NEELEY v. THOMAS

Opinions

Opinion

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

AUSTIN NEELEY, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

ANDREA THOMAS, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0113

FILED 08-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2019-014318

The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Mills and Woods Law, PLLC, Phoenix By Thomas A. Connelly Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Austin Neeley

Gillespie Shields & Taylor, Phoenix By DeeAn Gillespie Strub, Jenny D. Jansch Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants VSR and ALN

Doyle Hernandez Millam, Phoenix By William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millam, Emily Morgan Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Andrea Thomas and Grossman & Grossman LTD

Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiffs Austin Neeley, Brittany Robinette (“Mother”), V.R., A.L.N., and A.R.N.1 (collectively, “the Neeley Family”) appeal the superior court’s order granting summary judgment to defendants Grossman & Grossman, LTD (“Grossman”) and Andrea Thomas. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 V.R. is the biological child of Mother and David Rolan (“Father”). Mother also has two children with Neeley: A.L.N. and A.R.N.

¶3 In 2016, V.R.’s grandmother reported bruises on V.R.’s face to police, who informed the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”). DCS took temporary custody of V.R., A.L.N., and A.R.N., who were living with Mother and Neeley at the time, and filed a dependency petition.

¶4 DCS placed A.L.N. and A.R.N. in the same foster placement. DCS initially placed V.R. with Father, but V.R. was later found dependent as to Father, and DCS placed her in the same foster placement with A.L.N. and A.R.N.

¶5 After the dependency trial, the juvenile court found V.R. dependent as to Mother and found A.L.N. and A.R.N. dependent as to Mother and Neeley. We affirmed the dependency findings on appeal. Austin N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 2 CA-JV 2017-0113, 2017 WL 4857411, at *1,

¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Oct. 26, 2017) (mem. decision).

¶6 DCS referred V.R. to the Easter Seals Blake Foundation (“Easter Seals”) for a “parent/child assessment.” Because the assessment revealed that V.R. exhibited “sexualized behaviors,” the Easter Seals referred her to Grossman, a behavioral health provider that had a contract

1 We use initials to protect the children’s privacy. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(i).

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with DCS to provide therapy to children in DCS’s care. Grossman assigned Thomas to be V.R.’s therapist.

¶7 V.R. began therapy sessions with Thomas in November 2016. The therapy sessions took place in the foster parents’ home, and they participated in the sessions. The foster parents repeatedly told Thomas it would be “heartbreaking” if V.R. returned to Mother because they wanted to adopt her. They also reported to Thomas that V.R. disclosed sexual abuse by Neeley to them. After DCS found the foster parents’ reports of sexual abuse were unsubstantiated, V.R. disclosed several incidents directly to Thomas.

¶8 Thomas wrote a letter to DCS in May 2017, recommending that V.R.’s visitation with Mother be “temporarily suspended” because V.R. displayed “maladaptive behaviors,” including physical aggression and incontinence, after visits with Mother. Based on Thomas’s recommendation, DCS sought an emergency order to suspend visitation, which the court granted.

¶9 Over the next few months, Thomas wrote several more letters to DCS, continuing to recommend that visitation remain suspended. DCS presented these recommendations to the juvenile court, which kept the suspension in effect. But over time, the court became concerned about the foster parents’ involvement in V.R.’s therapy. In September 2017, the court asked Thomas to conduct therapy sessions at Grossman’s offices instead of the foster parents’ home. By November 2017, the court also began expressing concerns about causing V.R. “additional trauma” by continuing to keep her away from her family. Despite those concerns, the court stated that “[t]he last thing [it] want[ed] to do [wa]s override therapeutic [recommendations].”

¶10 In January 2018, the juvenile court ordered DCS to provide an updated report from Grossman before the next month’s hearing but noted it was “highly likely to overrule” their recommendations then.

¶11 In May 2018, the juvenile court ordered visitation between V.R. and Mother to resume. A few months later, the court appointed a psychologist to review the case file and V.R.’s medical records. The psychologist found V.R. had made little progress in therapy and recommended that V.R. see a doctorate level provider. The court gave DCS “discretion to reassign” the case manager. V.R. had her last session at Grossman on November 12, 2018, and began seeing a different therapist at a different clinic. V.R. returned home to Mother in September 2019, and the

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court dismissed the dependency in January 2020, nearly four years after it had been filed.

¶12 The Neeley Family subsequently filed this suit against the State of Arizona, DCS, and others involved in the dependency proceedings, including Thomas and Grossman. They asserted claims of malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy against Thomas, and negligent hiring, supervision, and training against Grossman. The Neeley Family settled with all defendants except Thomas and Grossman (collectively, “the Grossman Defendants”).

¶13 The Grossman Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that they had quasi-judicial immunity. After briefing and argument, the superior court concluded the Grossman Defendants had absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they were “engaged to provide therapeutic care . . . [,] keep [DCS] and [the] [c]ourt informed of [V.R.’s] condition, needs and progress, and make recommendations to the [c]ourt.” It found their services were “incidental to the [juvenile] [c]ourt’s purpose of evaluating and treating V.R.’s mental health and safely reunifying her with her parent” and therefore “integral to the judicial process.” It thus entered summary judgment for the Grossman Defendants. Because immunity disposed of all claims against them, the court did not address the other arguments raised by the Grossman Defendants.

¶14 The Neeley Family timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶15 The Neeley Family argues the Grossman Defendants were not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because: (1) they were not appointed by the juvenile court, (2) they were tasked with providing therapy to V.R., not making recommendations to the juvenile court, and (3) they acted contrary to the court’s order that reunification was the case plan.

¶16 “We review both the grant of summary judgment and the applicability of judicial immunity de novo.” Griggs v. Oasis Adoption Servs., Inc., 241 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11 (App. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party is required to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of

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material fact that must be resolved at trial. Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 12 (App. 2008) (as amended).

I. Quasi-judicial immunity requires a direct connection to the court.

¶17 Judicial immunity is a common law doctrine that affords judicial officers absolute immunity from liability when carrying out judicial acts. Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321 (1984). Judicial immunity serves the public interest by, among other things, ensuring the independence of the judiciary, thus encouraging principled decision-making without fear of adverse personal consequences. Burk v. State, 215 Ariz. 6, 9, ¶ 7 (App. 2007). Like other jurisdictions, Arizona has extended judicial immunity, using the term “quasi-judicial immunity,” to various non-judges who perform functions integral to the judicial process. See, e.g., Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 101 (App. 1992) (psychologist); Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 322 (probation officers); Mashni v. Foster, 234 Ariz. 522, 526-27, ¶ 15 (App. 2014) (receiver); Widoff v. Wiens, 202 Ariz. 383, 386-87, ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (guardian ad litem). But “immunity deprives individuals of a remedy for wrongdoing and should be bestowed only when and at the level necessary.” Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 265 (1977).

¶18 The superior court found that the Grossman Defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because they performed a function intimately connected to the judicial process, even though they were not appointed by the court. The Neeley Family counters that this case is like Kapusta v. Bennett, which denied quasi-judicial immunity to a sex offender treatment provider because there was no “direct connection” between the provider and the court, which “neither appointed the [provider] nor requested their recommendations.” 261 Ariz. 543, 546-47, ¶¶ 9, 12 (App. 2026).

¶19 More than 30 years ago, our supreme court explained in Acevedo that:

The consistent reasoning in [quasi-judicial immunity] cases is that each non-judicial officer performed a function, pursuant to a court directive, which was related to the judicial process. This application of judicial immunity may fairly be described as derivative in that the immunity would not exist except for the direct connection with the court.

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142 Ariz. at 321. Kapusta appears to interpret this language to mean that quasi-judicial immunity required a “direct connection” between the non- judicial officer/defendant and the court. 261 Ariz. at 546, ¶ 9. But the sentence in Acevedo immediately preceding the “direct connection” reference refers to a “function . . . related to the judicial process.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 (emphasis added). We therefore read Acevedo’s use of the phrase “direct connection” as referring to the connection between the function and the court, instead of the defendant and the court.

¶20 Although we disagree with Kapusta’s reasoning to the extent it interprets Acevedo to require a non-judicial officer to have a “direct connection” with the court in order to be covered by quasi-judicial immunity, we nevertheless agree with its result because other Arizona case law supports establishing such a requirement. We agree with Kapusta that a non-judicial officer does not have quasi-judicial immunity for performing functions—even those intimately connected to the judicial process—that were never ordered or requested by the court. See Kapusta, 261 Ariz. at 546,

¶ 9.

¶21 In Lavit, we held that a court-appointed psychologist was entitled to immunity because he aided the court’s decision-making by providing psychological expertise but cautioned that this immunity did not extend to private psychologists who were “not answerable to the court.” 173 Ariz. at 101. This is consistent with the Arizona Supreme Court’s directive that the underlying policy of quasi-judicial immunity is to protect “a non[-]judicial officer who is delegated judicial duties in aid of the court.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 (emphasis added) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980), abrogated by Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), as recognized in Coleman v. Dunlap, 695 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2012)). So quasi-judicial immunity does not apply unless the court delegated those duties to the non-judicial officer. In other words, the doctrine does not extend to any person who simply performs a function intimately related, or even integral, to the judicial process; it protects only “[c]ourt officers, employees, and agents” delegated such functions by the court. Burk, 215 Ariz. at 9, ¶ 8.

¶22 Applying this standard, we agree with the Neeley Family that quasi-judicial immunity requires a sufficient nexus not only between the activities performed and the judicial function, but also between the actor and the court.

¶23 We disagree with the Neeley Family, however, that a formal appointment order is the only way to establish the requisite nexus between

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the actor and the court. Court appointment is certainly one way that a non- judicial officer can become directly connected to the court. See, e.g., Brittner v. Lanzilotta, 246 Ariz. 294, 297, ¶ 11 (App. 2019) (“Judicial immunity for a court-appointed therapist is appropriate.”); Mashni, 234 Ariz. at 528, ¶ 19 (affording quasi-judicial immunity to receiver whose “authority is derived solely from the act of the court appointing him” (quoting Sawyer v. Ellis, 37 Ariz. 443, 448 (1931)). But a non-judicial officer may also be considered directly connected to the court when enforcing court orders on the court’s behalf. See Desilva v. Baker, 208 Ariz. 597, 603, ¶¶ 22-23 (App. 2004) (a probation officer “act[s] as an arm of the court” when enforcing court- ordered probation terms by monitoring probationers and reporting violations); Garibay v. Johnson, 259 Ariz. 248, 254, ¶ 16 (2025) (“[C]onstables act as officers of the court . . . when they execute court orders . . . .”). Similarly, a non-judicial officer may be directly connected with the court when the officer follows the court’s orders or directives. See Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 (“non-judicial officer perform[ing] a function, pursuant to a court directive” generally has immunity) (emphasis added); Widoff, 202 Ariz. at 387, ¶ 14 (lack of specific appointment order not dispositive when court allowed defendant to perform court-delegated guardian ad litem duties); Adams v. State, 185 Ariz. 440, 444-45 (denying immunity to Department of Economic Security caseworkers who were not acting “pursuant to any specific court order”).

¶24 Arizona case law has thus established three categories of non- judicial officers with a sufficient nexus to the court for quasi-judicial immunity to apply: (1) court-appointed officers, see Brittner, 246 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 11, (2) officers enforcing or executing court orders, see Garibay, 259 Ariz. at 254, ¶ 16, and (3) officers acting pursuant to court orders or directives, see Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321.

¶25 The parties do not dispute that the juvenile court never expressly appointed the Grossman Defendants to provide recommendations about V.R.’s visitation with Mother. Nor were the Grossman Defendants enforcing or executing a court order. We therefore examine whether the Grossman Defendants were acting pursuant to a court order or directive.

¶26 When the Grossman Defendants began treating V.R., they did so pursuant to Easter Seals’s referral and its contract with DCS—not because the court directed them to. The Grossman Defendants’ letters recommending the court suspend V.R.’s visitation with Mother were also unsolicited. The Grossman Defendants are not court officers or employees, nor could they be considered “agents” of the court when they wrote and

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sent those letters. See Burk, 215 Ariz. at 9, ¶ 8 (quasi-judicial immunity extends to “[c]ourt officers, employees, and agents”); Agent, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining agent as including “[s]omeone who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative”). Even though providing recommendations to assist the court’s decision-making is typically considered a function integral to the judicial process, see, e.g., Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 101, the Grossman Defendants lacked the requisite connection with the court when they performed it, see Kapusta, 261 Ariz. at 547, ¶ 12 (denying immunity because the superior court “neither appointed the defendants nor requested their recommendations”); Griggs, 241 Ariz. at 75,

¶ 21 (adoption services agency was not immune for statements in its “ex parte letter” to the court because “[it] was not acting pursuant to delegated judicial authority” in submitting the letter).

¶27 The only indication in the record of a potential court directive to the Grossman Defendants is the court’s January 2018 order that “[DCS] shall provide an updated [r]eport from Grossman.”2 But the record is unclear whether this order (1) directed the Grossman Defendants to prepare an updated report or (2) merely directed DCS to share with the court a report that the Grossman Defendants were already required to prepare under their obligation to DCS. This is an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on the Grossman Defendants’ immunity claim.

¶28 We therefore hold that any conduct by the Grossman Defendants before January 2018 is not covered by quasi-judicial immunity. But if the trier of fact determines that the January 2018 order was a court directive to the Grossman Defendants, they may be considered “agents” of the court performing “delegated judicial duties” when carrying out that directive. Burk, 215 Ariz. at 9, ¶ 8; Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321.

II. Quasi-judicial immunity only covers functions integral to the judicial process.

2 A non-judicial officer should not be deprived of immunity for furnishing

information that the court requested from it merely because the court receives the requested information from an agency instead of from the organization directly. So it makes no difference whether the court directs the Grossman Defendants to provide its report directly to the court or to the court through DCS.

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¶29 The Neeley Family alternatively argues that even if Thomas and Grossman were appointed, they were appointed only to provide therapy to V.R., which is not a function covered by quasi-judicial immunity.

¶30 As previously discussed, a direct connection between the non-judicial officer and the court, while necessary, is not sufficient on its own to confer immunity. There must also be a direct connection between the performed function and the court’s function. See Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321 (“[W]hether a particular officer is protected by judicial immunity depends upon the nature of the activities performed and the relationship of those activities to the judicial function.”). Even judges themselves do not enjoy judicial immunity when performing non-judicial functions. Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 101 (citing Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230 (judge not immune for dismissing court employee) and Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) (immunity does not “protect [a judge] in non-judicial activities”)). A non-judicial officer must perform a function that is “integral to the judicial process” to be cloaked in quasi-judicial immunity. Brittner, 246 Ariz. at 296,

¶ 6 (citation omitted). Quasi-judicial immunity is thus “limited to those situations where the underlying policy of judicial immunity is served: principled and fearless decision-making by that officer.” Acevedo, 142 Ariz. at 321.

¶31 Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently held that psychologists who perform court-ordered evaluations or provide professional recommendations to assist the court in its decision-making with their expertise perform functions “integral to the judicial process.” See Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 99 (citing cases); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 498 (Utah 1998) (courts “have uniformly held that psychologists appointed . . . to conduct psychological evaluations . . . perform a function integral to the judicial process”). But courts have differed as to whether providing therapeutic treatment is as well. Tolu v. Reid, 639 S.W.3d 504, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021); compare Awai v. Kotin, 872 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Colo. App. 1993) (court-appointed therapist entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for evaluation, but not for treatment) with Doe v. Hennepin Cnty., 623 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D. Minn. 1985) (court-appointed treating therapist immune for acts within scope of appointment).

¶32 In Arizona, we follow a more nuanced approach. Providing therapeutic treatment is a non-judicial function not typically protected by immunity. See Kapusta, 261 Ariz. at 547, ¶ 11; Paul E. v. Courtney F., 244 Ariz. 46, 57, ¶ 32 (App. 2018) (cautioning against “conflating the roles of a therapist and a judicial advisor”), vacated in part on other grounds, 246 Ariz. 388 (2019). But a therapist appointed both “to provide therapeutic services

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and to give recommendations” may be immune for both: If providing therapy is necessary for the therapist to gather information to report to the court, the therapist’s clinical functions are incidental to his or her reporting functions, making both “integral to the judicial process.” Brittner, 246 Ariz. at 296, ¶ 7.

¶33 Although the Neeley Family is correct that the Grossman Defendants were initially engaged solely to provide therapy to V.R.—a function typically not covered by quasi-judicial immunity—how the Grossman Defendants first became involved in the case is irrelevant because they had no direct connection to the court at that time. In other words, what DCS tasked Grossman with doing is irrelevant; the only question here is whether the court’s January 2018 order constituted a directive to the Grossman Defendants to provide information to the court to assist it. If so, then under Brittner, the Grossman Defendants would be immune both for preparing the report as ordered and for continuing to provide therapy to V.R. to the extent necessary to gather the information needed to form recommendations to report to the court.

III. Other arguments.

¶34 The Neeley Family also argues the Grossman Defendants are not entitled to immunity because they acted contrary to the court’s order for reunification by recommending the court suspend V.R.’s visitation with Mother and “advocat[ing] for the foster [parents].” We disagree.

¶35 The purpose of quasi-judicial immunity is to protect independent and impartial exercise of judgment. See Lavit, 173 Ariz. at 99 (immunity prevents the threat of liability from undermining objectivity and independence). If the court had in fact requested the Grossman Defendants’ recommendations, denying the Grossman Defendants immunity solely because their recommendations did not align with the court’s approach would undermine this purpose. The availability of immunity to a therapist cannot turn on whether the court accepts or rejects the therapist’s recommendations. Burk, 215 Ariz. at 12, ¶ 17 (custody evaluator entitled to immunity even though court rejected her recommendations). Such an approach would encourage professionals appointed or directed to provide objective opinions to simply agree with whatever the court is already doing, thus inhibiting independent judgment—the very thing judicial immunity is designed to protect. Cf. id. at ¶ 18. Accordingly, if the trier of fact determines the juvenile court’s January 2018 order directed the Grossman Defendants to prepare a report,

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the Grossman Defendants are entitled to immunity for the report regardless of whether it supports the reunification case plan.

¶36 Thomas and Grossman also cursorily claim they have qualified immunity under Section 8-805(A). They further argue the Neeley Family failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Although we may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any grounds, Watson v. Apache Cnty., 218 Ariz. 512, 517, ¶ 23 (App. 2008), we decline to reach these other arguments. The superior court did not address these arguments, and “the facts of this case have not been sufficiently developed in the context of the proper legal analysis to allow us to affirm the judgment on th[ese] bas[e]s.” Id.

¶37 The Neeley Family has conceded, however, that Austin Neeley has no malpractice claim against the Grossman Defendants because he was not V.R.’s father or legal guardian during the relevant period. We therefore affirm summary judgment on the malpractice claim to the extent it is asserted by Austin Neeley.

CONCLUSION

¶38 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR

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