Neil Hornsby and Maricor Poage Hornsby, husband and wife v. Alcoa Inc.

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 2:14-cv-00394
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE 2 EASTER U N . S D . I S D T I R S I T C R T I C O T F C W O A U S R H T I NGTON 3 Mar 11, 2026 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 No. 2:14-CV-00394-SAB 10 NEIL HORNSBY and MARICOR 11 POAGE HORNSBY, husband and wife, 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED 14 ALCOA INC., MOTION TO SET ASIDE 15 Defendant. JUDGMENT 16 17 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside Judgment, ECF No. 54 18 The motion was heard without oral argument. Plaintiffs are represented by Ashley 19 Richards, Beth Bollinger and William Gilbert. Defendant is represented by G. 20 William Shaw and Kevin James Craig. 21 Plaintiffs ask the Court to set aside the August 4, 2015 judgment and 22 reinstate the above-captioned case because the Washington Supreme Court’s recent 23 decision in Cockrum v. C.H. Murphy/Clark-Ullman, Inc., effectively overruled 24 Watson v. Boeing Co, which interpreted the deliberate injury exception with regard 25 to latent disease claims with regard to mesothelioma and which was relied on by 26 this Court and the Ninth Circuit to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. 27 // 28 // 1 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state 3 a claim in August 2015, ECF No. 24, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. ECF No. 31. 4 It noted that while generally employers receive immunity from civil suits resulting 5 from on-the-job injuries under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act (IIA),1 6 they can be held liable for deliberately intending to injure their employees.2 The 7 courts relied on Walston v. Boeing Co., 181 Wash.2d 391 (2014), which held an 8 employer deliberately injures an employee if “the employer had actual knowledge 9 that an injury is certain to occur and willfully disregards that knowledge,”3 to find 10 Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show Defendant deliberately intended to 11 injury Plaintiff. 12 Recently, the Washington Supreme Court overruled Walston and held a 13 plaintiff can satisfy the deliberate injury exception to the exclusivity provision of 14 IIA if they demonstrate the employer had actual knowledge that latent diseases are 15 virtually certain4 to occur and willfully disregard such knowledge. Cockrum v. 16 C.H. Murphy/Clark-Ullman, Inc., 4 Wash.3d 874 (2025) (emphasis added). In so 17

18 1 Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.010. 19 2 § 51.24.020. 20 3 Walston, 181 Wash.2d at 394 (emphasis added). 21 4 The court provided a nonexclusive list of facts that may be relevant in 22 determining whether the virtual certainty requirement is met: (1) the employer’s 23 knowledge of ongoing, repeated development of symptoms known to be associated 24 with the development of latent disease over time, (2) the employer’s knowledge of 25 symptoms developing in employees similarly situated to the plaintiff employee, (3) 26 the timing of such symptoms developing prior to or contemporaneous with the 27 plaintiff-employee's exposure(s), and (4) whether the exposure arises from a 28 common major cause within the employer’s control. 1 doing, the court noted that Walston incorrectly contradicted the plain text of the 2 statute and public policy behind the IIA5, and characterized Walston as “harmful,” 3 “a mistake,” and incorrect. Id. at 876. 4 BACKGROUND FACTS 5 From 2000 to 2002, and again from 2003 to 2008, Neil Hornsby worked at 6 Alcoa Wenatchee Works in various capacities in the pot rooms. In 2015, Hornsby 7 was diagnosed with congestive heart failure, Stage II. Recently, Plaintiff was 8 diagnosed with mesothelioma and aluminosis. 9 MOTION STANDARD 10 Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from final judgment and reopen a 11 case based on mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or 12 the void or prospectively inequitable status of a judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 60(b)(1)–(5). Rule 60(b) also includes a “catchall” provision—Rule 60(b)(6)—that 14 allows a district court to reopen a case for “‘any other reason that justifies relief.’” 15 Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022). A party seeking relief based on 16 mistake or excusable neglect, new evidence, or fraud faces a 1-year limitations 17 period. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(c)(1). That time bar, however, does not apply to 18 motions for relief filed under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires 19 extraordinary circumstances, and it is only available when Rules 60(b)(1) through 20 (b)(5) are inapplicable. Kemp, 596 U.S. at 533. 21 Generally, a change in the law does not constitute an extraordinary 22 circumstance justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 23 5 The court explained: 24 Walston is incorrect because it adds words to the statute where there are none 25 (excluding diseases caused by deliberate intention), renders other language superfluous (RCW 51.24.030(3)’s inclusion of “disease” as a type of injury 26 compensable in a cause of action under that chapter), and undermines the 27 policy of providing a cause of action for deliberately intended workplace injuries including diseases. 28 Id. at 888. 1 U.S. 204, 211 (2025). Otherwise, every time an appeals court or the Supreme 2 Court reached a conclusion of law different from that of a lower court, parties 3 adversely affected by the now defunct, previous law could seek to reopen their 4 case. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536–37 (2005). 5 That said, the Ninth Circuit has recognized in limited circumstances a 6 change in the controlling law can provide extraordinary circumstances that justify 7 relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Financial, Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 8 444 (9th Cir. 2019). In deciding a Rule 60(b)(6) motion based on changes in the 9 controlling law, courts are to assess the motion on a case-by-case basis, evaluate 10 the circumstances surrounding the specific motion before the court; and balance 11 the competing interests of finality of judgments and the “incessant command of the 12 court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Id. (citations and 13 quotations omitted) 14 “Rule 60(b)(6) is a grand reservoir of equitable power . . . and it affords 15 courts the discretion and power to vacate judgments whenever such action is 16 appropriate to accomplish justice.” Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135 (9th 17 Cir. 2009). 18 Analysis 19 Here, extraordinary circumstances exist to justify reopening this case. 20 Notably, the plaintiff in Cockrum and Mr. Hornsby were employed by the same 21 company and developed the same disease. Both should be allowed to have their 22 day in court. See Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2017). Under 23 Washington law, the Cockrum decision applies retroactively since the decision is 24 silent regarding prospective-only relief, see Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc, 25 166 Wash.2d 264, 267 (2009), and there is no need to certify the question to the 26 Washington Supreme Court. Given that Plaintiff was recently diagnosed with 27 mesothelioma and aluminosis, the interest of justice outweighs any interest in the 28 finality of the judgment. 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Set Aside Judgment, ECF No. 54, is GRANTED. 2. The above-captioned action is REINSTATED. 5 3. Within twenty (20) days from the date of this Order, Defendant shall file its Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby directed to 8|| file this Order and provide copies to counsel. 9 DATED this 11th day of March 2026.

8 Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION TO SET ASIDE