Neilson v. Garza

17 F. Cas. 1302, 2 Woods 287
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Texas
DecidedMarch 15, 1876
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 17 F. Cas. 1302 (Neilson v. Garza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Neilson v. Garza, 17 F. Cas. 1302, 2 Woods 287 (circtedtx 1876).

Opinion

BRADLEY, Circuit Justice.

The complainant in this case resides in Matamoras, Mexico, and is largely engaged in the business of importing hides from that city to Brownsville, in Texas, and sending the same thence via the port of Brazos Santiago, in Texas, to New York.

The defendant is inspector of hides and animals for Cameron county, Texas,' at Brownsville, appointed and acting under an [1303]*1303act of the legislature of Texas, approved October 14, 1871, and a further act, approved March 23, 1S74, entitled for “the encouragement of stock raising and the protection of stock raisers.” By virtue of his said office, the defendant claims and exercises the right to inspect the hides imported as aforesaid by the complainant, and to exact and receive and does exact and receive therefor, in accordance with said law, fees at the rate of from six to ten cents per hide, according to the number inspected.

The complainant contends that this exaction is in reality an impost or duty on the imporation or exportation of said hides, and that it is contrary to those clauses of the constitution of the United States which declare that congress shall have power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states;” and that “no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.” It is not pro-tended that congress has granted any consent in the ease; and the complainant insists that congress, in making the importation of hides free from duty, has regulated the subject, and no state regulation can have any' force or effect, but all such regulations are void.

If tlie state law of Texas, which is complained of, is really an inspection law, it is valid and binding unless it interferes with the power of congress to regulate commerce, and if it does thus interfere, it may still be valid and binding until revised and altered by congress. The right to make inspection laws is not granted to congress, but is reserved to the states; but it is subject to the paramount right of congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states; and if any state, as a means of carrying out and executing its inspection laws, imposes any duty or impost on imports or exports, such impost or duty is void if it exceeds what is absolutely necessary for executing such inspection laws. How the question. whether a duty is excessive or not, is to be decided, may be doubtful. As that question is passed upon by the state legislature, when the duty is imposed, it would hardly be seemly to submit it to the consideration of a jury in every case that arises. This might give rise to great diversity of judgment, the result of which would be to make the law constitutional one day, and in one case, and unconstitutional another day, in another case. As the..article of the constitution which prescribes the limit goes on to provide that “all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of congress,” it seems to me that congress is the proper tribunal to decide the question, whether a charge or duty is or is not excessive. If, therefore, the fee allowed in this case by the state law is to be regarded as in effect an impost or duty on imports or exports, still if the law is really an inspection law, the duty must stand until congress shall see flt to alter it.

Then we are brought back to the question whether the law is really an inspection law. If it is, we can not interfere with it on account of supposed exeessiveness of fees. If it is not, the exaction is clearly unconstitutional and void, being an unauthorized interference with the free importation of goods. The complainant contends that it is not an inspection law; that inspection laws only apply legitimately to the domestic products of the country, intended for exportation; and that no inspection is actually required in this particular case, but a mere examination to see if the hides are marked,- and who imported them, etc., duties which belong to the entry of goods, and not their inspection.

No doubt the primary and most usual object of inspection is to prepare goods for ex-poration in order to preserve the credit of our exports in foreign markets. Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, says: “The object of inspection laws is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a country; to fit them for exportation, or it may be. for domestice use.” 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 203; Story, Const. § 1017. But in Brown v. Maryland, he adds, speaking of the time when inspection takes place: “Inspection laws, so far as they act upon articles for exportation, are generally executed on land before the article is put on board a vessel; so far as they act upon importations, they are generally executed upon articles which are landed. The tax or duty of inspection is a tax which is frequently, if not always, paid for service performed on land.” 12 Wheat. [25 U. S.] 419; Story, Const. § 1017. So that, according to Chief Justice Marshall, imported as well as exported goods may be subject to inspection; and they may be inspected as well to -fit them for domestic use as for exportation. All housekeepers who are consumer’s of flour know what a protection it is to be able to rely on the inspection mark for a fine or superior article. Bouvier defines inspection as the examination of certain articles made by law subject to such examination, so that they may be declared fit for commerce. Law Diet. verb. “Inspection.” The removal or destruction of unsound articles is undoubtedly, says Chief Justice Marshall, an exercise of that power. Brown v. Maryland, supra; Story, Const. § 1024. “The object of the inspection laws,” says Justice Sutherland, “is to protect the community, so far as they apply to domestic sales, from frauds and impositions; and in relation to articles designed for exportation, to preserve the character and reputation of the state in foreign markets.” Clintsman v. Northrop, 8 Cow. 46. It thus appears that the scope of inspection laws is very large, and is not confined to articles of domestic produce or manufacture, or to articles intended for exporation, but applies to articles [1304]*1304imported, and to those intended for domestic use as well.

An examination of some of tlie actual inspection laws of the different states shows that this is the fact: Thus, in Alabama, the city authorities of Mobile are authorized to appoint inspectors, and to adopt regulations (to be approved by the governor) for the inspection of staves, tobacco, pitch, tar, turpentine, rosin, fish, flour and oil, within the limits of the city. Many of these articles must be articles of import. In Massachusetts, fish intended for exportation are to be inspected, whether inspected previously in another state or not. Pearson v. Purkett, 15 Pick. 264. In Kentucky, under the inspection laws of that state, imported salt .cannot be sold in the state until it has been inspected, and three cents inspection fees are chargeable for each barrel inspected. The inspection laws of North Carolina are very full, and, amongst other things, provisions and forage imported from out of the state, such as beef, pork, fish, flour, butter in firkins, cheese in boxes, hay or fodder, bacon in hogsheads, etc., must be inspected before they can be sold, on pain of $100 penalty, and a scale of inspection fees is fixed by law. It is true the constitutionality of these laws has not been tested, but they show what range inspection laws have taken, and what is generally regarded as within their scope.

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Bluebook (online)
17 F. Cas. 1302, 2 Woods 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/neilson-v-garza-circtedtx-1876.