Neenah Foundry Co. v. United States

155 F. Supp. 2d 710, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 643, 25 C.I.T. 643, 23 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1636, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 81
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Neenah Foundry Co. v. United States. Read the opinion of the Court — 155 F. Supp. 2d 766
United States Court of International Trade·Decided June 20, 2001·No. SLIP OP. 01-74; 99-07-00441·Published

Opinion

Memorandum

AQUILINO, Judge.

This court’s slip opinion Neenah Foundry Co. v. U.S., 25 CIT -, 142 F.Supp.2d 1008 (April 2, 2001), familiarity with which is presumed, denied plaintiffs’ motion for judgment herein upon the record compiled by the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (“ITA”) sub nom. Final Results of Expedited Sunset Review: Iron Metal Castings From India, 64 Fed.Reg. 30,316 (June 7, 1999), amended, 64 Fed.Reg. 37,509 (July 12, 1999), except for remand to that agency

for reconsideration of the subtraction of IPRS from the net countervailable subsidy without having considered the method of that program’s alleged termination or the likelihood of its reinstatement in the absence of any prior administrative determination of that issue. 1

The defendant has now duly filed its Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (May 25, 2001), the summary of which on page 1 thereof is that

we have reconsidered the exclusion of the IPRS from the net countervailable subsidy, by considering the method by which the IPRS program was terminated and the likelihood of its reinstatement in the absence of any prior administrative determination of this issue. Based on our reconsideration in accordance with the Court’s instructions, we continue to find that the IPRS program has been terminated and continue to exclude it from the net countervailable subsidy.

Footnotes omitted. This conclusion draws upon the premise that

*712 it is reasonable to conclude that when a program is initiated through the action of a government agency, it is rational to expect that that program would also be eliminated through agency action, rather than by legislative action.

Final Results, p. 7. Furthermore,

evidence indicating that a significant period of time had passed since the elimination of a program, without that program being re-instituted, provides a strong basis for concluding that the government is not likely to reinstate the program.... [I]n this case, Commerce has found no evidence in administrative reviews conducted for periods subsequent to the effective date of the elimination of the IPRS program that the IPRS program has been re-instituted.

Id. at 8.

I

The statutory standard governing judicial review of this case continues to be that any determination is unlawful if found to be arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(ii) (1995). See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(l)(D) (1995); 25 CIT at-, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1013.

The plaintiffs renew the pursuit of relief under this standard, arguing now that, for the ITA

to make a finding of termination in this remand determination, Commerce would have to be able to find that, during a proceeding in which this issue was addressed on the merits and plaintiffs were given an opportunity to comment on the evidence put forth by the Indian respondents (as well as submit any evidence of their own), Commerce had reached a formal determination of this issue.

Plaintiffs’ Comments on Remand Results, p. 6 (June 5, 2001). They maintain that, if

a respondent had claimed during an administrative review that the IPRS program was more than simply “not used,” Commerce would have considered the issue on its merits, taken evidence from all parties to the review, and all information would be subject to verification.... Commerce has neither considered the issue on its merits before, nor has the domestic industry had any opportunity to present evidence of its own.

Id. at 7.

A

Procedurally, this position is tenuous, given the number of administrative reviews conducted prior hereto by the ITA under 19 U.S.C. § 1675, and with the apparent, active participation of the plaintiffs herein therein. See, e.g., Certain Iron-Metal Castings From India; Final Results and Partial Rescission of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 63 Fed.Reg. 64,050, 64,051 (Nov. 18, 1998) (IPRS “not used” during 1996 period of review); Certain Iron-Metal Castings From India; Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 62 Fed.Reg. 32,297, 32,299 (June 13, 1997) (IPRS “not used” during 1994); Certain Iron-Metal Castings From India: Final Results of Countewailing Duty Administrative Review, 61 Fed.Reg. 64,676, 64,677 (Dec. 6, 1996) (IPRS “not used” during 1993 period of review); Certain Iron-Metal Castings From India: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,839, 44,842 (Aug. 29, 1995) (IPRS “not used” during 1992). Indeed, at least two of these administrative reviews were stated to have been at the behest of the domestic producers, plaintiffs herein. See Certain Iron Metal Castings From India: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Adminis *713 trative Review, 61 Fed.Reg. 25,623 (May 22, 1996); ibid., 60 Fed.Reg. at 44,839.

Moreover, prior to filing the Final Results now contested herein, the defendant moved this court for an extension of time within which to file on the stated ground that the ITA had

decided that additional information would be helpful in resolving the [IPRS] issue. Commerce personnel will be traveling to India to conduct a verification with respect to another order beginning the week of May 14, 2001, and returning around June 4, 2001. During this time, the personnel will have an opportunity to verify whether the IPRS program has been terminated. Upon their return, Commerce will prepare a verification report which it will make available to the parties. They will then be given time to submit whatever comments they wish to make on the issue. After considering the comments, Commerce will reconsider whether the IPRS program has been terminated, the method of termination, and the likelihood of its reinstatement. Commerce anticipate[s] that it will be in a position to report the results of its reconsideration upon remand by June 29, 2001. 2

The plaintiffs opposed this motion, arguing, among other things, that the ITA was precluded from reopening its administrative record, in part, because “it ... would be directly contrary to Commerce’s sunset regulations.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Remand, p. 2, and citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.218(e)(l)(ii)(C) (1999), to wit:

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Neenah Foundry Co. v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 2d 710, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 643, 25 C.I.T. 643, 23 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1636, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 81 (cit 2001).

155 F. Supp. 2d 710 (Neenah Foundry Co. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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Neenah Foundry Co. v. United States
142 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (Court of International Trade, 2001)