Neisen v. Nueces County

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedApril 15, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00088
StatusUnknown

This text of Neisen v. Nueces County (Neisen v. Nueces County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Neisen v. Nueces County, (S.D. Tex. 2025).

Opinion

Southern District of Texas ENTERED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT eon □□ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION HEATHER NEISEN, § Plaintiff, : v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00088 NUECES COUNTY, ef al., Defendants. ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Mitchel Neurock’s Memorandum and Recommendation (““M&R”), which recommends dismissal of Plaintiffs suit for failure to state a claim. (D.E. 20, p. 19). Plaintiff has filed written objections to the M&R. (D.E. 21). After review, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections, (D.E. 21), and ADOPTS the M&R in its entirety, (D.E. 20). J. Background Pro se Plaintiff Heather Neisen sued Defendants Corpus Christi Police Department, Nueces County, and the City of Corpus Christi. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff supplemented the facts in her original pleading by responding to a questionnaire. (D.E. 15). Magistrate Judge Neurock recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (D.E. 20, p. 19). Plaintiff timely objected. (D.E. 21). Among other things, she objects that Judge Neurock misinterpreted or overlooked important facts, and that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a valid basis for her suit. /d. at 1—2. Il. Law When a party objects to the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, the district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

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proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). As to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (Sth Cir. 1989) (per curiam). However, “[a]n objection must point out with particularity the alleged error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis” to warrant de novo review. Pelko v. Perales, No. 2:23-CV-00339, 2024 WL 1972896, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2024) (Ramos, J.); see FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“[A] party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”’). Objections that merely re-urge arguments contained in the original briefing are not proper and will not be considered. See Edmond y. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (Sth Cir. 1993) (first citing Smith v. Collins, 964 F.2d 483, 485 (Sth Cir. 1992); and then citing Nettles □□□ Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (Sth Cir. 1982) (en banc) (overruled on other grounds by Douglass y. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1416 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc)) (superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). As to any portion of a Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations to which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (Sth Cir. 1989) (per curiam). III. Analysis Plaintiff's objections fail to point out with particularity any error in the M&R. Accordingly, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objections, (D.E. 21), and adopts the M&R, (D.E. 20). A. Plaintiffs first objection merely re-urges facts in her complaint. Plaintiff's first objection is that the M&R “appears to misinterpret or overlook critical facts.” (D.E. 21, p. 1). In support of this, she states that she gave sufficient evidence to show that Defendants failed to prosecute her ex-husband and that she was subjected to a false criminal

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charge. Id. However, the M&R addresses each of these issues. As to Plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute, Judge Neurock stated that “Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to have someone else prosecuted” or investigated. (D.E. 20, p. 9). And the M&R recommends that her retaliation claim be dismissed because “Plaintiff fail[ed] to plausibly allege any facts indicating that Detective Villagomez’s act of seeking an arrest warrant was substantially motivated by his opposition to Plaintiff's act of reporting what she believed was criminal conduct.” /d. at 15. Finally, though the M&R recommends dismissal of these claims in this Court—a federal court— the M&R recommends that these claims be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing suit in state court. Jd. at 14-15. Plaintiff's objection merely re-urges these facts, without providing additional evidence. Compare (D.E. 1, p. 4), with (D.E. 21, p. 1). These facts were adequately addressed by the M&R, and Plaintiff did not point out any error in Judge Neurock’s reasoning. Accordingly, this objection is overruled. B. Plaintiff similarly re-urges that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a basis for her suit. The M&R acknowledges that Plaintiff purported to bring a suit under § 1983. (D.E. 20, p. 1). Nonetheless, it recommended her claims under § 1983 be dismissed because Plaintiff does not have a viable malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. at 12-14. And the M&R states that Plaintiff cannot bring a retaliation claim under § 1983 because she does not allege specific retaliatory actions by supervisory officials. /d. at 15. Again, Plaintiff does not point out the specific error in this assessment and merely re-urges her original claims, which Judge Neurock has already addressed. Accordingly, this objection is overruled.

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C. Plaintiff’s remaining objections do not point out an error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Plaintiff states that “the allegations warrant a more thorough investigation rather than an outright dismissal.” (D.E. 21, p. 2). Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the obstacles pro se and pro persona litigants face in navigating the legal system and the “broader implications” this dismissal will have on the public interest and the accountability of law enforcement. /d. In short, Plaintiff asks the Court to abide by broader notions of justice. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. “To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se litigants liberally.” Guy v. City of Corpus Christi, No. 2:24-CV-00100, 2024 WL 4279376, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2024) (Libby, Mag. J.) (citing United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (Sth Cir. 1996)), adopted, No. 2:24-CV-00100, 2024 WL 4282085 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024) (Ramos, J.). While the Court construes Plaintiffs pro se filings liberally in her favor, Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740 (Sth Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)), the Court cannot assist Plaintiff with her case, see Jacobsen v. Filler,

Related

Edmond v. Collins
8 F.3d 290 (Fifth Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Robinson
78 F.3d 172 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)
Oliver v. Scott
276 F.3d 736 (Fifth Circuit, 2002)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Harlan L. Jacobsen v. Richard Filler
790 F.2d 1362 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
Neisen v. Nueces County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neisen-v-nueces-county-txsd-2025.