Dkt. 40-2 at 33–34]. The Sheriff’s department conducted 7 a post-impound hearing. [Dkt. 40-1 at 6, ¶36]; [Dkt. 49-1 at 11, ¶36]; [Dkt. 40- 8 2 at 43–44, lines 14–25, 1–10]. As such, Ammari had the opportunity to contest 9 his parking tickets and the impounding of his vehicle. Therefore, Ammari’s due 10 process rights were not violated. Further, because Ammari is unable to show a 11 First or Fourteenth Amendment violation, Ammari is unable to show a § 1983 12 claim as a matter of law. 13 B. State law claims for trespass and conversion 14 For a plaintiff to sufficiently prove trespass, he must show: (1) ownership 15 or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent 16 entry on the property; (3) lack of permission to enter the property or acts in 17 excess of the permission; (4) actual harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct as a 18 substantial factor in causing the harm. Williams v. Santander Bank, No: CV 15- 19 04188 SJO (RAOx), 2015 WL 4484202, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2015) (citing 20 Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 186 21 Cal. App. 4th 1078, 1085 (2010), reversed on other grounds by 55 Cal. 4th 1083 22 (2012)). To prove conversion, the plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff’s 23 ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion 24 by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. Id. (citing 25 Welco Elecs., Inc. v. Mora, 223 Cal. App. 4th 202, 208 (2014)). 26 Ammari appears to abandon these claims in his Opposition, however, the 27 Court still finds that Ammari is unable to show a trespass or conversion claim as l As an initial matter, state law tort claims against state actors are subject to || the claim presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act (“GCA”). || Tat v. State, No. CV 22-08570-MCS (DFM), 2023 WL 4291830, at *7 (C.D. 4] Cal. Jan. 25, 2023) (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§§ 905, 945.4, & 950.2); see also 5 || Munoz v. State of California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1767, 1776 (1995)(“Government 6 || Code section 911.2 requires the claim relating to a cause of action for death or 7 || for injury to person or to personal property be presented not later than six 8 || months after the accrual of the cause of action.”). There is no evidence that 9 || Ammari filed a Government Code claim against the City. Therefore, Ammari is 10 || unable to establish a trespass or conversion claim. 11 Even if Ammari had made a Government Code claim, the Court would 12 || still find that he is unable to establish a trespass or conversion claim as a matter 13 | of law. Pursuant to California Motor Vehicle Code § 22852, the City had the || authority to tow and impound vehicles for violating parking policies. 15 || Accordingly, Ammari is unable to show the elements of trespass or conversion 16 || as a matter of law. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 Because Ammari is unable to show that there are genuine issues of material || fact regarding his § 1983, trespass, and conversion claims, the City’s Motion for 20 || Summary Judgment [Dkt. 40] is GRANTED. Accordingly, Ammari’s claims 21) against the City of Norwalk are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 f ( 24 |) Dated: August 3, 2023 2 SUNSHINE ¥SYKES 26 United States District Judge 27 28