MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2023 ME 47 Docket: Cum-23-25 Submitted On Briefs: June 21, 2023 Decided: August 10, 2023
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
NEILL EWING-WEGMANN
v.
KATHARINE ALLERDING
HORTON, J.
[¶1] Katharine Allerding appeals from a judgment of divorce from Neill
Ewing-Wegmann entered by the District Court (Portland, Darvin, J.) awarding
her and Ewing-Wegmann shared parental rights, allocating Father’s Day with
the child to Ewing-Wegmann, and ordering Allerding to contribute to the fees
of the appointed guardian ad litem (GAL). We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The parties were married in 2008 and have one child together. In
December 2020, Ewing-Wegmann filed a complaint for divorce against
Allerding due to irreconcilable marital differences. On May 10, 2021, at
Ewing-Wegmann’s request, a Family Law Magistrate (Najarian, J.) appointed a
GAL for the child and ordered that Ewing-Wegmann pay all of the GAL’s fees 2
and that the GAL was to spend no more than ten hours on the matter. The GAL
appointment order was amended twice. The first amended order, dated
March 18, 2022, authorized additional hours for the GAL’s work. The second
amended order, dated May 25, 2022, authorized additional hours for the GAL
and stated that the fees for the additional hours could be subject to reallocation
at the final hearing in the matter.
[¶3] After a final hearing on September 6, 9, and 13, 2022, the court
(Darvin, J.) issued a divorce judgment on December 29, 2022. “The court found
the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence admitted
during the hearing.” Whitmore v. Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 3, 288 A.3d 799;
see Littell v. Bridges, 2023 ME 29, ¶ 3, 293 A.3d 445.
[¶4] The child was born in 2009 and was twelve years old at the time of
the hearing. For much of the child’s life, “[Ewing-Wegmann] was an active and
engaged parent, and provided substantial [care], if not the primary care[,] of
the child.” After Ewing-Wegmann left the parties’ home in 2020, the child
resided with Allerding, and over time the child became estranged from
Ewing-Wegmann. During the year before the hearing, Ewing-Wegmann and the
child had in-person contact only three times, two of which were in the course 3
of counseling sessions aimed at promoting reunification between the child and
Ewing-Wegmann.
[¶5] What caused “the rapid and severe deterioration of the relationship
between [Ewing-Wegmann] and [the] child” is unclear. Ewing-Wegmann
contends that Allerding caused the estrangement by encouraging the child not
to see him. According to Allerding and the child’s therapist, it is the child who
has chosen not to speak or visit with Ewing-Wegmann.
[¶6] After the parties separated, the child disclosed to Allerding that
Ewing-Wegmann had engaged in what Allerding told the child was
inappropriate touching,1 and the child’s therapist later made a referral to the
Department of Health and Human Services regarding inappropriate sexual
behavior by Ewing-Wegmann. The court found that Ewing-Wegmann had on
occasion patted the child and pinched the child’s “bottom” but that “there [was]
no objective or confirming evidence of [other] claimed abuse[.]”
[¶7] The child is “described as extremely articulate, . . . highly intelligent
and very perceptive.” The child has had longstanding anxiety issues, has been
in counseling for years, and more recently has been hospitalized for
1 The GAL testified that that the child “did [not] come to the realization or the belief that [Ewing-Wegmann]’s behavior was inappropriate” until Allerding told the child that Ewing-Wegmann’s behavior was inappropriate. 4
experiencing suicidal ideation. The child, upon learning of impending contact
with Ewing-Wegmann, becomes severely “emotionally dysregulated”—upset
and unable to manage emotions.
[¶8] The parents share responsibility for both causing and repairing the
estrangement between the child and Ewing-Wegmann. “[Allerding] has
marginalized [Ewing-Wegmann] in his role as father” and “lack[s] . . .
self-awareness as to how her own feelings of antipathy towards
[Ewing-Wegmann] have been communicated to the child [] and adversely
impacted the child.” On the other hand, Ewing-Wegmann needs “to develop his
ability to understand and respond [empathetically] [] to the child’s needs and
‘validate’ [the child’s] feelings . . . .”
[¶9] The court ordered parental rights and responsibilities to be shared
between both parties and awarded primary residence of the child to Allerding.
The court awarded Ewing-Wegmann contact with the child for up to ninety
minutes on alternating Saturdays each month in a public location without
Allerding present.2 The court ordered video contact between Ewing-Wegmann
2Prior to each visit, Ewing-Wegmann “shall consult with the child’s therapist about the selection of a public location that will address any comfort or safety concerns expressed by the child. [Ewing-Wegmann] shall designate in writing at least 7 days in advance the date and time of the parental contact, with the expectation that the initial contacts should take place during a lunch or meal time in a restaurant like setting.” 5
and the child at least twice a month. The court also encouraged
Ewing-Wegmann to keep telephone or internet contact “to a time designated
on the weekends in response to specific request[s] by the child.” The court also
awarded Ewing-Wegmann contact with the child from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on
Father’s Day every year. As part of its determination of child support, the court
found that Allerding’s annual gross income was $51,525 and Ewing-Wegmann’s
annual gross income was $56,056. Those findings were incorporated into a
child support order requiring Ewing-Wegmann to pay Allerding $139 per week
in child support. The court also ordered that Allerding reimburse
Ewing-Wegmann $1,825 of the amount he paid toward GAL fees.
[¶10] Allerding timely filed a notice of appeal. See 14 M.R.S.
§ 1901(1)(2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] “We review the factual findings underlying a divorce judgment for
clear error and an award of parental rights and responsibilities for an abuse of
discretion.” Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 7, 288 A.3d 799. Contrary to Allerding’s
contentions, the court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in ordering
shared parental rights. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)-(3) (2023); see, e.g., Pyle v.
Pyle, 2017 ME 101, ¶¶ 7-9, 162 A.3d 814. The court’s judgment included 6
“extensive factual findings” regarding the parties and the child as well as
additional findings related to the best interest factors enumerated in 19-A
M.R.S. § 1653(3). Bergin v. Bergin, 2019 ME 133, ¶ 5, 214 A.3d 1071;
see Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 8, 288 A.3d 799.
[¶12] “We review determinations of rights of contact for abuse of
discretion.” Dube v. Dube, 2016 ME 15, ¶ 5, 131 A.3d 381. The court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding to Ewing-Wegmann rights of contact with the
child on Father’s Day. See id. ¶¶ 5-8. The court noted that “there is a risk of
emotional harm (and physical distress) to the child as a result of contact that
may be ‘forced’ by the court . . . [therefore,] it is the best interests of the child
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2023 ME 47 Docket: Cum-23-25 Submitted On Briefs: June 21, 2023 Decided: August 10, 2023
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
NEILL EWING-WEGMANN
v.
KATHARINE ALLERDING
HORTON, J.
[¶1] Katharine Allerding appeals from a judgment of divorce from Neill
Ewing-Wegmann entered by the District Court (Portland, Darvin, J.) awarding
her and Ewing-Wegmann shared parental rights, allocating Father’s Day with
the child to Ewing-Wegmann, and ordering Allerding to contribute to the fees
of the appointed guardian ad litem (GAL). We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The parties were married in 2008 and have one child together. In
December 2020, Ewing-Wegmann filed a complaint for divorce against
Allerding due to irreconcilable marital differences. On May 10, 2021, at
Ewing-Wegmann’s request, a Family Law Magistrate (Najarian, J.) appointed a
GAL for the child and ordered that Ewing-Wegmann pay all of the GAL’s fees 2
and that the GAL was to spend no more than ten hours on the matter. The GAL
appointment order was amended twice. The first amended order, dated
March 18, 2022, authorized additional hours for the GAL’s work. The second
amended order, dated May 25, 2022, authorized additional hours for the GAL
and stated that the fees for the additional hours could be subject to reallocation
at the final hearing in the matter.
[¶3] After a final hearing on September 6, 9, and 13, 2022, the court
(Darvin, J.) issued a divorce judgment on December 29, 2022. “The court found
the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence admitted
during the hearing.” Whitmore v. Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 3, 288 A.3d 799;
see Littell v. Bridges, 2023 ME 29, ¶ 3, 293 A.3d 445.
[¶4] The child was born in 2009 and was twelve years old at the time of
the hearing. For much of the child’s life, “[Ewing-Wegmann] was an active and
engaged parent, and provided substantial [care], if not the primary care[,] of
the child.” After Ewing-Wegmann left the parties’ home in 2020, the child
resided with Allerding, and over time the child became estranged from
Ewing-Wegmann. During the year before the hearing, Ewing-Wegmann and the
child had in-person contact only three times, two of which were in the course 3
of counseling sessions aimed at promoting reunification between the child and
Ewing-Wegmann.
[¶5] What caused “the rapid and severe deterioration of the relationship
between [Ewing-Wegmann] and [the] child” is unclear. Ewing-Wegmann
contends that Allerding caused the estrangement by encouraging the child not
to see him. According to Allerding and the child’s therapist, it is the child who
has chosen not to speak or visit with Ewing-Wegmann.
[¶6] After the parties separated, the child disclosed to Allerding that
Ewing-Wegmann had engaged in what Allerding told the child was
inappropriate touching,1 and the child’s therapist later made a referral to the
Department of Health and Human Services regarding inappropriate sexual
behavior by Ewing-Wegmann. The court found that Ewing-Wegmann had on
occasion patted the child and pinched the child’s “bottom” but that “there [was]
no objective or confirming evidence of [other] claimed abuse[.]”
[¶7] The child is “described as extremely articulate, . . . highly intelligent
and very perceptive.” The child has had longstanding anxiety issues, has been
in counseling for years, and more recently has been hospitalized for
1 The GAL testified that that the child “did [not] come to the realization or the belief that [Ewing-Wegmann]’s behavior was inappropriate” until Allerding told the child that Ewing-Wegmann’s behavior was inappropriate. 4
experiencing suicidal ideation. The child, upon learning of impending contact
with Ewing-Wegmann, becomes severely “emotionally dysregulated”—upset
and unable to manage emotions.
[¶8] The parents share responsibility for both causing and repairing the
estrangement between the child and Ewing-Wegmann. “[Allerding] has
marginalized [Ewing-Wegmann] in his role as father” and “lack[s] . . .
self-awareness as to how her own feelings of antipathy towards
[Ewing-Wegmann] have been communicated to the child [] and adversely
impacted the child.” On the other hand, Ewing-Wegmann needs “to develop his
ability to understand and respond [empathetically] [] to the child’s needs and
‘validate’ [the child’s] feelings . . . .”
[¶9] The court ordered parental rights and responsibilities to be shared
between both parties and awarded primary residence of the child to Allerding.
The court awarded Ewing-Wegmann contact with the child for up to ninety
minutes on alternating Saturdays each month in a public location without
Allerding present.2 The court ordered video contact between Ewing-Wegmann
2Prior to each visit, Ewing-Wegmann “shall consult with the child’s therapist about the selection of a public location that will address any comfort or safety concerns expressed by the child. [Ewing-Wegmann] shall designate in writing at least 7 days in advance the date and time of the parental contact, with the expectation that the initial contacts should take place during a lunch or meal time in a restaurant like setting.” 5
and the child at least twice a month. The court also encouraged
Ewing-Wegmann to keep telephone or internet contact “to a time designated
on the weekends in response to specific request[s] by the child.” The court also
awarded Ewing-Wegmann contact with the child from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on
Father’s Day every year. As part of its determination of child support, the court
found that Allerding’s annual gross income was $51,525 and Ewing-Wegmann’s
annual gross income was $56,056. Those findings were incorporated into a
child support order requiring Ewing-Wegmann to pay Allerding $139 per week
in child support. The court also ordered that Allerding reimburse
Ewing-Wegmann $1,825 of the amount he paid toward GAL fees.
[¶10] Allerding timely filed a notice of appeal. See 14 M.R.S.
§ 1901(1)(2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] “We review the factual findings underlying a divorce judgment for
clear error and an award of parental rights and responsibilities for an abuse of
discretion.” Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 7, 288 A.3d 799. Contrary to Allerding’s
contentions, the court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in ordering
shared parental rights. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)-(3) (2023); see, e.g., Pyle v.
Pyle, 2017 ME 101, ¶¶ 7-9, 162 A.3d 814. The court’s judgment included 6
“extensive factual findings” regarding the parties and the child as well as
additional findings related to the best interest factors enumerated in 19-A
M.R.S. § 1653(3). Bergin v. Bergin, 2019 ME 133, ¶ 5, 214 A.3d 1071;
see Whitmore, 2023 ME 3, ¶ 8, 288 A.3d 799.
[¶12] “We review determinations of rights of contact for abuse of
discretion.” Dube v. Dube, 2016 ME 15, ¶ 5, 131 A.3d 381. The court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding to Ewing-Wegmann rights of contact with the
child on Father’s Day. See id. ¶¶ 5-8. The court noted that “there is a risk of
emotional harm (and physical distress) to the child as a result of contact that
may be ‘forced’ by the court . . . [therefore,] it is the best interests of the child
that the court must address in fashioning relief.” The court laid out specific
requirements for other in-person contact—that the father can visit with the
child only twice a month, for ninety minutes, in a public place chosen in
consultation with the child’s therapist so that the child feels comfortable and
safe. When the court issued its judgment, Father’s Day was about six months
away. We conclude that the court issued its award in the hope that the parties
would by then find a way to cooperate on facilitating Father’s Day contact and
limit contact by agreement if necessary so as not to force contact contrary to
the child’s best interest. Cf. Dube, 2016 ME 15, ¶¶ 7-8, 131 A.3d 381. 7
[¶13] We review for an abuse of discretion the court’s decision on
allocating GAL fees, and we see no abuse of discretion here. Akers v. Akers,
2012 ME 75, ¶ 8, 44 A.3d 311. The first two GAL appointment orders requiring
Ewing-Wegmann to pay all of the fees attributable to the GAL’s work authorized
by those orders did not prevent the court from ordering Allerding to contribute
to the fees attributable to the court’s third order. The parties agreed that
Ewing-Wegmann would pay all of the fees associated with the first GAL
appointment order, but the agreement did not bar an allocation of fees incurred
as a result of subsequently authorized work, much of which was necessitated
by the parties’ shared difficulty in co-parenting effectively. The parties are in a
similar financial position to contribute to GAL fees. Moreover, the court’s
second amended GAL appointment order stated that the fee for that work could
be subject to reallocation. 19-A M.R.S. § 1507(1), (7) (2023); cf. McMahon v.
McMahon, 2019 ME 11, ¶¶ 13-18, 200 A.3d 789.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. 8
Jeanne C. Sund, Esq., Robinson, Kriger & McCallum, Portland, for appellant Katharine Allerding
Elizabeth J. Scheffee, Esq., Scheffee Law, Gorham, for appellee Neill Ewing- Wegmann
Portland District Court docket number FM-2020-832 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY