Nelson 260733 v. Wilson

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 31, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00009
StatusUnknown

This text of Nelson 260733 v. Wilson (Nelson 260733 v. Wilson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nelson 260733 v. Wilson, (W.D. Mich. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

JONNARD NELSON, #260733, ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 2:19-cv-9 -v- ) ) Honorable Paul L. Maloney SUSAN H. WILSON, ., ) Defendants. ) )

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Nelson, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed this civil rights complaint. Currently pending are two motions for summary judgment filed by the three defendants remaining in the case. (ECF No. 26 Wilson; ECF No. 28 Covert & Stabile). Defendants argue that Nelson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Magistrate Judge issued a report recommending the Court grant the two motions. (ECF No. 48.) Nelson filed objections. (ECF No. 49.) Defendant Wilson filed a response to Nelson’s objections. (ECF No. 50.) After being served with a report and recommendation (R&R) issued by a magistrate judge, a party has fourteen days to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A district court judge reviews de novo the portions of the R&R to which objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Only those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review under the statute. , 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). A. Claims against Defendant Stabile

The magistrate judge concludes that Nelson did not exhaust his claim against Defendant Stabile. Nelson did not name Stabile in a grievance and the record does not support the conclusion that the grievance process was unavailable. Nelson objects. The objection is overruled. The magistrate judge reasoned that Nelson could have requested a grievance form from multiple employees during their daily rounds. The magistrate judge

identified the evidence in the record which supported that conclusion that Nelson had access to those individuals. The Court will adopt this portion of the R&R. B. Claims against Defendant Wilson1 The magistrate judge concludes that Nelson’s Step III appeal was not timely filed and, therefore, Nelson’s claim against Wilson was not exhausted. Nelson objects. The Court will

uphold the objection. A genuine issue of material fact exists whether the grievance was timely filed and thus properly exhausted. A genuine issue of fact exists when the Step II rejection was returned to Nelson.2 The MDOC form states that the rejection was returned to Nelson on July 5, 2018. (ECF No. 29-

1 Defendants Covert and Stabile filed the relevant documents for Nelson’s grievance against Wilson, No. 18-06-1631. (ECF No. 29-9 PageID.213-19.) 2 The Magistrate Judge concludes that the parties do not contest that Nelson received the Step II response on July 9. (PageID.440.) In her motion, Defendant Wilson does not address when Nelson received the Step II response. Wilson argues only that the Step III appeal was denied as untimely. Wilson did not timely file any objection to the R&R. Wilson’s assertion that Nelson received the form on July 5 is first made in the response to Nelson’s objection. 9 PageID.214.) Defendant Wilson has not submitted any affidavit attesting to this fact. Nelson contends he received the Step II rejection on July 9, 2018 (ECF No. 36 PageID.300), and submitted an affidavit attesting to that fact (ECF No. 36-1 PageID.308). Viewing this

evidence in the light most favorable to Nelson, for this motion the Court will use the July 9 date. The relevant Policy Directive, PD 03.02.130, requires a prisoner to “send a completed Step III grievance, . . . within ten business days after receiving the Step II response[.]” (ECF No. 29-2 Policy Directive ¶ FF PageID.174.) The Policy Directive in

effect when Nelson filed his grievance does not define “business day.”3 The Court interprets “business day” to mean Monday through Friday. , No. 07- 11421, 2007 WL 4326803, at *4 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2007). The Court infers that the MDOC interprets the phrase “business day” in the same manner, meaning Monday through Friday. Nelson’s Step III appeal, rejected as untimely, states that the Step III appeal had a “due date of July 20, 2018.” (ECF No. 29-9 PageID.213.) Using the July 5 date (which is

contested), July 20, 2018, is ten business days later. The Magistrate Judge appears to have calculated the ten-day deadline using Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 6 applies when the rule, order or statute does not specify a method for computing time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). The Policy Directive does specify a method for computing days, only “business” days are counted.

3 On March 18, 2019, a revised version of PD 03.02.130 became effective. In paragraph A, the revised version now defines “business day” as Monday through Friday. Using the July 9 date, Nelson mailed his Step III grievance within ten business days. If Nelson received his Step II rejection on Monday, July 9, 2018, he had until Monday, July 23 to mail his Step III grievance. Nelson submitted an affidavit attesting that he mailed in

his Step III grievance on July 23. (ECF No. 36-1 PageID.308.) Nelson also submitted a Disbursement Authorization Form dated July 23 which indicates he mailed his Step III appeal on that day. ( PageID.311.) The Court will reject this portion of the R&R. C. Claims against Defendant Covert

The parties dispute whether Nelson properly exhausted his grievance against Covert. The Magistrate Judge agrees with Defendants that Nelson failed to exhaust his claim against Covert. The Magistrate Judge concludes that MDOC properly rejected the grievance for procedural reasons at Step I and Step III. Nelson objects. First, the law does not require this Court to conclude that Nelson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies simply because MDOC rejected his grievance for procedural

reasons at one step in the process. Binding circuit authority does not address the factual situation here. In , 603 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that Reed-Bey had properly exhausted his claim even though he did not name one of the defendants included in the lawsuit. The circuit reasoned that Reed-Bey “received merits-based responses at each step.” MDOC’s response was for the

exhaustion requirement. The court did not consider, because it did not have to, whether some other factual scenario would also satisfy the exhaustion requirement. In , 531 F. App’x 554, 563 (6th Cir. 2013), the circuit considered the opposite factual scenario, “Cook did not receive merits-based responses to his second grievance at any step in the grievance process.” In dicta, the panel then transposed the legal conclusion (exhaustion) with the factual finding (merit response at each step). The panel wrote

“[f]or holding to apply, Cook would have had to receive ‘merits-based responses ” at 563 (italics added in ). thus described the sufficiency finding based on facts in as a legal . and represent the two possible extremes.

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